THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, MINORITY FAITHS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS INDEPENDENCE AFTER RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM by Scott, David Charles
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy Philosophy 
2018 
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, MINORITY FAITHS, AND THE 
POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS INDEPENDENCE AFTER RAWLSIAN 
LIBERALISM 
David Charles Scott 
University of Kentucky, david.c.scott2010@gmail.com 
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2018.365 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Scott, David Charles, "THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, MINORITY FAITHS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
RELIGIOUS INDEPENDENCE AFTER RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM" (2018). Theses and Dissertations--
Philosophy. 21. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/21 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
David Charles Scott, Student 
Dr. David Bradshaw, Major Professor 
Dr. Clare Batty, Director of Graduate Studies 
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, MINORITY FAITHS, 
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS INDEPENDENCE 
AFTER RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION  
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
College of Arts and Sciences  
at the University of Kentucky 
 
 
 
By  
David C. Scott 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
Director: Dr. David Bradshaw, Professor of Philosophy 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
2018 
 
Copyright © David C. Scott 2018 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION  
 
 
 
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, MINORITY FAITHS, 
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS INDEPENDENCE 
AFTER RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM 
 
 
The conversation to which my dissertation belongs is that which preoccupied John 
Rawls in Political Liberalism, namely: (1) how it is possible that a religiously and morally 
pluralistic culture like ours lives cooperatively from one generation to the next, and (2) The 
extent to which religious or moral convictions are appropriate bases for political action. My 
three-essay dissertation is about aspects of this investigation that affect minority or non-
mainstream religious and cultural groups, since legal institutions, and theoretical models of 
them (such as Rawls’s and Ronald Dworkin’s) are in many ways ill-suited to accommodate their 
ways of life. In the first essay, I consider Rawlsian obstacles to developing a religiously impartial 
conception of “substantial burdens” on religious free exercise within First Amendment 
jurisprudence. I apply this question to federal cases in which Native American tribes sought to 
prevent government uses of land that would be, they claimed, catastrophic to their cultural 
survival and all citizens’ safety. I propose a jurisprudential model that places a heavier burden 
on judges to listen and perhaps translate such views, counting non-mainstream forms of 
reasoning as legally cognizable and sufficient to create a prima facie constitutional case, where 
current models would not.  In the second essay, because few conceptions of justice require that 
law be cognizable and justifiable to everyone, I review liberal conceptions of what makes a 
cultural group or person “irrational” or “unreasonable.” With a focus on public education, and 
cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins in mind, I argue that approaches to 
“unreasonableness” from the likes of Rawls, Charles Larmore, Jonathan Quong, and Stephen 
Macedo are well-intentioned but unduly restrictive, insofar as they tend to, by definitional fiat, 
exclude citizens who embody widely recognized civic virtues, or who at least pose no threat to a 
stable democracy. In doing so, I argue that they instantiate the sort of social circumstance that 
Herbert Marcuse calls one-dimensionality.  In the third essay, I consider whether a meaningful 
and practical model for “group rights,” which would include the right of peoples to preserve 
their cultures, can be developed within American jurisprudence. This argument is largely 
inspired by a paper from political scientist Vernon van Dyke, and considers overcoming 
challenges to this notion wrought by contemporary forms of liberalism and vehement public 
disagreement over recent, pertinent Supreme Court decisions involving associational rights, like 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Citizens United v. FEC. 
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I. Adjudicating Sacred Lands From Somewhere:  
The Original Position and Substantial Burdens to Free Exercise 
 
 
In upholding the conviction of a Mormon man for violating a federal law prohibiting 
polygamy, Chief Justice Morrison Waite famously remarked in Reynolds v. United States that to 
rule otherwise would open the door for free exercise arguments in favor of human sacrifice and 
that "to permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the 
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."1 Since the 
Supreme Court’s first major Free Exercise decision more than a century and a half ago, such 
slippery slopes are common, even formative, ingredients of Religion Clause jurisprudence, such 
as in the widely-maligned Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 and, in the cases that are 
central to my discussion to follow, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 
485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009). Similar conflicts have 
arisen in the past year, such as in the Dakota Access Pipeline protests near the Standing Rock 
Indian Reservation and President Trump’s decision to dial back land protection for two Utah 
national monuments that various Native American tribes consider sacred. The common judicial 
response to such challenges from minority faith communities has shown little signs of abating 
resulting controversies, making the conversation regarding how differently committed moral 
and religious communities can respectfully share living space with one another, while pursuing 
their deepest normative commitments, increasingly urgent. 
Claimants in such cases are generally members of faiths for whom regimes of property 
and other rights, epistemological practices, ethical principles, or numerous other grammars and 
vocabularies are foreign to mainstream democratic society and its institutions. The grammars 
                                                          
1 98 U.S. 145 
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and vocabularies of those institutions are in many, similar respects foreign to some of the 
claimants. In Smith, the court was unable to consider, against the claimants’ protestations, the 
import of ingesting peyote (as a ritual tribal practice) in deciding whether to mandate a religious 
exemption to generally applicable criminal laws criminalizing hallucinogens. In Lyng, the 
perceived sanctity and godhood of the forest could not allow a minority faith community to co-
opt the federal government’s use of “what was after all, its land.”2 The tribal claimants in 
recently-filed lawsuits regarding the Utah monuments will likely have difficulty translating 
certain of their concerns over land protection into judicially cognizable terms. These religious 
practitioners are inclined to offer reasons supporting their positions that judges or the public 
could not be reasonably expected to understand or, even if they did, reasons that they could not 
or would not accept. These are what John Rawls calls “nonpublic reasons,” whereas the 
appropriate lawmaking language of the court and the citizenry exclusively involves, so say Rawls 
and numerous others, “public reasons.” My central concern in this essay will be the tension that 
exists in legal, democratic theory between specifying the contours of this lawmaking language 
and the special interests of religious and cultural minorities like the Lyng claimants, viz. those 
who lay special claim to sacred lands.  
One of the central questions that occupied Rawls, covered most comprehensively in 
Political Liberalism, was how it is “possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society 
of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical 
and moral doctrines.”3 What Rawls assumes out of the gate is that (a) the survival of our social 
and political system is of paramount or nearly paramount importance to us (at least insofar as 
we are political beings); and (b) the terms of social cooperation by which this stability is secured 
                                                          
2 Lyng, 453. 
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 4. 
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must be determined through a lens that views all reasonable citizens as free and equal. The 
greater the degree of pluralism in a politically liberal society, the more intractable 
simultaneously maintaining this stability and equality is. The terms of social cooperation must 
be sufficiently inclusive and non-hostile towards a religious or cultural minority group to 
meaningfully count its members as free and equal, but not so accommodating that the concerns 
of this group carry weight at the great expense of the government, public or other groups, at 
least not to the extent that essential government functions or others’ legal or moral rights 
would be inhibited. 
What the above difficulty demands are fair terms of social cooperation among all 
reasonable persons and worldviews, terms which in turn require a dialogical home: a language 
of political deliberation that is neutral among citizens regardless of their beliefs and social 
circumstances. “Public reason” is Rawls’s name for the language of political action and 
deliberation that is to fulfill just this role, at least as to constitutional essentials and matters of 
basic justice. An influential line of public reason liberals like Rawls, Stephen Macedo, Robert 
Audi4 and Charles Larmore5 all argue, more or less, that citizens and (even more so) public 
officials should refrain from basing political action, advocacy or deliberation on the truth of any 
specific comprehensive doctrine, be it religious or secular. Christopher Eberle refers to this view 
that public reason (or “justificatory”) liberals have in common as the “doctrine of restraint.”6 
According to this doctrine, any instance of political action or advocacy should depend only on 
                                                          
4 For an exemplar of both Audi’s thought and dialogue with someone who occupies a contrary position on 
the place of religious reasons in politics, Nicholas Wolterstorff, see: Robert Audi and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). 
5 See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); 
Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96, no. 12 (Dec. 
1999): 599-625. 
6 Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 68-71. Much of 
Eberle’s book is devoted to refuting the doctrine of restraint that he identifies as common to various 
iterations of justificatory liberalism, including that in Political Liberalism. 
4 
 
the citizenry’s shared conception of justice, or on some other impartial or shared set of facts or 
principles, and not on the whole truth or other virtue of any particular worldview.  
The stories about why nonpublic reasons – justifications that depend on the whole truth 
of a comprehensive doctrine – are inappropriate in political action come in two significant 
strands. First, some justificatory liberals argue that political advocacy or government actions 
justified by nonpublic reasons are irreconcilable with sincere respect that one owes one’s fellow 
citizen. The insistence on public action based on one’s privately-held convictions, that (perhaps 
many) other citizens might not themselves accept, as Gerald Gaus puts it, is “browbeating.”7 
Rawls agrees with this charge, even if his account is not predicated on a thick, moralized notion 
of respect: “Since many doctrines are seen to be reasonable, those who insist, when 
fundamental political questions are at stake, on what they take as true but others do not, seem 
to others simply to insist on their own beliefs when they have the political power to do so.”8 
Civic respect includes the recognition of our compatriots’ categorically valuable and 
independent noetic endowments, and the consequent desire to advocate for laws we favor by 
having them come around to our way of seeing things.9 Having our compatriots governed by 
laws that bear no relation to their intellectual endorsement, by contrast, does not so value 
them.  
                                                          
7 For one among several instances in which Gaus employs this term, see Justificatory Liberalism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 123. 
8 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 61. 
9 Or consider Larmore’s formulation of this disrespect in familiar Kantian terms. If we cannot present 
reasons that are intelligible to our compatriot in terms of rational discourse, then we appear to her to give 
her no more reason to comply with our advocated laws than the threat of force. Larmore further explains 
the disrespect that follows in this event: “Forcing people to comply with principles of conduct is to treat 
them as means: their compliance is seen as conducive to public order or perhaps to their own 
reformation. In itself the use or threat of force cannot be wrong, for otherwise political association would 
be impossible. What is prohibited by the norm of respect is resting compliance only on force. For the 
distinctive feature of persons is that they are beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis of 
reasons. If we try to bring about conformity to some political principle simply by threat, we will be 
treating people solely as means, as objects of coercion. We will not be treating them as ends, engaging 
directly their distinctive capacity as persons.” (Qtd. in Eberle, Religious Conviction, 120-1). 
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Rawls argues that basing political action on contestable doctrines can, at best, 
instantiate a fragile and temporary social stability, where our social and political goals should 
instead involve a social consensus that exists in perpetuity. Thus, while his argument is focused 
less on what respect requires for the sake of a foundational account of human dignity, and more 
on what sort of respect social stability requires (a narrative in support of political, not 
comprehensive, liberalism),10 the admonition against browbeating is much the same in effect. In 
short, there is plenty from Rawls, and not just the lay citizens’ most cherished political values, to 
recommend the judicial line of thinking in the majority opinions of Reynolds, Smith and Lyng, 
even to those who might initially object to these decisions. We ought to remain vigilant against 
losing all the undeniable benefits that stable society affords us, argue Rawlsians and Supreme 
Court justices alike, and the publicly communicated preference for parochial reasons over 
political values and the political system itself will erode this stability.  
Many of Political Liberalism’s critics are concerned that the exclusion of nonpublic 
reasons from the public sphere presents the same dangers that Rawlsians believe they avoid: 
instability and disrespect. Michael Sandel,11 Jeffrey Stout,12 and others believe that the 
relegation of such reasons to the “background culture”13 will motivate mass retreat from public 
                                                          
10 The distinction between “political” and “comprehensive” is that the former involves some deep theory 
of value or truth that Rawls wishes to avoid, partly in response to some criticisms of Theory of Justice, 
which argued that Rawls’s notion of justice relied on such a deep theory without fessing up to one. What 
a political liberalism is after is a conception of justice that reflects settled convictions that are the product 
of an overlapping social consensus.  For a relatively concise and complete summary of this distinction, see 
especially Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8-11. For an excellent summary of the criticisms of Theory that 
motivated Rawls’s later emphasis on a merely political liberalism, see Robert Talisse, On Rawls (Belmont, 
CA: Cengage Learning, 2001). 
11 See, for example, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2d ed.) (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
12 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
13 In Rawlsian parlance, the “background” refers to those social and cultural spheres other than the 
political. Comprehensive doctrines, and consequently religious reasons, may be freely invoked here. 
Examples of “background” conversations are those that take place in “the culture of daily life, of its many 
associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs and teams, to mention a 
few” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, 114). 
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dialogue into dialogically closed-off enclaves. Such alienation from public discourse and action 
among cultural and faith communities will breed distrust in the government and other 
communities, which is an obvious threat to political stability. Eberle and Robert Talisse,14 in 
addition to their recognition of the above risk, suggest that refusing to hear certain reasons in 
public discourse or political action might be undemocratic or disrespectful in its own way. 
Paralleling Hegel’s critique of Kantian public reason,15 certain others find political liberalism 
undemocratic because of its static nature, insofar as it is unable to truly accommodate novel or 
radically different practices over time. Some more damning critics claim that the very notion of 
public liberalism is a sham, not a system of fair and neutral rules, but surreptitious browbeating 
from a specific set of ethical and metaphysical values that have an easier time, as Nicholas 
Wolterstorff observes, disguising themselves in public verbiage than do religious ones.16  
Rawls did not deny that his critics had legitimate concerns. Rawls insistently asks them: 
“What’s the alternative [to political liberalism]? How [else] are you going to get along in a 
constitutional regime with all these other comprehensive doctrines?”17 Rawls’s apparently 
simple question echoes Jacques Derrida’s important insight that actual political and legal 
systems are (regrettably) necessarily exclusionary at times, and are therefore always and 
everywhere “not-yet” democracies.18 That some citizens or subsets of the citizenry will bear a 
greater dialogical burden than some others by virtue of their (reasonable) comprehensive 
doctrines, while unfortunate and short of the democratic ideal, is an outcome to be minimized 
even if it is inevitable that it persists. Rawls laments, but accepts as inevitable, the fact that not 
                                                          
14 Robert Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
15 For a summary of this critique, see Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press 2004), 77-85. 
16 Audi and Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 1997), 105-6. 
17 John Rawls, “Commonweal Interview with John Rawls,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel 
Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 620. 
18 Jacques Derrida, Rogues (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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all comprehensive doctrines will fare equally well in political liberalism. Some might demand, for 
instance, a greater share of public resources, more burdensome accommodations or more 
difficult-to-publicly-translate interests than others. In this vein, a compassionate Rawlsian judge 
might well find results like Lyng’s unfortunate, particularly in view of the historical oppression 
and ongoing marginalization of Native American tribes, but necessary in view of our essential 
civic commitments to equality and freedom. What judicial doctrine presents a politically and 
ethically acceptable alternative, since there must be some system of rules by which all 
reasonable citizens willingly play if they wish to be social participants? How can minority 
interests like the Lyng claimants’ interests be accorded substantial weight without thereby 
marginalizing the interests of another group or the public? 
 The purpose of this essay will not be to ultimately settle any score between the 
aforementioned public reason liberals and critics regarding whether cases like Lyng expose the 
public reason concept as faulty or vindicate it. My immediate aim is to consider some central 
features of veiled rulemaking (i.e., in the original position) as an internal critique of those 
justificatory liberals who support the currently predominant judicial approach to determining 
just what constitutes an impermissible burden on the free exercise of religion. I will employ this 
device to demonstrate that (a) no representative in the original position could approve a set of 
rules like those this judicial line of thinking embraces, and (b) this device ostensibly leave room 
for a cognizable, prima facie argument in favor of the Lyng claimants even if a more detailed, 
complete picture of Rawls’s doctrine of public reason within political liberalism would not. That 
it might leave such room does not, of course, render the Rawlsian’s hands bloodless – far from 
it. In a later essay, I will demonstrate that public reason doctrines like Rawls’s, if they are not 
careful, risk imposing a condition much like what Herbert Marcuse calls one-dimensionality.19 
                                                          
19 Herbert Marcuse, 2nd ed., One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991). 
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Here, however, I am content to demonstrate how the original position (like other impartial 
rulemaking doctrines within political philosophy) reveals an asymmetry in First Amendment 
jurisprudence between those threats to one’s faith or safety that are cognizable and those that 
are not. 
If Rawlsian public reason is a helpful guideline in fashioning legal rules in a modern 
democracy, greater emphasis on the background conditions of the various parties engaged in 
reason-giving is needed to remind us that we are always adjudicating cases of paramount 
concern to the affected parties from somewhere. In this vein, Rawlsian public reason can be 
construed in such a way to adequately incorporate Thomas Nagel’s urging of epistemic 
humility20 that inspired this essay’s title. One might well conclude something like the following: 
“We need some fair system of rules to peaceably coexist, and these rules are made fair as 
possible.  If a religion can’t survive in such an environment or fades away with time, then so 
much the worse for such religions.” Indeed, Rawls arrives at similar conclusions, claiming that 
political liberalism will have the effect of exposing and rooting out unreasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, or even that some religions (reasonable or not) simply might fare better than others 
in specific instantiations of political liberalism.  The question that this invites, however, is how 
cavalierly we can extend this pronouncement to justify certain discursive practices while still 
living up to the democratic standards on which our legal system is purportedly based, including 
the rights it purports to guarantee. After all, those most easily painted unreasonable are 
minority faiths and cultural groups, which is just the sort of result Rawls wished to avoid. 
Whether the tribes in the following cases are unreasonable is an important investigation for 
another day. 
 
                                                          
20 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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A. Incidental Harms to Sacred Lands and Substantial Burdens on Free Exercise 
 Before offering a prima facie public reason argument in favor of the Native American 
plaintiffs in the two sacred land cases that concern me, I will describe the currently predominant 
judicial approach to incidental harms to sacred lands, summarizing both courts’ rationales in 
Lyng and Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009), as well as precisely what was at stake for 
the religious claimants. Next, I will describe the criteria of justice as fairness arising from the 
original position, which will be used to evaluate these decisions’ democratic (de)merits. The 
most important feature of both decisions for my purposes is that the relative importance of the 
belief or practice at issue (to the tribe members) did not factor into the court’s reasoning. I will 
assume that federal courts following Lyng each regard themselves as good political liberals by: 
(a) being neutral among comprehensive doctrines; (b) employing only public reason in issuing 
their decisions; and (c) basing their decisions on a conception of justice that is publicly shared 
and freestanding.21  
 The Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment expressly forbids Congress from 
making any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. This would obviously invalidate any laws 
that prohibit a certain religious status or a certain pronouncement of belief. “Prohibition” 
historically been construed to constitutionally invalidate laws that punished the practices of 
certain religions, but only where such laws were designed to target those specific religions. 
There also appears to be a significant consensus that government actions which either penalize 
a religious adherent for her religious beliefs or coerce an adherent to violate her beliefs 
constitute impermissible burdens or prohibitions on free exercise. Beyond these strictures, 
there is both division and confusion over what types of additional burdens on religious 
                                                          
21 This assumes, of course, that similarly situated claimants to those in Lyng have representatives in the 
original position in the first place, which in turn requires the assumption that these claimants and their 
comprehensive doctrines are “reasonable.”   
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expression, under parallel statutory and constitutional tests, are legally impermissible, if any. In 
some cases, such as those involving imprisoned convicts who need certain accommodations for 
their religious observances, the Clause has been construed to require affirmative acts of 
accommodation on the government’s part, though even these often are decided on statutory 
grounds (like the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000cc, et seq.). On the other hand, various incidental effects on religious conduct resulting 
from generally applicable laws have passed constitutional muster, most famously in Smith. 
Some of this confusion is attributable to the coexistence of the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, the latter of which was a legislative 
attempt to restore, in the wake of Employment Division v. Smith, what were purportedly the 
greater religious protections afforded by Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).22 In Smith, the Court held that generally applicable laws that have 
an incidental, harmful effect on religious conduct are permissible without any required showing 
of a compelling need from the government to justify such an incidental effect. What is also 
important here is that the Smith Court drew a stark line between religious speech or conviction 
on the one hand and conduct on the other, claiming that only the former enjoys nearly absolute 
protection and the latter much more limited protection. Academics, legislators, religious 
advocacy groups and myriad others who protested the decision instead demanded what they 
saw as the appropriate test from Sherbert and Yoder, whereby any incidental burden on 
religious free exercise must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Recognizing that 
generally applicable and religiously neutral laws can interfere with religion just as much as (or 
                                                          
22 The constitutionality of RFRA is a matter of significant controversy, but has only been invalidated, in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), where the federal government has attempted to impose its more 
restrictive rulemaking standard on state governments. Nearly half the states have since adopted RFRA 
statutes (mirroring the federal law that had been invalidated as applied to them) of their own since it was 
passed. 
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sometimes, more than) those that target religion or a religion, RFRA’s general pronouncement is 
that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability.” Thus, post-RFRA, once a plaintiff-religious 
practitioner demonstrates that a government action “substantially burdens” her exercise of 
religion, the onus is on the government to prove that the action is (a) necessary to further a 
compelling government interest, and (b) the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.23   
I am focusing on a seminal pre-RFRA case (Lyng) and a relatively recent post-RFRA case 
(Navajo Nation) because they are consistent in their factual background and reasoning even 
though they purportedly arise under distinct sources of law. RFRA appears to have made little 
difference in courts’ treatment of sacred land controversies: commentators have observed a 
tendency to simply construe the category “substantial burden” narrowly in cases involving 
Native American plaintiffs, such that the evidentiary burden to demonstrate necessity to further 
a compelling government interest never shifts to the government. I will therefore, for 
simplicity’s sake, use “incidental harms” or “substantial burdens” interchangeably, and treat 
both decisions as Free Exercise cases.  
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 
 At issue in Lyng was a government road construction project and a timber collecting 
endeavor, each of which would require the destruction (or disturbance) of a part of the Chimney 
Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. Parts of the Chimney Rock area were considered 
sacred by the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa tribes. “Specific sites [were] used for certain rituals,” 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion stated, “and successful use of the area is dependent upon 
                                                          
23 This verbiage is familiar elsewhere in constitutional jurisprudence, and is a demanding standard on 
government action known as “strict scrutiny.” For just two among myriad well-known examples 
elaborating on or applying this standard, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Fisher v. University of 
Texas, 579 U.S. ____ (2016).  
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and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment the most important of which are 
privacy, silence and an undisturbed natural setting.”24 The Forest Service decided to disregard a 
report it had commissioned that recommended the road not be built, though in doing so it did 
take care to avoid significant religious and cultural sites, and even provided a “safe zone” within 
a half mile of each of them. As Brennan’s dissent emphasized, the significance of the site to the 
tribes could not be overstated:  
While traditional Western religions view creation as the work of a deity "who institutes 
natural laws which then govern the operation of physical nature," tribal religions regard 
creation as an ongoing process in which they are morally and religiously obligated to 
participate. Native Americans fulfill this duty through ceremonies and rituals designed 
to preserve and stabilize the earth and to protect humankind from disease and other 
catastrophes. Failure to conduct these ceremonies in the manner and place specified, 
adherents believe, will result in great harm to the earth and to the people whose 
welfare depends upon it.25 
 
The majority opinion and dissent similarly described the extent to which the road would 
traverse ritualistic or sacred areas, but it will suffice for my purposes that the majority found it 
to be “undisputed [arguendo] that the Indian respondents’ beliefs are sincere and that the 
Government’s proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of their 
religion.”26 The majority recognized that the tribes have used the area for a very long time, that 
the rituals at issue are often aimed at results no less important than the welfare of the whole 
tribe and all of mankind, and that (according to the tribe’s beliefs) “the rituals would not be 
efficacious if conducted at other sites than the ones traditionally used, and too much 
disturbance of the area’s natural state would clearly render any meaningful continuation of 
traditional practices impossible.”27 Additionally, the majority did not contend that either the 
                                                          
24 485 U.S. 439, 442  
25 Id. at 460 
26 Id. at 447 
27 Id. at 451 
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road or the timber operations were particularly weighty government interests, satisfied that 
they were simply legitimate government activities on governmental property. 
In ruling against the tribes, the Court found that the tribe members’ Free Exercise rights 
were not violated because the government, in constructing the G-O road and collecting timber, 
neither (a) coerced the tribe members to violate their religious beliefs, nor (b) penalized them 
for continuing their religious practices.28 What was happening, as the majority did not deny, is 
that the proposed land uses would destroy a necessary condition for the tribes’ religious 
practices, at least from the tribes’ perspectives. The tribes had nonetheless failed to 
demonstrate the requisite sort of burden (i.e., being penalized or coerced) for the court to find a 
free exercise violation. The following excerpt from the opinion’s syllabus best summarizes the 
majority opinion’s holding and rationale:  
Incidental effects of government programs, which may interfere with the practice of 
certain religions, but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary 
to their religious beliefs, do not require the government to bring forward a compelling 
justification for its otherwise lawful actions. The Free Exercise Clause is written in terms 
of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual 
can exact from the government. Even assuming that the Government’s actions here will 
virtually destroy the Indians’ ability to practice their religion, the Constitution simply 
does not provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents’ legal claims.29 
 
While it seems that the government took some degree of care to honor the Native American 
cultural and religious practices at issue, I call attention to the Court’s willingness to assume that 
the road would virtually destroy the Indians’ ability to practice their religion, which is the crux of 
what I will criticize. 
In allowing this assumption, the Court was vehemently disagreeing with Justice William 
Brennan, rejecting his proposal that the Court employ a balancing test that considered the 
                                                          
28 Id. at 449-50 
29 Id. at 440 
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relative centrality of the religious practice at issue in a Free Exercise case. Justice O’Connor 
stated that in doing so, the Court would risk excessively entangling itself in religious affairs 
(which the Establishment Clause, according to many jurists, forbids) and, what is worse, finding 
itself confronted with situations where the Court claimed to know better than the religious 
adherents themselves what practices or beliefs were “central” to their faith. Moreover, the 
Court found the government’s property interest determinative: “Whatever rights the Indians 
may have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right 
to use what is, after all, its land.”30 It is also worth noting that the majority opinion drew 
significantly from Bowen v. Roy, which ostensibly stood for the principle that one’s religious 
freedom provides one no stake in directing, objecting to, or interfering with internal 
governmental functions. What was at issue in Bowen was the government’s own business of 
assigning citizens social security numbers, and what was at issue here was the government’s 
own business of managing its land. As an exemplar of the influence of the Lyng Court’s 
reasoning on the following decades of jurisprudence, I now turn to Navajo Nation, a Ninth 
Circuit decision with substantial (and in my view, troubling and undemocratic) implications for 
the judicial trend going forward. 
Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service31 
 Navajo Nation involved a government-owned ski area called the Snowbowl, located on 
the San Francisco Peaks near Flagstaff, Arizona. Importantly, to the Court at least, the Snowbowl 
covers less than 1% of the San Francisco Peaks. Because the snowfall at this ski area was highly 
variable, its operators claimed that the use of recycled wastewater to make artificial snow was 
required to keep this public recreation facility profitable and viable. Several Native American 
                                                          
30 Id. at 451-3 (internal citation omitted) 
31 535 F.3d 1058 
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tribes, including the Navajo Nation, had historically performed religious rituals at sites 
throughout the San Francisco Peaks. The tribe members believed that the use of recycled 
wastewater at the Snowbowl desecrated the entire mountain, rendered the religious rituals 
performed there inefficacious, and had consequently been responsible for global disasters such 
as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, numerous natural disasters and the Columbine massacre. Like the 
tribes in Lyng, the plaintiffs in Navajo Nation regarded themselves as stewards of their people 
and of humanity generally, a role that was threatened if not destroyed by the desecration of the 
ritual sites. I do not believe there is any risk of melodrama in claiming that, for them, nothing 
short of the death of themselves (or others) and, at least potentially, the world, was at stake. 
 Beyond the Navajo Nation court’s reliance on Lyng, there are two significant (and, I 
argue, troublesome) features of the decision that are well worth mentioning for the purpose of 
my subsequent critique. First, because the use of recycled wastewater would leave the ritual 
sites and the surrounding mountainside physically intact, what apparently weighed heavily on 
the judges’ minds is how little was at stake for the tribes: 
The district court also found, however, that there are no plants, springs, natural 
resources, shrines with religious significance, or religious ceremonies that would be 
physically affected by the use of such artificial snow. No plants would be destroyed or 
stunted; no springs polluted; no places of worship made inaccessible, or liturgy 
modified. The Plaintiffs continue to have virtually unlimited access to the mountain, 
including the ski area, for religious and cultural purposes. On the mountain, they 
continue to pray, conduct their religious ceremonies, and collect plants for religious 
use.32 
 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the “sole effect of the artificial snow is on the Plaintiffs’ 
subjective spiritual experience.”33 The implication of the court’s categorizing the effect as such 
was that physical destruction or physical threats would’ve at least given rise to a colorable claim, 
whereas categorically different harms – so-called subjective, spiritual ones – do not.  
                                                          
32 Id. at 1063 
33 Id. 
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 Second, the court employed a similar slippery slope argument as Smith and Reynolds 
(and, of course, Lyng), finding that if they were to rule otherwise, the following would be the 
result:  
Were it otherwise, any action the federal government were to take, including action on 
its own land, would be subject to the personalized oversight of millions of citizens. Each 
citizen would hold an individual veto to prohibit the government action solely because it 
offends his religious beliefs, sensibilities, or tastes, or fails to satisfy his religious desires. 
Further, giving one religious sect a veto over the use of public park land would deprive 
others of the right to use what is, by definition, land that belongs to everyone.34 
 
In such a setting, the court continued, no government, let alone a religiously pluralistic one like 
the United States, could function. As such, respecting religious beliefs absolutely must be 
distinguished from “requiring the government to avoid any perceived slight to them,”35 and it is 
only the former that the Free Exercise clause protects. While the first feature of this case that I 
highlighted is troubling, the majority’s comment regarding a “veto” over other public uses is a 
well-taken objection from a Rawlsian standpoint. My critique and proposed jurisprudential 
alternative, admittedly, struggles with an objection like this, i.e., how to distinguish a veto from 
a reasonable land management request. I will address objections of this form after explicating 
the features of the original position that reveal the undemocratic strand in these decisions. 
B. Comprehensive Doctrines and the Attitudinal Status of the Representatives 
With the central elements from each decision that will concern me in focus, I now turn 
to the ostensible difficulty with making a case for or against the plaintiffs in view of the 
strictures of public reason. What is central to the internal critique I intend to offer is the fact 
                                                          
34 Id. Such worries, a defender of Lyng might argue, are vindicated by the sorts of claims over sacred land 
that other tribes sought in Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 953 (1980) 
and Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004), cert denied 126 S. Ct. 
330 (2005). 
35 Id. at 1064 
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that the deliberative language of the representatives in the original position is public reason.36 
Thus, examining the original position can help us determine the boundaries of public reason, 
and public reason can help us clarify certain features of the original position.37 As Brennan 
keenly observes in his dissent in Lyng, it is far more foreseeable that someone in the original 
position would be concerned with the harmful effect (i.e., the degree of harm) of a proposed 
government action on the comprehensive doctrine at issue, incidental or not, rather than either 
the sort of burden imposed or the motivation of the burden-imposer. A massive mitigating 
factor in proposing a comprehensive “no harmful effects allowed (full stop)” sort of approach, of 
course, is that the representatives are at once advocates for the government officials, secular 
comprehensive doctrines, and the public. The representatives must occupy some middle ground 
between the currently predominant judicial approach and a “no harmful effects allowed” 
approach, or else make greater dialogical allowances during judicial proceedings for religious 
minorities to make their concerns judicially cognizable, even if not dispositive.  
To begin making this case, I must explain who the representatives are, what their 
legislative task is, what knowledge they have and lack, and how they must behave in their 
deliberations. The original position is a representational device in the social contract tradition, in 
which we are purportedly stripped of our prejudices and other indicia of self-interest or 
partiality to imagine what fair, self-legislated rules (by citizens insofar as they are reasonable 
                                                          
36 It must be noted, of course, that there are important and substantial differences between the parties to 
the original position and flesh-and-blood citizens: the latter are fully autonomous, whereas the former are 
rationally autonomous and limited in their motivations and sociohistorical knowledge. Moreover, I am 
using the “original position” loosely to refer jointly to the original position itself together with the 
successive stages of lawmaking in justice as fairness, especially the second stage (the “constitutional 
convention”). 
37 Though, as James Gordon Finlayson has observed, the original position is the focus of Theory and less so 
in Political Liberalism, it is still the case (as evidenced in his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement) that (i) it 
remains a representational device that Rawls favors, and (ii) even if it is not the only conception of justice 
that coheres with political liberalism (a door that Rawls explicitly leaves open), it is nonetheless an 
effective means of revealed shortcomings in a system of supposedly democratic, self-legislated rules. See 
“On Rawls’s Criticism of Habermas’s Conception of Legitimacy,” Kantian Review 21, no. 2 (2016): 161-183. 
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and rational) of social cooperation will look like. The wraith-like representatives38 exist behind a 
veil of ignorance, meaning that they are unaware of, among other things, the talent level, 
wealth, physical health, social status, intelligence, gender and ethnicity of their citizen 
counterparts. Perhaps most importantly for my purposes, they do not know their “final aims and 
interests, or their particular psychological makeup” nor, consequently, the religious beliefs or 
other comprehensive doctrine adherence of their flesh-and-blood counterparts. A 
representative qua advocate cannot assume as true or controlling the evidence set of any one 
citizen: an adherent to a secular worldview, Christian, Jewish, Hindu or a member of Native 
American tribe and religion. Rules should therefore be fashioned in consideration of the 
possibility that the citizen – whose interests the representative pursues – could be born into any 
one of these worldviews.39 The representative seeks to avoid her citizen counterpart 
experiencing any disadvantages by accident of birth; the representatives are not gamblers with 
heredity. Given the veil of ignorance, the basis the representative selects for the fair terms of 
social cooperation will not depend on the truth of any worldview.  
If the representatives lacked knowledge altogether regarding their possible citizen 
counterparts or the nature of comprehensive doctrines, however, they wouldn’t do much good 
as advocates; they must understand flesh-and-blood citizens and what matters to them. In this 
vein, Rawls apparently intends that the representatives, even if they are unaware of their citizen 
counterparts’ particular religious beliefs, are informed regarding (a) the attitudes that citizens 
have towards their (moral and religious) worldviews, and (b) the sorts of interests that arise 
                                                          
38 I will interchangeably call them “parties” and “representatives.” 
39 It is ambiguous here whether Rawls intends that the representatives would know any details regarding 
what moral principles or metaphysical propositions Christianity or Hinduism, as specific and determinate 
religious comprehensive doctrines, endorse, at least as some level of abstraction (i.e., what theism or 
supernaturalism are). What is clear is that they will not disadvantage one conception of the good over 
another and, in any event, they will know what theism or supernaturalism is at some further stage of 
veiled rulemaking. 
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from their having them. Most importantly, citizens will regard their comprehensive doctrines as 
politically non-negotiable:  
[T]he veil of ignorance combined with the parties’ responsibility to protect some 
unknown but determinate and affirmed religious, philosophical or moral view gives the 
parties the strongest reasons for securing this liberty. Here it is fundamental that 
affirming such views and conceptions of the good to which they give rise is recognized 
as non-negotiable, so to speak.  They are understood to be forms of belief and conduct 
the protection of which we cannot properly abandon or be persuaded to jeopardize for 
the kinds of considerations covered by the second principle of justice.40  
 
If, and this is particularly germane here, the parties were to gamble with the possibility that they 
belong to a minority religion, and permit rules that would cause them to suffer in that event, 
then this would “show that they did not take the religious, philosophical, or moral convictions of 
persons seriously, and, in effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or moral 
conviction was.”41 The parties also understand general principles of the social sciences, including 
human psychology, sociology and economic theory, though the degree of specificity is unclear. 
Finally, those items of propositional knowledge that are non-controversial, and do not prejudice 
the deliberations, are allowable: conclusions of science, where not controversial as well as other 
facts ascertainable from and open to public view. 
 One point of ambiguity in the parties’ knowledge concerns Rawls’s thick veil, wherein 
the parties are unaware of determinate, social and historical facts about the society for which 
they legislate. Rawls opts against a thin veil, in which we would “allow the parties to the original 
position full historical information, including knowledge of everyone’s desires and interests, and 
simply deprive them of knowledge of their identity in society.”42 He considers specific historical 
                                                          
40 The second principle of justice includes the equality of opportunity principle and the difference 
principle, and are not matters that affect a basic scheme of rights and liberties. Thus, the delegates to the 
constitutional convention, who are the successors to the original position, only concern themselves with 
the first principle of justice.  
41 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 311. 
42 Samuel Freeman, “John Rawls – An Overview,” in Cambridge Companion to John Rawls, ed. Samuel 
Freeman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2003): 11. 
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or social facts morally irrelevant and potentially prejudicial in this setting, Freeman explains, in 
part because a “thin” veil does not “remedy the problem of partiality towards dominant 
interests… a thinly veiled initial position still leads them to play the odds in hopes that they are 
among those who endorse the dominant majority position and values.”43 Rawls stipulates that 
the original position begins with “no information” and allows “just enough to make the 
agreement rational, though still suitably independent from historical, natural, and social 
happenstance.”44 Thus, it would seem inappropriate to Rawls (or at least Freeman) to equip the 
parties with knowledge regarding the Lyng claimants’ beliefs regarding the sanctity of land or 
the threat of desecrating it, the rarity of this belief among comprehensive doctrines, the Lyng 
claimants’ lack of political power, the religious history of the United States, the country’s 
institutional features and demographics, etc.. What is less clear is at what point during veiled 
rulemaking the parties understand more general features of religion, such as what theism is or 
what rituals might demand of practitioners.  
 Though a thick veil seems to frustrate my analysis (I will soon presume that the 
representatives understand the tribes’ predicaments with specificity), the original position is 
only the first of four stages of veiled rulemaking. After the representatives decide upon the two 
(very general) principles of justice, they move to the constitutional convention, wherein they 
will further choose a scheme of basic rights of citizens and decide on the political forms of a just 
regime,45 with all those rights pertaining to freedom of conscience taking priority over the 
                                                          
43 Id. 12. Freeman further explains that the thin veil would provide no safeguard against, for example, the 
initial position being structured in favor of those who would favor the status quo of any current nation of 
flesh-and-blood citizens, or any other legislative bargaining advantage that currently exists in actual, 
democratic institutions. The initial position should be designed such that it doesn’t especially favor any 
conception of the good. 
44 Id. 273-4 
45 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 196 
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others, and “weigh the justice of procedures for coping with diverse political views.”46 At this 
and each successive stage of the lawmaking process, the “[l]imitations on knowledge available 
the parties are progressively relaxed,”47 though the parties’ rational autonomy is constrained in 
these successive stages (much as lower courts are constrained by higher courts).48  
While Rawls does not exhaustively describe the additional knowledge that the parties 
gain as delegates to the constitutional convention, they know the “general relevant facts about 
their society,” including its “natural circumstances and resources, its level of economic advance 
and political culture, and so on.”49 Any presumption of religiously specific knowledge in my 
subsequent discussion can either be (i) presumed to take place at a later stage of veiled 
rulemaking, or (ii) restated at a much higher level of abstraction to take place in the original 
position. Such information, I submit, must inform veiled rulemaking at some early point in the 
process, since withholding it would render the parties impotent in one of their central tasks: 
maximizing their citizen counterparts’ opportunities to live out their conceptions of the good 
and to safeguard their own, deepest normative commitments.50 The details of the Lyng 
claimants’ beliefs that are most germane here, when generalized among religions and described 
at a much higher level of abstraction, would include facts like the following: (a) One of the most 
important features of religious fulfillment is the observance of various religious duties variously 
specified among comprehensive doctrines; and (b) Members of various comprehensive 
                                                          
46 Id. 
47 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 48 
48 For a concise summary regarding how each successive stage is bound by the determinations of a prior 
stage, see Political Liberalism, 339-41. 
49 Theory of Justice, 196 
50 While I need not make this case here, the rationale supporting a thick veil would not seem to demand 
withholding from the parties’ knowledge base the content of the full range of comprehensive doctrines 
throughout human history, where such information is not supplemented by any specific demographic 
information. It seems this sort of information would only assist the representatives in their central tasks in 
advocacy, without constituting one of the “contingencies that sets them in opposition.” Rawls, Theory of 
Justice, 137.  
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doctrines perceive grave threats from within their respective worldviews, protection against 
which is part and parcel of their well-being. 
Armed with, and lacking, the various bits of knowledge that I have described, it is worth 
saying a bit more about how the representatives (and subsequent delegates to the 
constitutional convention) will behave in deciding such “constitutional essentials” as the scope 
of religious freedom. While the original position is partly intended as an ideal for the Supreme 
Court (and hence, as a guide for the language that the Court-as-exemplar-of-public-reason 
should employ),51 it is not intended as a guide for what Rawls refers to as the “background 
culture,” which is “the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities, 
learned scientific societies, and clubs and teams,” as well as the reasoning of these sorts of 
associations regarding questions of political or public concern. Certain of these issues and 
deliberations within these associational capacities are not the sort we are to imagine the 
representatives hashing out, even if we are to impute to the representatives the knowledge that 
their citizen counterparts will often wear both private, associational and public, political hats. 
But it is clear that they do make determinations regarding the scope of other freedoms of 
conscience, including the “freedom and integrity of the internal life of religious associations” 
and the “liberty of persons to determine their religious affiliation in social conditions that are 
free.”52 The parties’ concerns involve not just setting up a basic structure that is just on its face 
and at its inception, but one that fosters an environment in which citizens living under such a 
                                                          
51 The Supreme Court is best understood on Rawls’s terms as the fourth and final stage of veiled 
rulemaking, whereby the veil has been lifted. As such, courts as we know them have access to the full 
array of facts on record, as well as those publicly ascertainable facts that are appropriate in various 
jurisdictions for judicial notice. Thus, the obligations pertaining to public reason and eschewing reliance 
on the whole truth remain. 
52 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 341. 
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political system will preserve these liberties over a complete life and make them effective.53 
Rawls largely subscribed to the Kantian insight that an enduring good society must cultivate 
certain virtues, or “ways of thought and feeling,” that are conducive to such a society’s 
endurance. Our social and political institutions, he thought, should be structured to fulfill this 
role.54 
Given this knowledge and this set of tasks, what is most important for my assessment of 
the sacred land cases is some characterization, even if it is mostly a negative one, of the parties’ 
attitudes, i.e., the way in which they must be disposed towards religions and comprehensive 
doctrines in general, when deciding them. Because the representatives are to be “neutral” or 
“impartial” among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, yet are also centrally tasked with 
securing liberty for pursuing them, the specific dispositions underlying these quoted terms can 
be easily misunderstood or overlooked; there are various other attitudes that this sort of 
neutrality is not. Habermas and Talisse each provide examples of negative attitudes toward 
religion that could not feasibly produce a fair set of rules.  
As they both lack a determinate attitude regarding the whole truth and must consider 
the possibility of their being among the religious ranks, the representatives cannot regard 
themselves as cognitively backwards or foster an institutional structure or policy that will treat 
the religious as such. What we cannot rely on in claiming secularity or neutrality among 
                                                          
53 It is also worth noting that many iterations of political liberalism, the full force of public reason 
obligations only apply to coercive laws. Many, such as Colin Bird (see his “Coercion and Public 
Justification,” Western Political Science Association Annual Conference (2011)), have argued that there is 
no need to so starkly draw the line between coercive and non-coercive laws in discussing public reason 
obligations. After all, as democratic participants, many sorts of political action involve our shaping (and 
sharing in) the social conditions that will be “imposed” on each of us. In any event, what I will assume for 
the purpose of this essay is that the Lyng and Navajo Nation cases do involve coercion, as they are tribal 
attempts to ensure government (and in a sense, public) forbearance from action. That coercion is 
sufficiently present to trigger public reason obligations is even clearer in the Bear Lodge case discussed 
below, wherein tribes sought to enjoin private conduct of other citizens. 
54 See, for example, Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 6-8. 
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comprehensive doctrines necessary to universal religious freedom is the sort of “condescending 
indulgence of a secularized authority that comes to tolerate minorities who previously suffered 
discrimination.”55 The representatives are tasked with setting up the social milieu for 
cooperation between citizens represented as free and equal. Habermas offers the following 
description of a sort of a contemporary secularist who would not be up to this sort of 
cooperative task:  
As long as secular citizens are convinced that religious traditions and religious 
communities are, as it were, archaic relics of premodern societies persisting into the 
present, they can understand freedom of religion only as the cultural equivalent of the 
conservation of species threatened with extinction…Even the principle of the separation 
of church and state can have for them only the laicist meaning of benign indifference.  In 
the secularist reading, it can be anticipated that religious views will ultimately dissolve in 
the acid of scientific criticism and that religious communities will not be able to 
withstand the pressures of advancing cultural and social modernization. Clearly, citizens 
who adopt such an epistemic stance toward religion can no longer be expected to take 
religious contributions to contentious political issues seriously[.]56 
 
The representatives, though their obligations are distinct from citizens (particularly as Habermas 
conceives them), at least have a higher-order interest in taking seriously the fact that their 
religious counterparts will take their religious contributions to society seriously. To protect 
religious citizens’ interests in a way that conceives their religious beliefs as an inherent burden 
or disadvantage that requires remedying, like an economic or cognitive disadvantage, or like a 
ward of the state, would be to see their interests from some other comprehensive doctrine, and 
fail in their truth-eschewing, universal advocate role. What the representatives are deciding 
amongst themselves are the “precarious demarcations between the positive liberty to practice a 
religion of one’s own and the negative liberty to remain unencumbered by the religious 
practices of others.”57 An attitude that, even if it does not actively seek to exclude or eradicate 
                                                          
55 Jurgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press 
2009), 120. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
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religion, nonetheless views it primarily as an encumbrance or a rational defect, even if 
somewhat benignly as something akin to religions being wards of the state, would overtly favor 
one side of the balance. 
 There might be a temptation to regard the injunction again the whole truth as 
encouraging a skeptical attitude towards the truth content of comprehensive doctrines but, as 
Talisse observes, this rests on a misunderstanding of the political purpose of the epistemic 
restraint proposed by both Rawls and Nagel58 before Political Liberalism, and recently defended 
more exhaustively by Jonathan Quong. It is a proffered political position’s acceptability and not 
its degree of evidentiary support or likelihood of truth that determines whether it can be 
consulted in rulemaking, at least according to Rawls; justification is a practical, as Talisse puts it, 
rather than an epistemological, endeavor.59 As such, the parochial reasons are to be excluded 
from public lawmaking, and from the representatives own deliberative vocabulary, for the 
purposes of conversation and not due to any evidentiary shortcoming or unfavorable 
epistemological foundation. Opting for moral or religious skepticism is inappropriate because it 
is a determinate view of those comprehensive doctrines that is just as “controversial and 
contestable as any other moral doctrine.”60 Put otherwise, the representatives can no more 
fairly judge all comprehensive doctrines to be equally suspect, or even likely false, than they can 
judge one or more to be more plausible or valuable than others, except, of course, where the 
exclusion of unreasonable doctrines is involved.  
Despite his probable disagreement with Habermas and Talisse regarding some of the 
details of the appropriate place of religious reasons in politics, his later work indicates he is 
                                                          
58 Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 16 (1987), 215-40. 
59 Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 51. 
60 Id. Talisse is far from the only one who raises this concern regarding skepticism. For a discussion of this 
common critique and a Rawlsian response, see Jonathan Quong, “Political Liberalism Without Skepticism,” 
Ratio: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20, no. 3 (September 2003): 320-40. 
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largely in agreement regarding those attitudes that are antithetical to a stable democracy (and 
so antithetical to its imagined lawmakers too). First, he recognizes in Political Liberalism that a 
political conception of justice that is skeptical of or indifferent to truth, would be “fatal to the 
idea of a political conception” because it would “put political philosophy in opposition to 
numerous comprehensive doctrines, and would thus defeat from the outset its aim of achieving 
an overlapping consensus.”61 What an overlapping consensus, an essential component of 
achieving “stability for the right reasons,” involves is the affirmation of a political conception of 
justice from within the perspectives of the various comprehensive doctrines that citizens may 
adopt, and not simply from some observational point outside of (and purporting to be “above”) 
all of them. That said, citizens are to avoid putting questions pertaining to the whole truth on 
the political agenda to the greatest extent feasible, and the representatives are not to do so at 
all. 
We can also infer how the representatives are to be disposed from obligations and 
attitudes that Rawls requires of flesh-and-blood citizens. Though the representatives are 
understood differently than citizens, the representatives’ task includes setting up a system of 
social cooperation wherein the civic virtues Rawls espouses can thrive. A citizen’s duty of civility 
requires, among other things, “a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding 
when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.”62 What a well-ordered 
society includes at the outset, then, is a climate in which its citizens are inclined to honor this 
“listening” side (I call the duty to provide accessible reasons the “speaking” side) of the duty of 
civility. Habermas similarly explains that fair arrangements to determining what should or 
should not be heard (i.e., tolerated) in democratic deliberation can only be found “if the parties 
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involved also learn to adopt the perspectives of the others.”63 In this vein, he encourages them 
to keep an open mind to the truth content of their presentation and “enter into dialogues from 
which religious reasons might well emerge in the transformed guise of generally accessible 
arguments.”64 Rawls similarly endorses citizen practices such as declarations, in which citizens 
state their religious basis for endorsing a conception of justice, and reasoning from conjecture, 
wherein others demonstrate to religious citizens how their own perspectives. As such, though it 
would be nonsensical to impute a duty of civility to the representatives themselves, their aim of 
creating a structure in which such a duty can be fulfilled would seem to require their choosing 
legal principles and procedures that are conducive to receiving and taking seriously those 
untranslated, yet reasonable, comprehensive doctrines (especially those issuing from the least 
advantaged in society). 
I concede that civility does not constitute only being mindful of the socially beneficial, 
and not the harmful, tendencies of minority faiths and cultures. The representatives must 
consider the opposing possibilities of being a religious citizen or a citizen who wishes to be free 
from religion’s putative encumbrances, particularly from those advocated by moral or religious 
majorities. As such, a perspective that only seeks to account for the positive influences of 
religion in society – some might offer Nicholas Wolterstorff or Michael Perry as examples – 
would clearly be one from within a different set of comprehensive doctrines than those 
religiously hostile ones previously discussed. The notion of religious values must motivate the 
parties, but so must the desire to be unencumbered by religious values. I will speak more of the 
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impropriety of these sorts of attitudes (which I contend are not actually Perry’s or Wolterstorff’s 
attitudes) in the following section. 
 What these features of the original position are to produce – the representatives’ 
knowledge, decisional scope and dispositions – is a procedurally just system that will ensure 
“stability for the right reasons” and not a fragile modus vivendi. Rawls explains that a modus 
vivendi is a term often used to “characterize a treaty between two states whose national aims 
and interests put them at odds.”65 Such a treaty is set up such that both parties recognize it is 
against their respective interests to violate the agreement, but they remain ready to pursue 
their own goals at the expense of the other party and may do so should the background social 
conditions change. Sixteenth-century Catholics and Protestants in Europe, to borrow Rawls’s 
example, each saw the ruler’s duty as including the upholding of the true religion and repressing 
the spread of false doctrine. Should either of them gain a political foothold, there was little 
reason to suspect that they would continue to abide by the principle of toleration of the other, 
given that each of them possessed parochial values that outweighed political values, and the 
political system was not set up to withstand the end of a political power stalemate. By analogy, 
a central assumption in Political Liberalism is that a social unity founded on self- or group 
interests is similarly dependent on social circumstances, and a dominant group might be ready 
to pursue its goals, including its religious or secular moral doctrine’s goals, at the expense of all 
other citizens and groups, should that become a political possibility. Should a law prove at all 
costly in view of a dominant worldview’s hierarchy of values, or should its view of the social 
good include a demand to implement a theocracy or else codify its values against others’ 
wishes, what reason would it have to avoid doing so? 
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 The question that I will be exploring for the remainder of the essay is whether the 
representatives would have fulfilled their mission, or would be the sort of beings I have 
described in this section, if they were to adopt the Supreme Court’s approach to Lyng and 
Navajo Nation. Does the substance of this judicial approach depend, for instance, on similarly 
situated minority religions’ lack of political currency, or on the moral majority’s rejection of such 
religions’ values or metaphysics in favor of their own? Or alternatively, would the sort of ruling 
that the Native American claimants urge, if they only were politically more powerful, result in 
public policy that was disproportionately influenced by Native American beliefs, beliefs that 
conflicted with those of the rest of the public? If either of these questions could be answered in 
the affirmative, then the proposed approach could not be chosen by representatives, and those 
adopting that approach would surely not be acting agnostically or impartially among reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.  
Recall that in both cases, the Native American claimants urged the Court to weigh the 
life-or-death (or “central”) import of the religious interests at issue against the marginal benefit 
of the proposed governmental interest in a certain land use. Each court regarded this sort of 
consideration improper in constitutional reasoning, not just as a matter of rote fulfillment of 
stare decisis, but with affirmative, moral arguments as to why an alternate ruling would either 
be unfair to the government or the public (or else would open the door in the future to such 
inequities). What I will soon turn to are two different ways in which a prima facie case might be 
urged in favor of the claimants. One insists on recognition of the truth of their beliefs or 
hierarchy of values, and is thereby both violative of the original position’s contours and rightly 
rejected by the Supreme Court qua exemplar of public reason, or qua human representation of 
a party in the original position. The second depends on no such insistence, and I will argue that 
it is not just permissible under, but is required by, the concepts of the original position and 
30 
 
public reason. The same reasoning extends, I submit, to the currently evolving disputes over the 
Utah monuments at Bear Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante. 
C. Nonpublic Reasons and the Parochial, Inadmissible Case for the Tribes  
 The representatives must grapple with the possibility that they belong to a similarly 
situated tribe that regards the destruction of a portion of the forest or shrines on a 
mountainside as existential threats, beliefs that are not be subject to negotiation or 
compromise. At the same time, they must do so without allowing the actual truth of such beliefs 
or the relative weight of such values to be dispositive in determining First Amendment 
boundaries.66 They must not be indifferent to, or skeptical of, the life-or-death significance of 
Court cases like Lyng to the claimants, and this valuation must matter to them in a higher-order 
sense, while they ultimately remain agnostic or neutral about whether the government action at 
issue is actually of life-or-death importance.  
 Something like the following claim, if it were employed as a justification for the 
plaintiffs’ position, is a paradigmatic parochial, nonpublic reason that a court could not accord 
weight:  
(1) The sacred site cannot be destroyed or desecrated because this will either destroy 
the spirits that reside within or render inefficacious a ritual that protects people or 
the world. 
 
This formulation is just one example, as there are plenty more of greater or lesser specificity 
that we can imagine which equally appear as an imposition of values or evidence sets. The 
tribes’ insistence on (1) as a basis for government action, or in these cases government restraint, 
is demanding that the government act in accordance with their beliefs notwithstanding the 
public’s non-recognition of them, and the co-opting of government resources by an 
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infinitesimally small minority of citizens. A pre-social being who allowed this sort of reasoning to 
be admissible (and dispositive) in an adjudicative or other political, deliberative proceeding 
would be countenancing a reliance on the whole truth in political action, failing to serve as an 
advocate for comprehensive doctrines substantially at odds with those who adhere to (1). 
Suppose that I engage in a recreational or business activity on a part of public land that 
others regard as sacred, and my religious or secular comprehensive doctrine includes in its 
evidence set no statement regarding any obligation towards maintaining the serenity or 
integrity of the land in question. Thus, I obtain enough of an economic, psychological or fitness-
related benefit from the land use that my forbearing my land use would demand a reason (from 
my perspective) for doing so. Without a translation of (1) into a statement of fact or value that 
overlaps with mine, then, the offeror of (1) has provided me no more (from my perspective) 
than a bare insistence that I refrain from my land use, supplemented by a false claim. I would 
rightly wonder whether such a person regarded me as her equal, or whether my right to land 
access mattered to her. To so insist on another’s compliance is not to treat the now-obligated 
citizen with respect or even as a person, but (per Talisse) as a mere “subject of legislation.”67  
 Another way to understand the unacceptability of (1) is that it casts doubt on or 
completely dissolves the claimants’ ostensible commitment to the results of the 
representatives’ deliberations. In view of the modus vivendi problem mentioned in the previous 
section, Paul Weithman emphasizes the centrality of assurance to characterizing improper uses 
of religious reasons in Political Liberalism, rather than prohibiting religious reasons per se. The 
fact that each flesh-and-blood citizen has a conception of the good “opens the possibility that 
she will think honoring the terms of cooperation…is not good for her… And so the rational thing 
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for each individual to do may be to defect from the terms of cooperation.”68 If citizens could 
affirm a conception of justice from within their own doctrines, this would provide greater 
assurance to their compatriots, since their compatriots would regard their affirmations as 
sincere. This is so because it would be public knowledge that each citizen recognizes the 
individual rationality of compliance with the political system. What this would require of 
religious citizens is a willingness to translate initially parochial reasons into public ones, or else 
be willing to take those positions unsupported by translatable reasons off the political agenda. 
A member of the claimant-tribes in Lyng or Navajo Nation relying on something like (1), 
given the threat that mountain shrine desecration poses to the tribe’s salvation and safety could 
foreseeably claim that the import of insulating the shrines from threats outweighs most, and 
more likely all, governmental concerns or rights claims from other citizens or citizen groups. 
Should the tribe’s political capital or military might meteorically increase, what reason would we 
have to suppose they would refrain from violating laws or rights in order to safeguard whatever 
spiritual threats they perceive at any cost? Should this manner of thinking becoming sufficiently 
common among interest groups, or should it even be frequently entertained as a live option in 
society, it would be rational for all others to entertain or opt for preemptive defection of their 
own.  
It might not initially seem that tribes’ attempts to rely on (1) would necessarily erode 
public assurance in their compliance, as shrine desecration is one of the greatest possible 
preventable threats from their perspectives, and there is no reason to believe that they would 
not otherwise (i.e., for all other issues) regard compliance as eminently rational. After all, 
freedom of conscience is one of the central features of a politically liberal society in which 
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citizens are to be free and equal in the exercise of their moral powers. It might also seem 
dubious that their insisting on recognition of this greatest of threats would not be browbeating 
of their fellow citizens, especially if they were willing to abide by legal recognition of the 
greatest of threats as perceived by other citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. If their marginal or 
recreational land use elsewhere were contrary to a paramount spiritual value for another faith, 
perhaps the same citizen who insists on (1) is receptive to similar insistences from other faiths. 
Suppose that instead of a marginally profitable use of land, however, the countervailing 
interest was something of greater or comparative worth from the public’s or another religious 
group’s perspective.69 These would become cases in which the tribe member would suddenly be 
unwilling, for spiritual reasons, to reciprocate another citizen’s acquiescence to a spiritual 
insistence like (1). Even if it did not sound so oppressive that a tribe member could not provide 
me with a reason for my forbearing a recreationally or economically beneficial land use, 
particularly given their minority status and their greater historical lineage in land use, an 
unwillingness to listen would be more evident where my forbearance from a morally compelling 
or physically necessary land use (from my perspective) was in play. A representative could not 
allow a citizen to be subject to very costly forbearances, in the face of no cognizable reason 
from the religious citizen insisting on the forbearance. 
Rawls comes closest to addressing concerns like these where he recognizes the 
possibility that it could become unavoidable that, in select cases, we must assert the truth of our 
comprehensive doctrines in the political sphere. This may be so where “someone insists…that 
certain questions are so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled justifies civil 
                                                          
69 Alternatively, we might suppose, as was arguably the case in Badoni v. Higginson, that the tribe 
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strife[,]”70 such as in cases where, as in the sacred land cases, “the salvation of a whole people 
may be said to depend on it.” At this point, Rawls asserts that we have little choice but to deny 
the truth of that claim. The essential distinction Rawls makes is that we can generally consider 
believers mistaken that an exceptional degree of civil strife is specially justified without also 
denying the factual claims about salvation they make. Thus, it might be the case that a Rawlsian 
who endorses this claim can accord some moral weight to the tribal claimants’ concerns (i.e., by 
suggesting a court must consider them) without taking a stance on the truth of the matter. 
What this quote surely reveals, however, is a tension between the representatives of duties of 
maintaining “stability for the right reasons” and eschewing reliance on the whole truth, on the 
one hand, and maximally inclusiveness and fairness, on the other.  
 Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith marks what 
is arguably a controversial implementation of the assurance concern in American jurisprudence. 
In Smith, the plaintiffs were members of a Native American Church whose sacramental practices 
include ingesting peyote, an illegal substance under Oregon law. Following failed drug tests at 
their place of employment (which, ironically as could be, was a drug rehabilitation center), the 
plaintiffs applied for and were denied unemployment benefits because their firings resulted 
from job-related misconduct (a legally recognized exception to unemployment compensation in 
Oregon).  Because the law criminalizing peyote that led to the sacramental practices was 
ultimately the basis for the Employment Division’s decision, the plaintiffs argued that punishing 
peyote use was identical with punishing their essential religious practices, a violation of their 
Free Exercise rights. 
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 Scalia’s majority opinion, citing one of the Supreme Court’s earliest concerns regarding 
Free Exercise (from Reynolds), declined to find what he referred to as “a private right to ignore 
generally applicable laws,” as this would erode the sort of assurance described above:  
The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful 
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on 
measuring the effects of a government action on a religious objector’s spiritual 
development.’ To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon 
the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is 
‘compelling’ – permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto himself,’ 
[citing Reynolds] – contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.71 
 
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of a strict scrutiny standard, pursuant to 
which the state of Oregon would have to show that its denial of unemployment benefits was 
necessary to satisfy a compelling government interest. Instead, Scalia claimed that the Court has 
always drawn a clear line between religious expression and the religious “performance of (or 
abstention from) physical acts,” finding strict scrutiny to be the appropriate standard for laws 
restricting conduct only where that conduct also implicates another fundamental right.72 
What ostensibly underlay the Court’s worry was this: If spiritual concerns and the 
resultant conduct were to always or even often override legitimate and historically government 
functions related to protecting the public against criminal harms, especially criminal laws, then 
we’d have little reason to expect our compatriots to honor the system of rules that deliberations 
behind the veil of ignorance produced. Recalling Waite’s concern that began this essay, the 
natural extension of allowing this for small religious communities is allowing it for family units, 
ad hoc religious communities and individuals. Such worries are not mere potentialities: In 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 for instance (which Scalia cited in his opinion), tribal parents 
protested a welfare program’s requirement that their daughter have a social security number to 
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receive its benefits, claiming that issuing a social security number would rob her of her spiritual 
uniqueness, a belief whose connection to an existing religious doctrine was tenuous at best. 
Kevin Seamus Hasson73 describes a public controversy in which a religious group sought to block 
state removal of a piece of concrete (which had been accidentally left there by a highway 
construction crew nearby) from the Japanese Tea Garden in San Francisco, all because the group 
thought the concrete resembled Shiva, and had consequently begun praying at and leaving gifts 
before the concrete. It is foreseeable that small groups or families could continue to seek to 
impede government functions or public interests on similarly ad hoc grounds to the point of 
governmental impotence. All that keeps a similarly-minded religious group from coopting 
government resources or the public will is the political currency or physical might to exercise 
that degree of influence.  
D. What a Prima Facie Case for the Tribes Can, and Must, Look Like 
 Based on the foregoing analysis of claims like (1), it would seem that any litigant’s 
mention of the sort of spiritual threat that the tribal claimants in Lyng perceive would require 
reference to parochial claims. But this rests on a misunderstanding, an overbroad construal, of 
where and when an impermissible reliance on religious reasons occurs. While the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Smith is ostensibly concordant with Political Liberalism, in this same book 
and especially in Rawls’s addendum, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,74 Rawls anticipates 
various avenues by which one can discuss matters that implicate moral or religious values or 
propositions, two of which I have briefly mentioned. What I will demonstrate after briefly 
summarizing three of them is that there is ample room for a middle position between 
impermissibly allowing (1) to carry political weight no matter what, on the one hand, and never 
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allowing a concern like (1) (a central religious concern or spiritual threat) to count at all. Only 
such a middle position is consummate with the representatives’ dispositions and duties.  
 First, Rawls calls attention to the misconception that making public reason the language 
of the representatives and the Court “mistakenly tries to settle political questions in advance.”75 
Here, Rawls anticipates Eberle’s objection that, for public reason proponents, the temptation (or 
inevitability) of question-begging in spelling out one’s conception of public reason (and what 
makes for a “rational” citizen who can speak it) looms large. No conception of public reason that 
excludes religious reasons through definitional fiat can claim to be neutral among 
comprehensive doctrines or treat all citizens as equal moral agents. Rawls recalls the famous 
debate between Patrick Henry and James Madison regarding the establishment of the Anglican 
Church in Virginia and the presence of religion in schools, and remarks that “it was argued 
almost entirely by reference to political values alone.”76  Henry argued that the presence of 
religion in moral education strengthened strictly (secular) political values and was a necessary 
condition in doing so, whereas Madison denied that civic virtues needed any such foundation to 
ensure their stability. The interests in producing good citizens and providing strong moral 
education that would effectively do so are political concerns that can involve solutions with 
religious content, so long as the basis for the argument is not the truth of one religion or the 
possibility that any one religion could override political values. Rawls was similarly confident 
that the debate regarding public support for church schools could include those from both sides 
of a very divisive issue, yet operate within the bounds of public reason.   
 Second, what apparently troubled Rawls among the various criticisms of Political 
Liberalism is that socially beneficial moments of political advocacy, such as many of Dr. Martin 
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Luther King, Jr.’s speeches, were often dominated by and drew their widespread appeal from 
religious language and imagery. In many cases, to once again employ Robert Audi’s verbiage, 
there was in Dr. King’s religiously-inclined speeches, for many listeners, no secular reason to 
support his proposed policies that was both motivationally sufficient and evidentially adequate, 
at least at that moment the reason was given. One of the most significant contributions of IPRR 
was the so-called in due course proviso (or simply the “proviso”):  
[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in 
public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political 
reasons—and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that 
are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to 
support.77   
 
Rawls claims that the details of the proviso must be worked out in practice, and that it is 
impractical to provide rule-like guidelines for its satisfaction in advance. Nonetheless, on my 
reading, it is difficult to understand the proviso other than a claim that, for example, Dr. King’s 
religious language was a politically effective stand-in for, supplement to or promissory note 
regarding another, (secular) political value to follow: “The proviso was fulfilled in their [civil 
rights advocates’ and Abolitionists’] cases, however much they emphasized the religious roots of 
their doctrines, because these doctrines supported basic constitutional values—as they 
themselves asserted—and so supported reasonable conceptions of justice.”78 Thus, that the 
religious roots were motivating was morally acceptable and in line with citizens’ moral 
obligations insofar as constitutional, political values were still doing the work as the basis for 
subsequent political action, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.79  
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 Third, Rawls found certain statements or uses of religious reasons permissible even 
absent later supplementation in two cases: Declarations and Reasoning from Conjecture 
(“RFC”).80  In instances of declaration, the citizen makes clear the comprehensive doctrine that 
he occupies and how this doctrine supports shared political values, such as in the case of a 
Christian who recounts the Good Samaritan parable and then explains that parable in terms of 
political values. Such instances of declaring one’s comprehensive doctrine both add 
transparency to political debate and show that the citizen has deeply internalized the social 
contract. RFC involves discussing another citizen’s religious or other comprehensive doctrine to 
show that citizen how her doctrine also supports political values.   
 With these dialogical allowances in mind, I now turn to the Lyng and Navajo Nation 
claimants’ ability to not only disabuse the Court of the notion that any ruling in their favor is 
tantamount to (1), but that the original position (and public reason) demands a significantly 
different constitutional analysis than is prevalent in American jurisprudence. Recall that in 
describing the two sacred land cases, from the tribes’ perspectives, nothing short of the death 
of spirits, their cultures or even human souls or lives was at stake. Similarly, claimants like those 
in Smith might well regard peyote ingestion as a necessary condition for connecting to the 
spiritual realm, or to experiencing what Charles Taylor more generally calls the “fullness,” a goal 
shared by a wide range of both religious and non-religious comprehensive doctrines. The 
representatives have no position on the whole truth, but they must consider the possibility that 
their flesh-and-blood counterparts will possess and act in accordance with such beliefs with 
great intensity.  
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 The problem with (1) was not that it allowed a parochial belief or practice to carry the 
day, but how it justified allowing a parochial belief or practice to do so: by presenting others 
with no real reason for their forbearance from a contrary land use. A more appropriate basis for 
land use forbearance than the extremely contestable belief about shrine desecration (and the 
attendant threats of doing so) is the brute and presumptively undeniable fact of the claimant’s 
beliefs about such desecration. While shrine desecration cannot directly matter to the 
representatives, the possession of highest values by their citizen counterparts must, and their 
deliberations must reflect that they matter. The representative must consider the (highly likely) 
possibility that the representative’s counterpart is a citizen who occupies a different 
comprehensive doctrine that in no way overlaps with the Navajo Nation or Lyng claimants. Such 
a citizen cannot recognize the contestable “fact” (or belief) of shrine desecration, as it is not a 
factually true part of their moral or metaphysical evidence sets, but such a citizen should 
recognize the brute fact of a compatriot’s belief and pursuits in light of belief. Another way of 
making the distinction between these two types of putative facts is this: The representatives are 
not to take a position on the whole truth regarding facts about the world,81 but they are to, and 
must, consider the psychological reality of facts about beliefs and practices. What the federal 
decisions in question risk doing is relying on contestable facts about the world, however 
undeniable these facts might seem to many of us, while entirely denying others (i.e., those 
belonging to the claimants).  
 Just as the representatives or Justices could not base a ruling on the recognition of a 
contestable statement of fact (or “belief”) like (1), neither could they base their rulings on 
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contestable “facts” that are parts of other comprehensive doctrines, including secular ones. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that one of the chief difficulties with justificatory liberalism is that 
certain comprehensive doctrines, often non-religious ones, have a much easier time of 
disguising themselves as public reason than do many religious ones. How am I to tell, 
Wolterstorff asks, whether someone arguing along utilitarian or nationalist lines (though I think 
a metaphysical or ethical view clothed in scientific language might be a more apt example for 
our times) is doing so as a part of her comprehensive doctrine? Habermas and Talisse similarly 
recognize an asymmetrical burden on religious believers that might exist in certain iterations of 
political liberalism.82 Thus, the first stage of the claimants’ prima facie case, from the standpoint 
of the original position, would involve exposing and rooting out those elements of the Court’s 
decision (as it is now) that depend on secular comprehensive doctrines, however subtly, and the 
contestable facts about the world that issue from these doctrines.  
 While it may not be feasible to neatly attribute an –ism to the Lyng line of decisions, 
they are friendly to or constitutive of certain comprehensive doctrines and not others, and it is 
this quality of this area of jurisprudence that makes it difficult to square with the original 
position. There is some sort of tradition or paradigm to which they belong, and some features of 
the general attitude underlying these decisions tempt me to call it something much like 
“naturalism” or “positivism.” Recall that in Navajo Nation, the majority opinion found it 
significant that the mountainside shrine would not be “physically affected” by the use of 
artificial snow, nor would the tribes’ physical access to the shrine be impeded for ritualistic use. 
From the tribes’ perspectives, the shrine was ultimately unavailable for ritualistic use, since it 
had been desecrated, and numerous physical and spiritual threats to themselves and the world 
were imminent. Per the majority opinion, however, the use of recycled wastewater would only 
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affect the tribes’ “subjective spiritual fulfillment”, which could not possibly constitute a 
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. In Lyng, the majority opinion similarly had 
dubbed the putative harms as no more than subjective “spiritual fulfillment” or individual 
“spiritual development.”  
The upshot of these decisions is that certain kinds of harms matter in the legal arena 
and certain sorts of harms, conceived as such by their putative sufferers, do not (i.e., they 
cannot be among the considerations that affect the outcome of the matter). The immediate 
implications of the physical-effect-versus-diminished-spiritual-fulfillment dichotomy is that 
harms must be legal, economically or empirically (and physically) describable in a relatively 
direct way, or else they are meaningless for legal purposes. Instead of finding any harm, the 
Lyng majority only saw a minority’s attempt at exaction from the government, ending up in a 
more beneficial position than before. The court also found it instructive that the activities in 
question included a safe zone around the specific ritual sites. The majority was willing to assume 
arguendo that this would virtually destroy the tribe’s ability to practice its religion, and that 
from the tribe’s perspective, an inability to perform efficacious rituals would bring catastrophic 
harm on the earth and people who inhabit it. Underlying each court’s decision is not simply a 
contestable metaphysical and epistemological standpoint, but a distinct notion of property 
ownership or the personhood of natural resources. As Brennan observes, the majority’s 
reasoning is rife with examples of forcing Indian concepts into non-Indian categories, reflecting 
Mark Tushnet’s recognition (perhaps inspired by this then-recent case) that religious claims tend 
to be interpreted through the lens of particular religions or attitudes toward religions:  
The less familiar the claim is – that is, the less connected it is to the kinds of worship 
that the Justices of the Supreme Court are accustomed to – the less likely it is that they 
will regard infringements on those forms of worship as really serious.83 
                                                          
83  Tushnet, Mark. ‘‘‘Of Church and State and the Supreme Court’: Kurland Revisited.’’ The Supreme 
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Constitutionally (and evidentially) cognizable harms arguably must be limited to specific 
categories, at least in the lion’s share of cases, or else any ad hoc religion could simply claim that 
any government action whatsoever causes an unspecifiable harm.84 Otherwise, the notion of a 
neutral and objective arbiter making final decisions on legal disputes in an impartial manner and 
from impartial principles would be impracticable. Thus, it might seem perfectly fair that 
evidence of a physical, economic or legally punitive consequence is required to show a 
substantial burden (or various other, related harms in American constitutional law) on free 
exercise. But simply possessing an attitude or clothing it in, say, scientific language does not 
thereby render it impartial. This does not automatically invalidate naturalistic or positivistic 
principles for use in the rules of evidence or constitutional law, as they may be stipulated as 
procedurally fair or the most non-parochial or pareto-optimal ground available even if not 
posited as true or better supported by (perhaps scientific) evidence. Recall Talisse’s observation 
earlier that what matters to Rawls (and other justificatory liberals) for public admissibility is not 
“likelihood of truth” but “accessibility,” often construed as that which all citizens could be 
reasonably expected to accept or find acceptable. The question, then, is whether the 
representatives would accept a free exercise jurisprudence in which a “substantial burden” is so 
                                                          
Court Review 1989 (1989): 373–402. Tushnet marshals this observation in favor of a dramatically different 
jurisprudential conclusion than what I urge here. 
84 Recall the memorable example from Kevin Seamus Hasson’s Right to Be Wrong mentioned above, in 
which he recounts a dispute between a new age religious group and the city of San Francisco.  After a 
construction worker had temporarily set aside a concrete parking barrier in San Francisco’s Japanese Tea 
Garden at Golden Gate Park, the group objected to the city’s plans to remove it on the ground that it 
resembled a Shiva Lingam (or manifestation of the Hindu deity Shiva) and that they had begun to pray and 
worship at the barrier. The other frequenters of the park, however, demanded its removing because it 
upset the aesthetic harmony of the park. The proliferation and judicial recognition of such idiosyncratic 
complaints could foreseeably spiral into the sort of concerns about lawlessness or governmental 
impotence that worried Waite, O’Connor and Scalia in the majority opinions in Reynolds, Lyng and Smith, 
respectively. 
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construed, or whether it would leave some of their counterparts unacceptably exposed to and 
unprotected against certain threats. 
 Whatever the proper interpretation of the veil of ignorance, the representatives have 
must have sufficient knowledge to understand that (a) substantially all comprehensive doctrines 
will have religious or moral interests (or “goods”) of paramount import to them, and (b) it would 
be in each religious citizen’s interest (for maximal use of that citizen’s moral powers) to secure 
the greatest guarantee feasible of the means to pursue, and not jeopardize, that central good. A 
necessary corollary of this would involve each citizen being maximally interested in avoiding 
obstacles to such pursuits. As Eberle puts this feature more succinctly, “a citizen’s moral identity 
is constituted by his commitment to certain intrinsic goods and by his avoidance of certain 
intrinsic evils.”85  
Rawls indicates that he likewise recognizes this feature of citizen’s moral identities86 and 
that, at some level of abstraction, the representatives in the original position are to as well. Two 
concepts that help further specify this warrant special attention. First, Rawls identifies an “index 
of primary goods” that are purportedly resources that are common to citizens’ pursuits of their 
separate conceptions of intrinsic goods, and much of the representatives’ mission can be 
understood in terms of their securing more, rather than fewer, primary goods for whatever 
citizens they happen to represent. Among them are the “freedom of thought and liberty of 
conscience, and the rest” and “the social bases of self-respect.”87 Second, and relatedly, a 
                                                          
85 Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, 146. 
86 The two senses in which citizens are understood as “free” in Justice as Fairness are imbued with this 
notion of moral identity: (i) their conception of themselves and others as having the moral power to have 
a conception of the good; and (ii) their regard for themselves as the self-authenticating sources of valid 
claims. (23)  
87 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 58. Both here and in Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasizes that the 
representatives’ motivations are to be understood in terms of securing the greatest distribution of 
primary goods attainable subject to the maximin principle (i.e., the greatest benefit for the least 
advantaged). 
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constraint on the original position’s deliberations that was first introduced in Theory is that the 
representatives will refuse to “enter into agreements that have consequences they cannot 
accept,”88 which has been called his “strains of commitment” principle. Intolerable 
consequences would be irrationally chosen at the time of the original position and would not be 
feasible to abide by for the citizen offended by them. Combining these two concepts, the 
representatives seek to maximize every citizen’s (no matter her doctrine) ability to pursue her 
conception of the good without a sense of political estrangement and avoid arrangements that 
they would find intolerable. 
 Given this knowledge, it is difficult to imagine that the representatives could have 
satisfied their fiduciary duties without having set up a legal system in which some special regard 
was paid for a comprehensive doctrine’s practices or beliefs, especially those of utmost concern 
to its adherents. Because compliance with exceptionless laws (i.e., exceptionless as to their own 
practices) might come at an unpalatable or entirely unbearable cost where issues of ultimate 
concern are at stake, it would be unrealistic to suppose that the representatives could create a 
constitutional framework in which there were exceptionless laws; indeed, no legal system in a 
democratic nation is any such thing. The sorts of beings who permitted this could neither be 
risk-averse nor rational, for they would commit to terms that could “require them to violate 
their deepest and most important commitments.”89 Alternatively, we might think of the 
religious citizen looking backwards in time, as Rawls was fond of doing as a test of liberal 
principles, long after the veil of ignorance has been lifted: it is dubious that she could see any 
mark of herself among those primordial legislators. 
                                                          
88 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 176. 
89 Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, 147. 
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Consider how ordinary legal mechanisms operate differently in the United States in 
cases of threats or emergencies to an individual or public safety, whether reasonably perceived, 
ostensibly imminent or actual (and this is even truer in some European democracies, which are 
substantially less rights-focused and more welfare-focused). This is especially true in the case of 
existential threats. There are myriad exceptions (or rather, affirmative defenses) to actions that 
would ordinarily be crimes or torts. The class of these exceptions are determined in the real 
world, of course, from a particular point of view, or rather, by flesh-and-blood-citizens. Those 
who occupy a different standpoint, or comprehensive doctrine, are sometimes excluded from or 
marginalized in such determinations. We can commit what would ordinarily be battery against 
an apparent aggressor, where we reasonably anticipate that apparent aggressor is about to 
harm our own bodies or another person’s, even if it turns out that we were wrong about the 
threat. We can trespass on and even damage another person’s property where it is foreseeably 
necessary to secure our own safety (though this typically obligates us to pay for any damages).  
The government can even abridge what are normally seen as fundamental rights in 
exigent circumstances or operate outside the bounds of default separation of powers 
constraints. Against a widely-perceived right to generally travel where we want (especially 
domestically), the government may prevent us from traveling where a weather emergency 
exists, or buckle our seatbelts under threat of penalty.  The executive branch and law 
enforcement have permission to take actions that would otherwise be described as violations of 
the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments in cases of emergency or imminent danger. Eminent 
domain permits government officials to take private property where doing so serves a public 
purpose, controversially in cases of emergencies. Even more subjectively, certain categories of 
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offensive conduct in public are punishable,90 without much of a principled distinction between 
the categories that are not and those that are within our rights (and not punishable) beyond the 
weight of public opinion. These are therefore determined, at least in many cases, on a cultural 
level. While there is considerable controversy in various applications of each of these views and 
how far they extend, I can safely assume that nearly all democratic citizens would agree that 
some of them are permissible abridgements of freedom in certain cases. 
Though the above examples are just a select few, they are all exceptions to laws justified 
by the presence of actual or perceived existential threats. For many of these, it is well-settled 
that we must make a psychological inquiry into whether the person perceiving the threat was 
reasonable in so perceiving it at that moment; in these cases the threat was determined at the 
time of action on an individual level.  What is noticeably absent are exceptions for existential 
threats or dangers perceived from the perspective of a comprehensive doctrine, or from a set or 
type of comprehensive doctrines. What the claimants in Lyng and Navajo Nation each 
perceived, if we take them at their word, were existential threats, albeit ones with spiritual 
causes, as a result of the challenged government actions in those cases. The dissents in both 
cases call attention to the tribes’ beliefs in their stewardship roles for humanity and the 
catastrophic events that would befall the earth and its inhabitants if efficacious rituals were not 
performed.  
There is therefore a disparity in the treatment of existential threats that the Lyng line of 
cases either itself caused or leaves open: those existential threats perceived or harms suffered 
that are spiritual in nature do not enjoy carve-outs (at least in cases like Lyng) unless they are 
coupled with a physical, economic or legal punishment or harm. It might even be appropriate to 
                                                          
90 For Joel Feinberg’s extended discussion of this issue and an attempt to model the distinction, see 
Offense to Others (Cambridge: Oxford University Press 1984). J.S. Mill, as staunch a defender of broad 
liberty as any, also defends a “defense principle” in On Liberty. 
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call the threats at issue in those cases physical threats with spiritual causes, and this makes the 
disparity even clearer. No matter the degree of the harm or imminence of the threat, both 
courts were emphatic that a court shall accord such spiritual threats no weight in the case’s 
disposition.  
The representatives do not simply advocate the range of doctrines who happen to 
require no legal exceptions (or at least not more than what is widely endorsed among citizens) 
for ultimate spiritual or moral concerns, or those who object to them, including the sort at issue 
in these sacred land cases: they also represent various theists, other minority religions and 
secular comprehensive doctrines with special moral concerns that might require exceptions or 
unique legal considerations in various circumstances. In Lyng, for instance, the over 5,000 tribe 
members who lived near the Chimney Rock area possessed unique conceptions of land and land 
ownership, mankind’s essential role in sustaining the created world, religious practices 
inextricably tied to land use (rather than doxastic practices) and so on. While there is no single 
spiritual or moral threat (or attendant duty) that these various comprehensive doctrines would 
agree exists and warrants some special legal exceptions (certainly not the purportedly sacred 
sites in Lyng or Navajo Nation), they would agree that there is such a thing and that its reflection 
in the law is a priority. Accordingly, they would similarly wish for some mechanism by which 
such concerns can be accorded some weight, since they all have such concerns, including some 
degree of admissibility in legal forums. A being who sets the scope of free exercise to include no 
such mechanism, then, is either: a flesh-and-blood citizen who adheres to the sorts of doctrines 
I listed at the beginning of this paragraph, a being who represents a coalition of such 
comprehensive doctrines and is either indifferent towards or disfavors others, or a being behind 
the veil of ignorance who is a gambler. The representatives in the original position are no such 
beings, as Section B explained at length. In short, this is an approach tolerable only from the 
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standpoint of certain comprehensive doctrines and their advocates: it is endorsed from a limited 
set of somewheres. 
 A well-placed objection, perhaps from Rawls or Charles Larmore, might argue that I have 
misunderstood the sort of consensus that the representatives, as advocates for both coalitions 
of worldviews I mentioned above, must seek regarding the sorts of burden that give rise to 
religious exceptions to ordinary operations of laws. Those which they can neither agree on nor 
defend based on values accessible to one another simply are not matters for public recognition 
and treatment for they are, as Richard Rorty describes religious claims generally, “conversation 
stoppers.” Accordingly, Larmore advocates the following dialogical procedure: “In the face of 
disagreement, those who wish to continue the conversation should retreat to neutral ground, 
with the hope of either resolving the dispute or bypassing it.”91 Talisse explains that Larmore 
and others who advocate similar procedures involving “restraint” or “retreat” therefore do not 
forbid public restrictions out of any attitude like skepticism, but suggest this sort of public-
private epistemological division “for the purposes of [political] conversation” and without any 
“deeper epistemic ramifications.”92  
Rawls recognizes that there must be some fund of facts about the world from which the 
representatives (or later, citizens as faithful adherents to public reason) must draw. His 
description of what these facts can be is understandably limited, but they include the 
“conclusions of science, where not controversial” and “ascertainable facts and evidence open to 
public view.” Assuming a limited and non-controversial set of rudimentary scientific facts 
regarding bodily security, threats to public safety of property or person, etc., are recognizable 
from the array of evidence sets from which various citizens begin reasoning. There is therefore a 
                                                          
91 Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1987), 53.  
92 Democracy and Moral Conflict, 51. 
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common evidentiary ground from which deliberations about such threats can issue. In the case 
of more contestable issues, where the most pertinent claims turn on unshared facts, the parties 
to both sides of a deliberation will have trouble reaching a common deliberative ground. 
Larmore and Rawls similarly observe, and Rawls especially focuses on regarding contentious 
issues like abortion, that they will often reveal an impasse regarding facts about the personhood 
or ensoulment of a fetus. Larmore’s “retreat” proposal here would move from the specific 
battleground of an unrelentingly contestable fact to a more common ground, such as a shared 
idea of freedom or human dignity. Using somewhat different vocabulary, Rawls claims that the 
Roe v. Wade ruling is the product of just this sort of process. Wherever the institution of a legal 
rule, or exception to a legal rule, can be settled only on the basis of facts that are the subject of 
considerable, and rational, disagreement among comprehensive doctrines, that issue must 
simply be removed from the political agenda, for it cannot be the product of universally 
legislated rulemaking. Because there is no non-controversial basis for instituting protections for 
sacred lands or spiritual threats, particularly where they involve inhibiting legitimate 
government activities taken for a public purpose, neither the original position’s delineation of 
constitutional essentials nor the Supreme Court qua exemplar of public reason can be the 
morally appropriate place to deliberate over such matters. 
While there is much that is right about this sort of objection regarding religion’s place in 
politics generally, I will offer three replies that each suggest why it is misplaced in, at least, 
substantial burden jurisprudence. The first two replies are to some misunderstandings 
embedded in this kind of objection and the third claims that this objection overlooks some 
features of the original position. First, and most importantly, the argument in favor of the 
claimants that I have begun to lay out does not dictate the result in advance: the problem from 
the standpoint of the original position with the ruling is not that the tribal claimants lost per se, 
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but that their parochial concerns were inadmissible as a category.93 It might well be the case 
that the publicly cognizable import of certain or most government functions will win the day 
over some notion of “spiritual, existential threats” or “significant dangers of spiritual concern” 
or any other way of formulating the tribes’ concerns at a higher level of abstraction (such that 
they are cognizable across comprehensive doctrines). What matters in the first place is that 
these concerns factor into the court’s reasoning and that issues of ultimate concern to the tribes 
matter in court, and matter as they would to an impartial being of maximum imaginative 
flexibility. Put otherwise, constitutional legal doctrine must account for their concerns in 
determining the scope of free exercise generally and what constitutes a substantial burden 
specifically; after all, the liberal notion of legitimacy demands that constitutional essentials bear 
their fingerprints. 
Second, the tribal claimants’ call for courts to consider spiritual threats as potentially 
dispositive factors is not an insistence that their beliefs must win out no matter what for them 
to recognize the finality or binding nature of the ruling. One who insisted that the government 
must recognize a spiritual threat or duty as more important than what others see as important 
or essential government activities would not (in so insisting) fully recognize the moral agency of 
others. To argue for their claim having weight, however, the tribes in Lyng, Navajo Nation, and 
the pending Utah disputes need to offer no such insistences as these. The tribes may argue 
quite forcefully for their views mattering in a public sense, even determinatively so, by insisting 
on recognition not of the value of their beliefs or the fact of the dreaded spiritual threats at 
issue, but on recognition of a certain conception of free exercise and the psychological fact of 
their possessing their beliefs with great intensity. As a practical matter, it is within a tribe’s 
                                                          
93 Regarding the legality of abortion, Talisse analogously says of Political Liberalism that the difficulty lies 
in not being able to recognize Thomist reasons as reasons, even in the case of a hypothetically irrefutable 
proof of the doctrine of ensoulment as a basis for opposing abortion.  
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range of options in many such cases to endorse or negotiate a solution that treats public and 
other doctrines’ parochial values alongside their own.  
This was the case, for instance, in a sacred land controversy near Devil’s Tower, 
culminating in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999). In this 
case, much like in Lyng, ritualistic uses of the land in question demanded a degree of silence and 
non-disturbance, during which the tribe requested a temporary cessation of recreational 
activities at the top of Devil’s Tower by other visitors. Because Devil’s Tower is a popular and 
frequented destination among climbing enthusiasts, the climbing group objected to the tribe’s 
request for periodic, uninterrupted use of this area of Devil’s Tower. Outside of court, however, 
the tribe participated in negotiations regarding and assented to a compromise land 
management plan offered to both sides by the National Park Service, pursuant to which the 
ritual site would be closed to climbers during part of the year and open to them during the rest. 
This was no instance of the tribe’s baldly insisting on the truth or the value of its own worldview, 
but an attempt to recognize the value of both. The tribe in this matter did not view its own claim 
from within its comprehensive doctrine as that of an exclusive or higher priority owner or 
possessor of the land, but as an interest more akin to a timeshare.  
Third, identifying the appropriate scope of “substantial burdens” to free exercise by 
determining which threats are universally recognized misunderstands the representatives’ task 
and the veil of ignorance. Including only economic punishments, physical restraints, and the like, 
as cognizable harms that can give rise to a claim is an approach that I have mentioned is 
satisfying to one set of comprehensive doctrines and deeply unsatisfying to another set. This 
sort of objection would take each sort of harm or accommodation and ask whether it is 
cognizable by all parties, including only those that would yield an affirmative answer. The result 
would be that those doctrines possessing minimalist ontologies would be inevitably and 
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automatically favored, and minority comprehensive doctrines would be automatically 
disfavored.  
By contrast, the question that I have posed more generally is how we could describe, in 
the form of a rule together with any carve-outs, the scope of what can potentially be recognized 
as a “substantial burden” to free exercise, where this scope is understood as a compromise 
among comprehensive doctrines and one that treats the variously inclined citizens as equal 
moral agents. In fact, assuming arguendo that Rawls’s account of Roe v. Wade as a compromise 
between vigorously opposed comprehensive doctrines is correct, the land management plan 
proposed by the National Park Service in Bear Lodge and assented to by the tribal claimants in 
that case would be much more analogous to it than would the majority opinions in either Lyng 
or Navajo Nation.  
 What I have argued so far is that the representatives’ features, particularly their 
attitudes toward comprehensive doctrines, would not permit the scope of “substantial burdens” 
that we find in the courts’ rulings in question. Because this might well be said of any alternative 
judicial approach, my negative critique is of little value if I do not at least offer some 
characteristics of an approach to sacred lands cases that would be more consistent with the 
attitudes and duties of the representatives. When describing the sort of approach that the 
original position could produce, we must keep in mind those from other comprehensive 
doctrines and opposing interests, including those like the climbers in Bear Lodge. Rawls’s duty of 
civility, as discussed in Section A, comes with both a speaking and a listening component: all 
citizens ought to be willing to both offer others reasons they can foreseeably accept and willing 
to consider the possibility that other speakers are contributing something of political and social 
value. Those in the original position are tasked with making decisions regarding constitutional 
essentials that will foster this sort of environment. This approach ends up being, I argue, similar 
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to Brennan’s dissent, wherein he recommends that the Court employ strict scrutiny,94 or (to a 
lesser degree) Judith Jarvis Thomson’s proposal of rights’ varying in stringency with the degree 
of a party’s interest in them.95 
Brennan’s charge that the majority “forces Indian concepts into non-Indian 
categories,”96 is construable as an attempt to highlight those additional factors that an impartial 
observer, or universal advocate, would find important in determining the appropriate scope of 
free exercise on sacred lands. In defense of its contention that the Government could not have 
been more solicitous to the tribes’ interests, the majority notes (among other things) that “no 
sites where specific rituals take place were to be disturbed.”97 Brennan observes that 
understanding the tribes’ beliefs about creation, land, the lack of a boundary between religious 
and social existence, their ritualistic stewardship duties, and so on, is essential in understanding 
their claims. More specifically and regarding the aforementioned notion of a “site” embedded in 
the majority’s reasoning, the reality that Brennan highlighted is that the 25-mile area known as 
the “high country” was regarded as being alive, and various forms of land use (including the 
trails used and the precise sequence of sites visited) are necessary to harness the specific 
spiritual properties of various areas of land.98 Moreover, successful rituals and acts of medicine 
making (which was often thought to cure ailments and save lives on an individual level) in the 
                                                          
94 As mentioned in Section A, in American constitutional law, strict scrutiny applies where the government 
infringes a fundamental right. If the court deems a fundamental right present, the government must show 
that its action infringing the fundamental right is necessary to satisfy a compelling government interest. 
95Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Some Ruminations on Rights,” Arizona Law Review 19 (1997), 54. 
96 Lyng, 459. 
97 Id. 454. 
98 Id., 462-3. That the notion of a “site” is sometimes imposed from the outside and in a mode of cultural 
imperialism, however innocently, is a position that has wide appeal outside of constitutional 
jurisprudence. Robert Dunnell and other archaeologists who have promoted more community-based 
approaches to archaeology near indigenous communities, for instance, have argued that the process of 
defining a “site” masquerades as, but is not, simply objective. See, for example, Robert C. Dunnell, “The 
Notion of Site” in Space, Time and Archaeological Landscapes, eds. Jacqueline Rossignol & Luann 
Wandsnider (New York: Plenum 1992), 21-41. 
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high country require certain conditions, such as silence and privacy.  These land uses are of 
central importance in their religious beliefs, and their religious beliefs are inextricably 
intertwined with their social or political existence. Thus, they are essential not only to their 
religious survival, but social cohesion and moral identity.  
On the other hand, the government’s interests in the land and the potential benefits 
were marginal.  The majority did not contest the lower courts’ findings that the G-O road would 
not increase access to timber resources, the road would not significantly improve administration 
of the surrounding forest, and the only (minimal) benefits to recreational use would also detract 
from recreational use (by upsetting the pristineness of the countryside).  Instead, as Brennan 
notes, the majority simply claims that the government’s prerogative as landowner takes priority 
over any contrary interests, based on a property regime (which treats land tracts as divisible and 
subject to such forms of ownership) not cognizable to the tribes. The crux of the decisions was 
that only legal sanctions and coerced violation of beliefs were recognizable injuries to religious 
beliefs or practices for free exercise purposes. 
An advocate behind the veil of ignorance, armed with the facts about the tribes’ 
religious and cultural beliefs and practices summarized above, would surely regard the above 
value discrepancy (regarding the proposed land uses) as making some degree of a moral 
difference that ought to be reflected in a legal or political action. Such a shift in perspective and 
attitude would bring this case much closer to the sort of moral difference highlighted by 
Thomson’s thought experiment involving the medicine-containing lockbox.99 A being who 
                                                          
99 Thomson memorably considers the sorts of rights or rights violations that would be involved if it were 
the case that I had a lockbox containing lifesaving medicine on my back porch, and a third party wished 
enter my property, break the lock and take it if I am not home to give permission. Thomson submits that it 
is intuitive to almost all of us that it would be morally impermissible of me to withhold permission if the 
medicine did not matter very much to me, but that a different result would obtain if I was in just as dire a 
need of the medicine as the child. 
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decided on a regime in which all interests in a land use were treated identically, or without 
regard to the differences that mattered to potential land users, would not be the sort of being 
who would be sympathetic towards a variety of doctrines, nor would it be a being who 
understood much, if anything, regarding human psychology or how human beings take up and 
pursue conceptions of the good. To suggest that this set of religious and cultural practices would 
always take priority is to forget that such an advocate also represents the public and those who 
might wish to use the land on the basis of putatively comparable moral or religious values. But 
neither contrary private land uses nor compelling government land uses are asserted here.  
An advocate (i.e., representative) would not base protection of injuries approaching life-
or-death importance on the type or form of the burden imposed, but on the degree of the 
burden imposed or, as Brennan puts it, the effect of the challenged land uses on the tribe’s 
culture and the world’s safety. Why should a tribe member be more satisfied with what is from 
her perspective a catastrophe, so long as it was imposed slightly more indirectly? The only 
approach that could reflect the attitudes of the representatives, or rather, the only approach 
that would be a rational choice for beings tasked with such a decision, is one in which: (i) the 
fact that interests of the greatest value were involved in a proceeding, rather than those of 
marginal important, would be accorded constitutionally cognizable weight in a balancing test; 
and (ii) that degree of moral difference would be sufficient to be dispositive absent a 
comparatively strong or important value from the other side, be that from a public welfare 
standpoint or opposing private, parochial interest. Whether this must necessarily take the form 
that strict scrutiny analyses ordinarily take in constitutional deliberations is not something I 
need to settle here. But it is difficult to imagine that the representatives would not add some 
third requirement like the following, in order to ensure that contrived, ad hoc religious claims do 
not run amok and immobilize the government: (iii) the balancing act regarding (i) and (ii) is only 
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required if some sort of demonstration of the import of the interest at issue is offered. Without 
(iii), the representatives would forget their advocacy duties for those citizen counterparts who 
had contrary interests in the land or government functions that benefitted them immensely.  If 
the interest in (i) were to no or very little extent translatable in terms of primary goods, or more 
abstract and shared statements regarding conceptions of the good, then they would appear to 
those outside of one’s doctrine as shrill assertions or bare insistences. What sort of form this 
evidentiary showing must take is almost unavoidably problematic in practice, but such problems 
would be preferable to the representatives to staying out of the inquiry altogether (which is the 
route for which both Scalia in Smith and O’Connor in Lyng opt). This suggestion of some 
evidentiary showing attending something like (iii), including some effort at translating parochial 
concerns into a publicly coherent form, is similar to the sorts of epistemic constraints that 
Talisse and Habermas wish to introduce as a middle option between exclusivists and inclusivists 
in the public reason debate. If there were no such required showing, then the government (and 
the public insofar as they bore the costs) would be potentially subject to accommodating 
putatively central religious concerns as a matter of mere assertion by religious or cultural 
groups.  
What Brennan suggests along the lines of (iii) is that, to trigger the balancing test that 
inheres in strict scrutiny, the claimant must show that the religious belief or practice is central or 
indispensable in their religion. Because I believe “centrality” is a sufficiently close proxy to the 
sort of showing the representatives must choose, I will consider O’Connor and Scalia’s common 
objection to that proposal specifically. Scalia’s opinion in Smith details (perhaps sympathetically 
and laudably) the Court’s long-standing recognition of its inadequacy in assessing the value of 
certain religious beliefs or locating a specific belief or practice within a religion or culture.100 The 
                                                          
100 Smith, 888. 
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worry that both share is that inquiries into “centrality”, in addition to being unguided by reliable 
principles, could result in the Court disagreeing with a religious adherent’s claims about which of 
her beliefs were central or indispensable and, in effect, require the court to rule that “some 
religious adherents misunderstand their own beliefs.”101   
As odious as this paternalistic eventuality may seem to some, we must consider the two 
options before the representatives in deciding whether to accord special constitutional weight 
to certain “central” values, especially those that I have described as existential spiritual threats. 
In the first, the representatives can decide to avoid such epistemic arrogance or capriciousness 
from judges and stay out of the “centrality” inquiry altogether. I have chosen Lyng and Navajo 
Nation to demonstrate the potentially unbearable costs of this first approach: where a religious 
group faces what its adherents regard as a grave or even catastrophic threat, they leave 
themselves without any further protection than in cases implicating those duties (or threats to 
them) that are of comparatively lesser concern. There is no immediately available principle to 
make centrality determinations, but surely in every religion there are issues of greater and 
lesser concern and, there are one or more normative commitments that are deepest to its 
adherents. Nonetheless, this option (i.e., staying out of the centrality inquiry altogether) does 
not risk the deep offense or blasphemy that the sorts of judicial or other political misstatements 
of doctrine might visit on certain comprehensive doctrines. As reflected in the admission from 
Tushnet that I marshalled in favor of my position, it might also be the case that the judiciary’s 
greater epistemic access to so-called Western religions prevents them from regarding their 
concerns as serious. Religious or cultural self-determination remains free from political or legal 
corruption in whatever forms they might take.  
                                                          
101 Lyng, 459. 
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Notwithstanding the validity of this concern, it is difficult to imagine that 
representatives would compromise their citizens’ deepest commitments to withstand some 
potential paternalistic pronouncements or judicial misstatements. The ultimate disrespect or 
harm would be an indifference to spiritual threats of the highest degree or to erecting an 
impenetrable barrier to pursuing the ultimate good and avoiding the ultimate evil (i.e., an 
impenetrable barrier to keeping themselves, their culture and others safe). This conclusion is 
based on the representatives’ central task in maximizing their citizen counterparts’ share of the 
index of primary goods, including a meaningful opportunity for freedom of conscience, rather 
than a notion of it particular to select Western religious denominations or to the non-religious, 
and (b) a simple notion of rational advantage from the perspectives of individual believers. 
Brennan well-summarized the asymmetry between the majority’s concern for offending this sort 
of sensibility regarding religious self-determination and its concern for what was, according to 
the tribes themselves, an indispensable religious and cultural practice:  
Ironically, the Court's apparent solicitude for the integrity of religious belief and its 
desire to forestall the possibility that courts might second-guess the claims of religious 
adherents leads to far greater inequities than those the Court postulates: today's ruling 
sacrifices a religion at least as old as the Nation itself, along with the spiritual well-being 
of its approximately 5,000 adherents, so that the Forest Service can build a 6-mile 
segment of road that two lower courts found had only the most marginal and 
speculative utility, both to the Government itself and to the private lumber interests 
that might conceivably use it.102 
 
Based on these considerations, I will simply close by assuming that any religious believer 
similarly situated to the tribe would prefer a jurisprudence that risked occasional paternalism in 
order to leave open a dialogical opportunity for protection against graver threats. Any potential, 
paternalistic threat (or other misunderstanding of their religion or culture) could be minimized 
by this very dialogical opportunity: in situating their concerns within free exercise jurisprudence, 
                                                          
102 Lyng, 475-6. 
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they could take that opportunity to contribute substantial effort toward translating their specific 
concerns and their broader cultural context to much differently disposed citizens or public 
officials. 
Finally, as I transition out of the internal critique of only those Rawlsians who endorse 
Lyng or Smith, and to some closing reflections more directly critical of Rawls, there is evidence 
implying that Rawls might well have been sympathetic to the majority opinions in these cases 
and regarded the claimants as unreasonable. I alluded to this possibility at the beginning of this 
essay, but think it appropriate at this juncture to recognize how great an assumption it might be 
to suppose that those like the tribes would constitute full participants in the four-stage veiled 
deliberation, beginning with the original position. There are two points in Political Liberalism 
especially that suggest, for Rawls, similarly situated claimants ought not be so included, though 
neither of the hypothetical comprehensive doctrines he discusses in these examples squares 
precisely with the tribal claimants.  
First, Rawls is emphatic that those who demand a special distribution of primary goods 
as demanded by certain religious content (and somewhat similar religious content to the tribal 
claimants’) are at odds with enduring social stability:  
Some persons may count among their religious obligations going on pilgrimages to 
distant places or building magnificent cathedrals or temples. To guarantee the equal 
worth of religious liberty is now understood to require that such persons receive special 
provision to enable them to meet these obligations. On this view, then, their religious 
needs, as it were, are greater for the purposes of political justice, whereas those whose 
religious beliefs oblige them to make but modest demands on material means do not 
receive such provision; their religious needs are much less. Plainly, this kind of 
guarantee is socially divisive, a receipt for religious controversy if not civil strife. Similar 
consequences result, I believe, whenever the public conception of justice adjusts 
citizens’ claims to social resources so that some receive more than others depending on 
the determinate final ends and loyalties belonging to their conceptions of the good.…It 
suffices to say that one main reason for using an index of primary goods in assessing the 
strength of citizens’ claims in questions of political justice is precisely to eliminate the 
socially divisive and irreconcilable conflicts which such principles would arouse.103     
                                                          
103 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 329-30. 
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While the prima facie public reason argument I have presented is distinguishable from the 
specific examples Rawls uses in this passage, it is also clear that the tribal claimants are, to some 
extent, requesting some special (even if non-exclusive) claim or access over a stretch of public 
land. The spirit of the above passage is reminiscent of at least some of the components of the 
Lyng, Smith and Navajo Nation majority opinions. In Rawls’s thought, there is unmistakable 
tension here between inclusiveness in the political arena and avoiding irreconcilable conflicts or 
social division within it.  
 If the sacred lands cases I have considered and those that are now pending in federal 
courts are not distinguishable, for Rawls, from the aforementioned passage, then we encounter 
a difficulty that relates to the attitudinal states of the representatives (and delegates) 
throughout this essay. The original position and its deliberations should not be set up in such a 
way that they favor either a majoritarian coalition or those who are satisfied with the status 
quo; the parties have no such disposition towards such positions. While it’s possible that the 
index of primary goods can be construed and specified such that they are not demanding more 
than others, in the passage above Rawls appears to include in his chastisement any of those who 
demand any special provision of resources to accommodate a set of religious beliefs or 
practices. How to handle property regimes or land-based religious practices that depart from 
the mainstream, whatever that might be, is an unusual conundrum for Rawls. The sacred land 
cases are also difficult ones in that they do not explicitly demand funding or affirmative conduct 
from the government (at least here), but forbearance. In the contemporary Utah disputes, 
however, the basis for objection does seem to demand affirmative protection (as it did in Bear 
Lodge). Given this quandary, we might well wonder whether a comprehensive doctrine like this 
can resist an “unreasonable” label according to Rawlsian political liberalism; it may be that their 
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abdicating any such claim to the land in court or the political arena is a condition of their being 
full participants in the veiled rulemaking underlying the social contract.  
 Second, and relatedly, Rawls makes equally clear that we must deny any claim from a 
comprehensive doctrine that there are certain ends or obligations so important that they justify 
some degree of civil strife,104 such as where the religious salvation of a whole people is said to 
depend on an issue’s being settled properly.  As with the first Rawlsian tension in the foregoing 
analysis, this does not precisely describe the tribal claimants. Their beliefs did not expressly 
justify civil strife, but they did claim that their salvation and the world’s security were both at 
stake. While by a “denial” Rawls emphasizes not that this is not a claim that such religious 
beliefs are false, but that they cannot be publicly justified, my discussion of existential, spiritual 
threats indicates why this might also be a blurry distinction. To have cognizable interests, under 
both of these two sources of tension that suggest Rawls might disagree with Brennan, it appears 
that the tribal claimants would have to forego public claims regarding the gravity of their 
interests in the sacred lands at issue. The analytical possibilities regarding how we can 
understand the tribes in light of these concerns, and to what extent religious citizens can 
“accept” public reason-based determinations that offend their deepest normative 
commitments, are what I will explore in the following section. 
E. Between Acceptability and Acquiescence: A Limitation of the Foregoing Analysis 
 There are at least two deeply unsatisfying features of viewing the sacred lands cases 
through the lens of the original position, as I have tried to do here. Each of these, as I have just 
said, reveals a tension between Rawls’s attempt to imagine a system of justice that 
simultaneously maintains social stability, achieves fairness through equal access to primary 
goods and eschews reference to the whole truth in politics. First, it is doubtful that, where a 
                                                          
104 This passage was also discussed earlier, see Political Liberalism 152-3. 
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religious claimant’s beliefs are heard and considered (i.e., a judge or other decision-making 
authority makes an effort to translate that claimant’s views into appropriately public concerns), 
but another governmental or private interest is ruled to be overriding, the religious claimant 
could meaningfully accept that ruling, particularly in cases involving something like “spiritual, 
existential threats” or “deepest normative commitments.” This is why I have presented the 
argument against the currently predominant judicial approach to sacred lands, and the case in 
favor of a contrary approach, as a prima facie case: it doesn’t help settle cases of contrary, 
compelling government interests or deepest normative commitments to contrary land uses by 
other private citizen groups. Second, because the representatives do accept some propositions 
as true and must have some attitudes related to the truth value of certain other categories of 
claims, it is doubtful that a representational device like the original position can provide 
comprehensive answers to constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice without 
somewhat frequent reference to truth apt claims.  I will outline several possible responses to 
the first tension here and, because the second tension is closely related to my more thorough 
critique of Rawls, I will save my discussion of that for my subsequent work. 
 As applied to the cases before us, and given that the tribes might well lose to 
government or other parochial interests in a sacred lands case even under the free exercise 
approach that Brennan and I endorse, one might well wonder how meaningfully the tribes could 
see their own fingerprints in a system in which they could still possibly lose (and, if their beliefs 
are sincere, this would be a catastrophic loss). After all, insofar as they are free and equal moral 
agents, and insofar as their comprehensive doctrine is a reasonable one, the representatives are 
their advocates too and a legal system could not be indifferent to them or their worldview. An 
awfully convenient feature of several major sacred land cases is that the contrary governmental 
use was clearly of less value (or at least stipulated to be) to the government than preventing 
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that use was to the tribal claimants. But it might well be the case that a proposed land use was 
supported by a putative compelling interest on the government’s or the public’s part. Or, 
considering the Bear Lodge case briefly discussed above, it is not difficult to imagine a 
competing moral or religious claim to land that is of the utmost importance to that other citizen 
or citizen group and that is mutually exclusive with the tribal claim to it (perhaps because the 
competing land use, from the tribe’s perspective, poses a spiritual threat).105 I claimed in my 
prima facie public reason-based argument against the Lyng and Navajo Nation majority 
opinions, as the tribal claimants did, that they did not seek a superior or privileged use of the 
land, but something more akin to a timeshare that allowed for other comprehensive doctrines 
to make land use claims.  I also claimed that their insistence was not that they win no matter 
what, but that the paramount import of the land use made a difference or mattered in the 
Court’s analysis, as a representative in the original position must require. If it did not matter, 
then the Court’s attitude would resemble the sorts of attitudes that Habermas and Talisse 
identified as non-neutral ones.  
 What if, in one of these more difficult cases (i.e., involving a competing use of 
supposedly life-or-death or compelling import), the tribal claimants did lose? It would be 
unrealistic to suppose that the tribes would say something less flip, but to the effect of, “thanks 
for thinking of me, but now we must face our doom.” One of the principal bases for Brennan’s 
proposed approach, and against the majority approach that I have spent this essay criticizing 
from a Rawlsian perspective, was that the effect on the claimants’ religious practices and the 
                                                          
105 This sort of possibility is what centrally occupies Brian Leiter in his Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 2014). Leiter memorably juxtaposes (i) a Canadian dispute in which Sikhs were 
granted a religious exemption to the rule against weapons in schools, so that their adherents could fulfill 
their religious duty of carrying a ceremonial dagger called a kirpan with them at all times; and (ii) a 
possible non-religious or moral claim involving an agricultural community in which receiving and carrying 
a rifle is endemic to their conception of the duties surrounding manhood.  
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spiritual threats they perceived were what they cared about, and not the form in which that 
effect was first produced. One might well wonder how the situation would be any better or 
different, from their perspectives, if the Court (in some other case) were to accord their 
interests in the land use some (even a great amount of) weight, but nonetheless conclude that 
the government had a compelling interest in the land that took priority over theirs. In such 
cases, as for spiritual threats that arise for religious claimants from almost any faith, it is 
doubtful that the Court’s analysis, in which the tribes’ concerns made some difference to the 
Court, would make any difference to the tribes from the current one. In a losing case, the tribe 
would face what the Lyng syllabus called a “virtual destruction” of their religion (and culture) 
and would be exposed to all the threats that the Lyng and Navajo Nation claimants feared 
would result from inefficacious rituals. So could this jurisprudence be any less foreign to them 
and could they see any of their own authorship in it or view it as a legitimate exercise of 
authority? Put still otherwise, could this alternate approach, in the event of a judicial loss, 
survive under Rawls’s “strains of commitment” argument? 
 It seems to me that there are three analytic possibilities, for each of these types of 
cases, that are foreseeable. First, we might agree with a tribal insistence that they must (i.e., as 
justice requires) win in cases like Lyng above almost all other interests, though we would have 
to tell an awfully compelling story as to why the original position and public reason necessarily 
lead to automatic moral or legal priority for interests like theirs. This story would have to be 
even more compelling in cases like Badoni or Wyoming Sawmill, which sought to enjoin citizens’ 
conduct, particularly if the tribes seek to enjoin the public from visiting or using large swaths of 
land. Moreover, in the latter, two of the justifications underlying prior deforesting efforts on 
some of the sacred land at issue were forest health (reducing the threat of pests to the rest of 
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the forest) and public safety (reducing the risk of wildfires).106 While Rawls suggests that these 
concepts do lead to a prioritization of “fundamental interests connected with the exercise of 
citizens’ two moral powers”107 over all other interests (which presumably includes free 
exercise), those cases I have asked us to imagine in this section involve competing interests of 
these sorts. It is not clear what resources a doctrinally neutral being of total imaginative 
flexibility, if “total imaginative flexibility” (language from Nagel and not Rawls) is applicable to 
the representatives, could access in beginning to work out an answer. If it were claimed that 
such a determination and the underlying guidelines for it were not a task for the 
representatives, then we might well wonder whether, as Eberle does, whether the Rawlsian 
conception of public reason can satisfy the sufficiency condition. What good is a framework that 
cannot solve the hard cases involving constitutional essentials? Alternatively, if we were to treat 
all “central” religious practices as dispositive in free exercise cases, then collectively one would 
suspect such claims (or compelling cases supporting them) would proliferate, and frustrate a 
number of public or government functions. It might also, as several courts in sacred land cases 
have feared, lead to vetoes over much larger swaths of public (or private) land. 
 Second, we might simply dub the tribal claimants “unreasonable” if they were insistent 
that the grave threats they perceive in sacred lands cases ought to always be dispositive. The 
Rawlsian consequence of this label is that those so insisting are not granted a place at the table 
in the original position, and their authorship is thereby excluded in determining constitutional 
essential; or, at the very least, their authorship is not equal with those citizens or 
comprehensive doctrines that are reasonable. One reason why this label might be warranted is 
                                                          
106 See William Perry Pendley, “The Establishment Clause and the Closure of ‘Sacred’ Public and Private 
Lands,” Denver University Law Review 83 (2006), 1025-6. Pendley, who joined Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. in 
challenging the Forest Service’s protection of sacred land in this case, is deeply critical of the sort of “veto 
power” that he believes Native Americans have been granted in cases like Badoni and Wyoming Sawmills. 
107 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 110. 
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because, once the tribe has offered, through labors of translation, a public reason-based 
account of their concerns, and the Court has accorded them some moral weight but nonetheless 
found other interests weightier, the tribe may have no public reasons left to offer as to why 
theirs should be more controlling.  At such a point, they might appear to shrilly and baldly insist 
on their own, unshared views, and appear to the Court or other citizens to offer no reasons at 
all. It might also be said that this position is tantamount to a claim for a greater share of the 
“index of primary goods” than other citizens or the public, insofar as their religion is unique in 
permitting greater land access or more space and resources in pursuing their conception of the 
good than others can possibly enjoy. Such insistences, as we have said, are inconsistent with a 
system of mutual cooperation among free and equal systems, especially one in which all parties 
must (as is the central Hobbesian insight) feel bound. 
 While there is much support (beyond these) for the possibility that an insistent tribal 
claimant would be “unreasonable” under Political Liberalism (two examples of which I 
presented at the end of the last section), this label has many, potentially undemocratic 
difficulties. Most straightforwardly, the optics of such a declaration regarding a minority faith or 
cultural group for any putative, politically liberal democracy, are quite bad. What this 
declaration would amount to, in essence, is that cultural groups who do not square well with 
land uses or regimes of property ownership that were historically foisted on them in the first 
place, violently so, are unreasonable for continuing their practices that predated such violence. 
Who in the original position could choose such an oppressive property regime to victims of past 
hegemonic violence? This case is obviously distinct from other instances where the imposition 
of a liberal hegemony seems less problematic, such as in public schools or in prohibitions of hate 
speech. The ritualistic practices at issue in the cases discussed here existed at a time before the 
sacred lands were (repeating Justice O’Connor’s words) “after all, its [the government’s] land.” 
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These historically specific considerations, however, are somewhat beside the point of an 
application and critique of Rawls to minority faiths generally.  
 A greater difficulty with this second possibility is that the way the term “unreasonable” 
is applied here would potentially implicate almost any religion with extremely deep normative 
commitments, particularly those with commitments of a “life-or-death” nature or those whose 
deepest normative commitments are performative (i.e., ritualistic). This might excuse some 
denominations within major faiths whose deepest commitments are entirely doxastic, but it 
could foreseeably extend across majority and minority faiths, and various demographic 
divisions. For any sincere and committed believer (be it a religious system or a moral cause), 
their religion would require them to continue to insist on recognition of, or their right to protect 
against, a spiritual threat in the face of a competing private or government interest. As 
Wolterstorff elegantly puts the matter for religious citizens:  
They do not view it as an option whether or not to do it. It is their conviction that they 
strive for wholeness, integrity, integration in their lives: that they ought to allow the 
Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or 
whatever,108 to shape their existence as a whole, including, then, their social and 
political existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than their 
social and political existence; it is also about their social and political existence. 
 
The only senses of “religion” or “culture” that would not seem to require such behaviors are 
those that, as Slavoj Zizek says, are used almost pejoratively these days to pick those things we 
simply do in private.109 The application of the term “unreasonable” here to the tribes would 
therefore severely limit the scope of those included in the original position and whose interests 
would be represented there and here, in the real, social world. Moreover, the way the concept 
“unreasonable” is being used here, while admittedly a Rawlsian term of art, would put 
extraordinary strain on our colloquial understanding of that term. As was clear of the claimants 
                                                          
108 To this I might add, for our tribal claimants here, “the call of the land and its spirits.” 
109 The Puppet and the Dwarf (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003). 
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in Lyng, and even clearer in the Bear Lodge case, an insistence on a land use is often combinable 
with an attitude that is eager to accommodate other citizen groups’ and the government’s 
interests. The application of the term “unreasonable” here would therefore include those whose 
attitudes are, at least in many cases, cooperative and imbued with a desire to peaceably coexist 
in a democratic culture comprised of free and equal moral agents. 
 The third analytic option in squaring a tribal claimant’s foreseeable attitude toward a 
contrary judicial decision with the Rawlsian principle of legitimacy is to allow that they are 
reasonable notwithstanding their continued insistence on recognition of a grave threat, if not 
their extension of the potential site of the threat to an entire region or state. This would 
obviously be the case for any religious believer who, as I have suggested of certain tribal 
claimants in sacred land cases, only demands a Court’s consideration of their deepest 
commitments, such that they matter for constitutional purposes, rather than the outcome. Even 
if we are reasonably skeptical about such believers’ willingness to lay down their arms (given the 
right opportunity), or at least relegate their continued advocacy to the background, given how 
much is at stake according to their worldview, we might then be forced to conclude that a 
citizen need only be willing to grudgingly acquiesce in a contrary ruling to be reasonable. The 
many versions of justificatory liberalism, as it stands, have the loftier goal of a system predicated 
on reasons that everyone can be reasonably expected to find acceptable (though there are 
various formulations of acceptability that have been proposed other than actual acceptance).  
What this avenue would risk is the abandonment of a guaranteed social stability over a 
complete life as the object of a system of public reason: the best that we can hope for, perhaps, 
is a collective attitudinal state that is (at least to some degree) a modus vivendi. It remains 
possible, however, that Rawls does wish to ultimately exclude any faith that feels a certain 
degree of reluctance in abiding by a contrary ruling.  After all, one function of political liberalism 
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will be to expose and root out unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, which will decline in a 
politically liberal society. Even so, and we find the “unreasonable” label both tenable and 
palatable as applied to those like the tribal claimants, it is not clear that such a status should 
mean no representation whatsoever, rather than less-than-full representation.110 
This avenue is also in tension with the greatest desideratum of political liberalism: social 
stability. There is empirical support for the possibility that a political or legal system that tends 
to underrepresent the deepest normative commitments of religious believers or other citizens 
deeply committed to a comprehensive doctrine leads to their mass retreat into their own, 
dialogical enclaves.111 If this eventuality turns out to be well-supported, regardless of whether 
or not we dub the tribal claimants or other believers “unreasonable,” and the representatives 
purportedly are aware of this feature of human psychology, then it remains to be determined 
whether this threat is adequately accounted for as political liberalism currently stands.  
 Because I will provide much greater detail elsewhere in considering these three 
interpretations of a true believer (or so a secular liberal would call them) who loses in court, I 
only to mention them here to underscore the limited scope of the preceding discussion and its 
vulnerability beyond these sorts of cases. A consideration of the original position and the 
consequent duties of the Supreme Court as exemplar of public reason might help decide cases 
of clear value disparity between a religious claimant and the government, or demonstrate some 
preliminary features of a just (in the Rawlsian sense) free exercise jurisprudence, but could be 
impoverished as applied to other, hard cases. To summarize, a consideration of a tribal 
claimant’s possible attitude following a judicial loss in a case like Lyng reveals a tension between 
                                                          
110 Even if one is unreasonable in some sense, as Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson have observed, this does 
not exhaust the question of whether an explanation is owed to that unreasonable person, group, or 
doctrine. 
111 For several examples of this prediction, see Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 217; 
Robert Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict, 56-69; and Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 75.  
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accommodating religious believers with deep normative commitments (especially ones that are 
less than entirely doxastic) and achieving “stability for the right reasons.”  
F. Concluding Remarks on the Import of Test Cases for Justice as Fairness  
 Considering the amount of ink that has been spilled over Political Liberalism over the 
last two decades, one well-versed in the dispute regarding religious reasons in the public sphere 
might wonder why we need another essay on it. There are two reasons why I chose to explore 
the application of core Rawlsian concepts to a specific line of judicial decisions involving a 
unique religious minority. First, as David Golembeski has observed, there is a relative dearth of 
literature putting jurisprudential debates about religious exemptions to generally applicable 
laws and those from political philosophy about public reason into dialogue (though each of 
these debates are themselves voluminous).112 While the conversation has begun to move in this 
direction, the proliferation of pressing matters like the Standing Rock protests and the Utah 
monument lawsuits have demanded that the conversation regarding what is owed to minority 
faith communities with special demands be sharpened. Commentators in ethics and political 
philosophy have also noted the talkings-past between so-called inclusivists and exclusivists 
regarding public reason.113  
Another source of this impasse is that much of the existing literature focuses on the 
caricatured form that opposing sides of debates over big questions take in popular news media 
and mass public fora. Even where a more detailed picture of dialogical combatants is provided, 
it is at the legislative level. Litigated disputes involving competing, desired courses of conduct 
                                                          
112 David Golembeski, “Judicial Evaluation of Religious Belief and the Accessibility Requirement in Public 
Reason,” Law and Philosophy 35 (2016): 435-60, at 436. Much excellent work on the subject, however, is 
in progress, including a soon-to-be published volume, edited by Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber. 
113 For example, see J. Aaron Simmons, God and the Other (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2011). 
In After Virtue, McIntyre similarly observes that the opposite sides of various issues are incapable of 
interacting towards a resolution since they have are operating on different conceptions of justice or social 
virtue. 
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between two parties who occupy irreconcilable moral or religious positions (including those of 
the religious versus the government), must be adjudicated and are cases in which a decision by a 
neutral third party, a decision that will be deeply dissatisfying to at least one party, is both 
urgent and unavoidable. The judicial record in such cases also typically involves a complete 
statement of both parties’ interests and the degree to which one or the other will be 
unavoidably offended by a judicial decision. In short, the application of Rawlsian concepts to 
constitutional disputes tests the limits of a conception of justice to real, flesh-and-blood citizens 
and disputes of paramount import. It brings out, for example, just how difficult neutrality can be 
and just which groups we might be forced to exclude from first-class citizenship in our 
deliberations if we adopt this or that judicial proposal. On the other hand, some legal 
commentators who discuss appropriate approaches to religious exemptions and free exercise 
jurisprudence often include less rigorous notions of “fairness” or “neutrality” than do those 
from political philosophy. 
 Second, I chose cases involving sacred lands not just because they involve a historically 
oppressed minority religion, whose moral and metaphysical beliefs significantly depart from 
those that are mainstream, but also because of both the literal significance and metaphorical 
power of the problem of shared living space. Much of the existing debate involves an ethic of 
discourse while seated at the deliberating table, including how to accord respect in speaking or 
listening to one’s opponents, and less on the background of conditions of the parties who 
approach it and how space is shared when not reason-giving. Eberle and Marcuse, from very 
different traditions and interests, each noted the profound effect that the social morass one 
inhabits has on the breadth of one’s live psychological, moral, or religious possibilities and the 
degree of one’s doxastic autonomy. How we make decisions about control over and sharing of 
living space has as much to do with freedom of conscience as do the types of reasons that are 
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admissible in passing or justifying positive items of legislation. As I will argue in my next essay on 
this subject, it is not just the language of public reason that ought to be non-hostile to 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, but the structure of the surrounding, shared living space 
insofar as constructing the latter is partly within the ambit of the state. The closer together we 
get, as the recent Standing Rock and the Bear Ears controversies illustrate, the more intractable 
land uses among putatively reasonable citizens pursuing their deepest commitments in shared 
spaces become. 
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II. Liberalism Against Novelty: Containing Unreasonable Doctrines  
and the Risk of One-Dimensionality 
 
Many of those cultures or religions who differ most radically from mainstream 
democratic dialogue are faced, per liberal democratic theory, with one of two fates: some 
degree of absorption into the prevailing legal discourse, or a fading away from political existence 
by virtue of their refusal or inability to so transform.114 This phenomenon is present in all 
contemporary, heterogenous democracies. Jeremy Waldron offers a particularly pessimistic 
articulation of minority cultural or religious communities’ fates in modern, mainstream life: “We 
know that a world in which deracinated cosmopolitanism flourishes is not a safe place for 
minority communities. Our experience has been that they wither and die in the harsh glare of 
modern life, and that the custodians of these dying traditions live out their lives in misery and 
demoralization.”115 John Rawls describes this kind of loss as an inevitable fact of “commonsense 
political sociology”: the social environment will change in a way that makes it more or less 
hospitable to one worldview or another; political gains in modern liberal society tend to entail 
such costs.116 The sort of religious neutrality that liberal theory typically expects of the state is 
religious or moral neutrality regarding procedure rather than outcome, a duty that is discharged 
wherever a law or other political action “can be justified without appealing to the presumed 
intrinsic superiority of any particular conception of the good life.”117 Rawls offers similar 
admissions in Political Liberalism, concluding that “no society can handle within itself all forms 
of life” and that “not all truths can fit into one social world.”118 Were it the state’s responsibility 
                                                          
114 While this process underlies many forms of public reason liberalism, John Rawls offers the most 
detailed description of this process in Political Liberalism.  
115 Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): 93-119, 99. 
116 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 193-97. Also see, for such an account, Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral 
Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 42-47. 
117 Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, 44. 
118 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (expanded edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 197.  
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to preserve all belief systems and lifeways as live, psychological options, it would find itself 
without an operating principle, drained of resources, impotent, and nevertheless unable to 
satisfy all worldviews.119  
The question that this commonsense fact of political sociology immediately invites is 
how (or whether) we can fairly decide which or how many doctrines will have difficulty 
persisting in each legal or political milieu. There is some limit on our ability to claim any 
struggling doctrine or community as unavoidable collateral damage in instituting a state of just 
and generally applicable laws; at what point does this sort of justification appear as little more 
than state-sanctioned suppression of non-mainstream views (i.e., the very thing a democratic 
republic supposedly isn’t)? A thoroughly democratic system of laws should not, without 
compelling reasons, disfavor certain populations’ survival from the outset, either intentionally or 
knowingly. Maximizing cultural or religious difference without limit, however, is putatively 
undesirable for many political theorists. Stephen Macedo argues that we ought to celebrate the 
decline of certain religions or cultures, since it is democratically legitimate for us to construct an 
environment that imposes a “moderate hegemony” of liberal values on citizens in order to 
render a democracy stable.120 That certain cultural vanishings or declines should be celebrated 
and catalyzed seems perfectly obvious in many cases: some state- or majority-imposed coercion 
                                                          
119 To borrow one of Jeff Spinner-Halev’s many apt examples, suppose that a right of state support of 
one’s cultural preservation were adopted in Nigeria, which contains two to four hundred ethnic groups; 
this would seem to require the bulk of a state’s administrative resources (see his “Land, Culture, and 
Justice: A Framework for Group Rights Recognition,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Nov. 
2000): 319-42). Spinner-Halev also makes the more general observation that industrialization demands a 
common tongue, such that industrialized nations cannot support more than several language groups in 
any sort of equal way. The same can certainly be said of religious practices or, to use another example 
that is instructive elsewhere in my work, conceptions of property rights. 
120 See generally Stephen Macedo, “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending 
the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism,” Political Theory, Vol. 26, No.1 (1998): 56-80. 
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or value impositions are aimed at preventing other coercion (i.e., harm to third parties).121  As 
one example, when developing a working constitutional definition of equal protection and its 
applications, we don’t concern ourselves with accommodating a militant neo-Nazi group that 
wishes to have a say in the matter, and don’t lose much sleep over forcing them to abide by our 
conceptions of equal protection instead. Even more clearly, to adapt an example from Robert 
Nozick, we ought not to be concerned that subcultures celebrating overt chauvinism and sexual 
aggression will have a harder time thriving in an environment that effectively enforces laws 
prohibiting and severely punishing rape. 
But what political liberalism often means by the inevitability of cultural or religious 
vanishings extends beyond persons so clearly odious and antithetical to democracy as these 
examples. Some doomed lifeways might reject or live in tension with one or more liberal 
democratic principles, yet have no clearly violent intentions or encourage their adherents to live 
as cooperative citizens. Others might not explicitly reject any democratic principles at all, yet 
have conceptions of property rights that are not legally recognized in the United States, or 
adhere to epistemological principles that do not gel with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Are 
these cultures not perfectly reasonable to be ultimately concerned with their own cultural 
survival, and feel aggrieved when their efforts at cultural self-preservation seem futile? While 
some doctrines will face inevitable decline, morally culpable or not, it is foreseeable that bare 
recitations of this fact of so-called inevitable fact of “commonsense political sociology” can be 
used to preserve a simply majoritarian framework or perpetuate stereotypes of non-
                                                          
121 For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Andrew Lister, Public Reason and Political 
Community (London: Bloomsbury, 2016). It is also worth that the desire to discourage certain undesirable 
views plays out much differently among the iterations of political liberalism, and especially between 
perfectionist and non-perfectionist theories of liberalism. The sort of paternalism for which Quong chides 
perfectionism, such as that of Joseph Raz, is the very result that I am contending here that Rawlsian 
political liberalism cannot entirely avoid. 
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mainstream communities.122 The extent to which a legal and political environment’s 
inhospitableness to a doctrine is (un)just, surely turns, at least to some degree, on the reason 
why the community in question faces inevitable decline. Are we just in intentionally shaping the 
political milieu to make the decline of (a) only hostile and violent communities highly likely or 
inevitable, or (b) can we knowingly or intentionally do so in the case of somewhat 
undemocratic, yet socially cooperative doctrines, or even (c) for non-mainstream, democratic 
doctrines with merely unusual (but not necessarily undemocratic) beliefs or practices? To what 
extent do each of these kinds of communities (i.e., (a) – (c) above) deserve a hearing regarding 
their complaints, and in what circumstances is some corrective measure required by justice? The 
answer is surely not “to no extent and in no circumstances.”  
As a partial answer to this line of questioning, many versions of political liberalism offer 
a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. This distinction is 
commonly discussed in fleshing out a liberal public justification principle (PJP), pursuant to 
which a legitimate law or policy need not be justifiable to every person or citizen, taken as they 
are (i.e., with their moral or rational defects). Instead, according to most iterations of the PJP, 
laws must be justifiable to all citizens only at some level of idealization, which includes an 
assumption of their reasonableness. We are only concerned with reasonable citizens or 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines seeing their interests reflected in a body of law; 
reasonable parties are, as Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson summarize the Rawlsian position, the 
only parties to our social contract.123 A doctrine or community is unreasonable when, among 
                                                          
122 For a detailed articulation of the latter worry, see Marilyn Friedman, “John Rawls and the Political 
Coercion of Unreasonable People,” in The Idea of a Political Liberalism, eds. Victoria Davion & Clark Wolf 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 16-33. 
123 Erin Kelly & Lionel McPherson, “On Tolerating the Unreasonable,” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 9 
(2001): pp. 38-55. Marilyn Friedman summarizes the significance of this distinction nicely: “Reasonable 
and rational persons constitute, for Rawls, what I will call the ‘legitimation pool,’ the pool of persons 
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other characteristics, it lacks a conception of people as free and equal or is uninterested in 
negotiating and abiding by fair terms of social cooperation. Because a social contract is an 
agreement to live as equals in accordance with a binding social pact, we have little reason to 
consider, weigh, or incorporate the interests of those who are unwilling to act as a mutually, 
contractually bound party with all qualified others.124 It therefore takes certain civic or 
intellectual accomplishments for a citizen to deserve a voice, veto power, religious exemption 
from a law, or other tangible form of inclusion, as we create the conditions of public life. Put 
otherwise, those who can lay a claim to partial construction of the shared public environment 
are only those who buy into the norms inherent in peaceably sharing public space; others are 
purportedly excludable from this constructive process. 
Beyond exclusion from political constituency, a consequence of a doctrine being 
declared “unreasonable” is being subject to a social evolutionary process that militates against 
it. Rawls famously, albeit briefly, suggests that it is the political constituency’s duty to “contain” 
unreasonable doctrines and prevent their spread.125 Jonathan Quong argues that “containment” 
justifies affirmative measures that are specifically directed at making it difficult for an 
unreasonable comprehensive doctrine to persist from one generation to the next, rather than 
merely pursuing legitimate public purposes that are indifferent in their effects towards such 
doctrines. Similarly, Rawls hopes that a politically liberal society fills in the gaps of partially 
comprehensive doctrines, such that the adherent sees the benefits of living in a politically liberal 
society over time and, consequently, adapts his or her doctrine (whether by transformation or 
                                                          
whose endorsement would confirm the legitimacy of Rawls’s political liberalism—or whose rejection 
would confirm its illegitimacy” (The Idea of a Political Liberalism, p. 16). 
124 Similarly, Quong suggests that unreasonable persons, because they reject a premise of political 
liberalism, which is a theory about the freedom and equality of citizens, their “views are simply of no 
normative interest in the process of political justification” (“The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2004): 314-35, 315).  
125 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 64 n. 19. 
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addition) in deference to political liberalism. “A reasonable and effective political conception 
may bend comprehensive doctrines toward itself,” Rawls similarly allows, “shaping them if need 
be from unreasonable to reasonable.”126 
This proposal of identifying, transforming, and excluding certain doctrines from public 
life has drawn the ire of numerous political theorists because such proposals (i) disrespect or 
unfairly disadvantage those with religious beliefs, (ii) risk threatening the very sort of stability 
that initially motivates such exclusions, or else (iii) restrict public life in a way that discourages 
novelty. The first sort of criticism is more often levied at the public reason requirement (the 
PJP), rather than the whole, guided evolutionary process I have just identified. This criticism 
often claims that public reason liberalism (a) distinguishes public from non-public reasons in a 
trivial way,127 (b) distinguishes reasonable from unreasonable comprehensive doctrines in a way 
that intentionally favors the views of nonreligious, progressive academics, or (c) as put forth 
most forcefully by Nicholas Wolterstorff, misunderstands citizens’ religiosity by asking them to 
perform an internal division of self that their deepest normative commitments forbid:    
They do not view it as an option whether or not to do it. It is their conviction that they 
strive for wholeness, integrity, integration in their lives: that they ought to allow the 
Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or 
whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including, then, their social and political 
existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than their social and 
political existence; it is also about their social and political existence.128 
 
Even assuming “unreasonableness” is the appropriate label for a non-hostile doctrine, Erin Kelly 
and Lionel McPherson suggest that many such persons might still “be due a say in the 
                                                          
126  Id., p. 246 
127 Christopher Eberle offers the most thorough and sophisticated version of this argument in his Religious 
Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
128 Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
1997), p. 105. 
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arrangement of institutions binding them,”129 a principle that at least the early Rawls denies. 
Michael Sandel offers an example of the second sort of criticism, which suspects that the 
exclusion or non-engagement of unreasonable doctrines does not motivate universal social 
cooperation, and instead generates instability by motivating unreasonable groups to retreat to 
socially closed-off enclaves,130 rather than liberalize. As an example of the third variety of 
criticism, Jeremy Waldron has voiced a Millian concern that the closing of public, dialogical 
possibilities, and the intended decline of non-mainstream voices from public, political life will be 
to the detriment of all citizens. Under what Lawrence Solum calls Waldron’s “novelty 
objection,”131 Waldron worries that the closing of the public dialogical universe will exclude 
those novel arguments that might provide inventive solutions to social malaises or, as Solum 
frames it, that it will “impoverish political discourse by banishing novel arguments from the 
public sphere.”132 What the aforementioned disrespect and novelty-based arguments share is a 
concern that Rawlsian liberalism will narrow the possibilities of lived public existence; the 
former is concerned with the negative impact on the religious citizens themselves, and the latter 
on the public, or at least its discourse.  
While these criticisms and Rawlsian replies pertaining to public justification are now 
legion, the literature on “containing” unreasonable doctrines is comparatively 
                                                          
129 See Kelly & McPherson, “On Tolerating the Unreasonable,” p. 39. 
130 See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2d ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998): p. 217. Interestingly, as I explain later, Rawls is quite concerned with this possibility in The 
Law of Peoples, wherein he argues that a parallel concern on an international stage warrants the inclusion 
of what he calls “decent [but unreasonable] peoples” in the international lawmaking constituency. 
Whether Rawls would have incorporated certain of these realizations back into this domestic theory or 
not, which is a move I would advocate, is a question about which we can only speculate, as he died shortly 
after both this work and his Idea of Public Reason Revisited, both of which marked more inclusive trends 
in his idea of a political constituency. 
131 For Waldron’s own statement of this objection, see Jeremy Waldron “Religious Contributions in Public 
Deliberation,” San Diego Law Review, Vol. 30 (1993): pp. 817-48. 
132 Lawrence Solum, “Novel Public Reasons,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 29 (1996): pp. 1459-
86. 
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underdeveloped.133 I concede that Rawlsians are correct that persons antagonistic to 
democratic life cannot have an equal claim on others to cultural survival or political inclusion, 
but I will argue that this principle’s overbroad specification in the Rawlsian tradition vindicate 
critics’ concerns. Wherever an inhospitable political atmosphere exists, at least according to a 
religion or culture that is not antagonistic to democratic cooperation, that religion or culture has 
grounds for complaint. Moreover, Quong's conception of containment and Macedo's related 
“transformative constitutionalism” each presume a specific, controversial principle of instability-
toleration, i.e., a rule about the likelihood or magnitude of instability that a doctrine can visit on 
society before it is deemed an unacceptable risk. These conceptions risk presuming much else 
about which there is reasonable disagreement, such as a particularized conception of what 
respecting one’s fellow citizens requires one to do or abstain from doing in public action or 
discourse. Such presumptions are problematic for a political theory that at once claims to value 
equal liberty for its citizens, social stability, and worldview neutrality. 
Rawls ostensibly recognizes the internal tension between genuinely accepting pluralism 
among flesh-and-blood persons and maintaining internal stability, conceding that it is 
“unreasonable for us to use political power…to repress comprehensive views that are not 
unreasonable.”134 Wherever the state or public majority imposes more inhospitableness than is 
necessary for cooperative democratic life among free and equal citizens, and I claim that the 
strand of justificatory liberalism to which Rawls, Macedo, and Quong belong has this tendency, 
                                                          
133 There has been some recent work on the notion of “tolerating” unreasonable doctrines, which is 
closely connected to “containment” in Rawls or “transformative constitutionalism” in Macedo. I take 
“containment,” however, to be either a close cousin or variety of toleration, as it specifically implies (a) 
the exclusion of the contained doctrine from the political constituency, and (b) policies that are aimed at 
making it more difficult for certain doctrines to thrive, at least according to those varieties of it discussed 
here. Bare “toleration” is not nearly so loaded as this. I summarize Rawls, Quong, and Macedo on this 
topic below. 
134 Political Liberalism, p. 61 
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it instantiates an undemocratic burden on non-mainstream adherents analogous to what 
Herbert Marcuse calls “one-dimensionality.” This is far from a claim that all failures to grant a 
right to either preserve one’s culture or ensure the neutrality of one’s social milieu are 
undemocratic. Like some of my previous work, this is intended as an internal critique of political 
liberalism, insofar as the practice of containment brings political liberalism into unavoidable 
conflict with its other central values. Following my elaboration on the Rawlsian treatment of 
unreasonableness, I will offer what I call the one-dimensionality objection to this guided, 
sociopolitical evolutionary process. This is also not meant to be a primarily exegetical argument: 
even if one believes my analysis to be an overstatement of Rawls, Quong, or Macedo, each of 
whom admittedly recognize that such a process is to be construed and applied carefully and 
narrowly, I hope that it will nonetheless serve as a cautionary tale for the sort of illegitimate 
democratic aims that can easily be wrought, and I suspect nearly always will be, by the real-
world applications of “unreasonableness” and “containment.”  
A. Vignettes of Unreasonable Doctrines  
I have suggested that even the most ardent inclusivist135 would agree on the exclusion 
from political constituency of a militant group that, for instance: encourages and plans for the 
imminent, violent overthrow of the democratic state, reneges on its agreements with others, 
and regards large swaths of the citizenry as so inferior that they are worthy of subjugation or 
annihilation. But because the problems with “unreasonableness” and “containment” are made 
manifest in the penumbral cases, I will begin by offering a composite sketch of the Rawlsian 
                                                          
135 An “inclusivist” is one who wishes for the kinds of reasons allowed in political discourse and action to 
be quite broad, including parochial moral and religious rationales, whereas an “exclusivist” is a term that 
is often used to describe those who wish to minimize or eradicate the use of parochial, religious reasons 
from public debate and political action. John Rawls is often described as falling in between these 
positions, such as in Tom Bailey & Valentina Gentille (eds.), Rawls & Religion (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015). 
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tradition’s “unreasonable” doctrines (which are the doctrines to be contained), and describe 
two prominent rationales for these concepts’ ranges of application.  
It is more often the myriad other groups who are less clearly threatening who make for 
the hard cases and thereby are the locus of disagreement in political theory. Examples of groups 
or worldviews I have in mind are those who share some or many of our core democratic 
convictions, yet engage in some practice – such as requiring a religious exemption from a 
generally applicable law – that insists on special recognition of its own values, or on legal 
outcomes that otherwise rely on public recognition of the special truth or import of its beliefs. 
Many such worldviews coexist quite well in American life, even where they reject certain tenets 
of mainstream society or comprehensive liberalism; Jeff Spinner-Halev calls one subset of these 
groups, like the Amish, who are not especially interested in political participation, “partial 
citizens.”136 While Rawls does not specially define any such “moderate” group in Political 
Liberalism (i.e., a “minimally unreasonable” or “unreasonable but tolerable” doctrine) or 
elsewhere in his domestic political theory, his international political theory features just such a 
category: what he calls “decent peoples.”137 Somewhat similar to his concept of “decent 
peoples,” I will call such doctrines Cooperative but Insistent Doctrines (CIDs). My claim will be 
that Rawlsian political liberalism risks democratic failures especially for CIDs, and that one-
dimensionality is manifest where the public arena, generally or in specific fora like public 
schools, is inhospitable towards them or to other non-mainstream doctrines. This critique is not 
dissimilar from Ryan Muldoon’s general concern about political liberalism that it presumes an 
                                                          
136 See Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Cultural Pluralism and Partial Citizenship,” Multicultural Questions, eds. 
Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): pp. 65-86. It is worth noting 
that certain Rawlsians, such as Quong, consider containment measures unjustified or justifiable in only 
limited circumstances when applied to “partial citizens.” 
137 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): pp. 64-7. 
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environment of sameness, and is ill-equipped to account for genuine difference,138 rather than 
the degree of difference that Rawlsian idealization circumscribes in advance. 
Though excluding certain unreasonable doctrines is justifiable on the grounds of their 
direct and imminent threat to democracy, the exclusion of CIDs from political participation is 
overbroad and not similarly justifiable on stability or other, moral grounds; it is only justifiable 
based on a certain conception of stability, a specific and controversial political risk calculus, and 
a certain degree of toleration for social dissension (i.e., a reasonably contestable comprehensive 
view). For this reason, in reply to a suggestion from Larmore or Rawls that one must accept their 
decline or their transformation as inevitable, a CID (unlike an unreasonable and hostile 
comprehensive doctrine), might well reply: “why me rather than another?” In this case, it seems 
that further explanation is owed that it seems the Rawlsian cannot provide the inquisitor: it is 
not enough, at least from a Rawlsian standpoint of fairness, to say that some forms of life must 
inevitably decline in a given milieu, and that by happenstance it is yours. 
While I have framed this as a problem of the penumbra, the evolution of social 
circumstances will change just who belongs in the core or penumbra of unreasonableness, and 
even who constitutes a threat to the political institutions that now exist. My suspicion is that 
most major or currently mainstream religions, particularly those with significant non-doxastic 
elements or those with moral tenets that are inflexible, become CIDs in the right circumstance: 
it is just that they don’t find themselves confronted with such conflict – given their social 
circumstances or political currency – as often as non-mainstream religious, ethical, or 
epistemological doctrines do.139 I have chosen “CID” to describe them because it is simply the 
                                                          
138 See Ryan Muldoon, Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance (New York: Taylor & 
Francis, 2016). 
139 In his commentary on a Free Exercise case involving Native American sacred lands, Kent Greenawalt 
suggests (without resorting to specific Rawlsian vocabulary) that Christians among us would suddenly 
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nature of a comprehensive doctrine to insist upon itself (i.e., as ultimate arbiter of truth or 
goodness), or for its adherents to insist on its behalf, as the need arises. Certain CIDs are not ill-
equipped for cooperative, democratic social life at all, but only for the Rawlsian model of it. 
Excluding them therefore stretches the meaning of “unreasonable” to arbitrary, capricious, or 
trivial status. Such processes as containment are rightly understood, at least in these cases, as 
encroachments on the affected citizens from without and from an alien (albeit “public”) ethos. 
Those participants who are putatively good citizens (i.e., are “reasonable”) are exposed largely 
only to familiar elements, and Waldron and others (such as Michael Perry) suggest this is to their 
(the “reasonable” citizens’) impoverishment as well; it might well be that it is the familiar 
elements of mainstream culture that limit citizens' life opportunities. Before arguing my position 
further, however, I need to say much more about the furniture of the system that I claim is 
often guilty of such encroachments. 
 Based both on explicit indicia of “unreasonableness” in Rawls’s work and by negative 
inference from that which makes one “reasonable,” unreasonable persons or doctrines possess 
one or more of these general qualities, among others:  
(1) An unwillingness to abide by the fair terms of cooperation (i.e., a willful intent to bide 
one’s time and renege on the social contract where it is no longer individually rational); 
(2) A refusal to recognize the burdens of judgment;  
(3) A view contrary to the idea of citizens as politically free and equal;  
(4) Rejection of the idea of public reason, or refusal to politically act in this language; and 
                                                          
behave in ways that made us appear unreasonable if the site of Jesus Christ’s crucifixion were located on 
government-owned land (see his Religion and the Constitution, Vol. 1: Free Exercise and Fairness 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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(5) An insistence on a greater share of the index of primary goods140 than other citizens or 
doctrines, including those with “expensive” or “unusual” tastes.141 
In Quong’s defense of Rawlsian reasonableness, he focuses on criteria (1) – (4) and argues, 
following Rawls, that a citizen’s worldview or specific claim to the effect of (1) – (4) renders his 
or her view unreasonable, and not deserving of political participation for want of interests in the 
democratic project.142 I suspect he would follow Rawls in adding (5) as an outgrowth of (1) – (4), 
just as he regarded (4) as inferable from (1) – (3).143  
Many political liberals also assume that some degree of rationality inheres in 
reasonableness, such as Joshua Cohen, for whom reasonableness means that a doctrine’s 
adherents are “stably disposed to affirm it as they acquire new information and subject it to 
critical reflection.”144 What Rawls means by reasonableness, however, is a description of certain 
moral qualities and is not derivable from the rational. As Quong puts the matter in responding 
to a common misuse of Rawlsian “reasonableness,”145 this is intended as a moral and not a 
                                                          
140 The “index of primary goods” refers to Rawls’s attempt to give a rough account of those provisions that 
are necessary conditions to persons possessing a wide range of comprehensive doctrines being enabled to 
pursue their separate conceptions of the good life. He identifies five general categories of primary 
goods(see, for example, his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2001): pp. 58-9): (a) basic liberties, including freedom of thought and conscience; (b) freedom of 
movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities; (c) powers and 
prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility; (d) income and wealth, understood as 
all-purpose means (having an exchange value) generally needed to achieve a wide range of ends whatever 
they may be; and (e) the social bases of self-respect. 
141 Rawls does not explicitly declare those of “expensive” or “unusual” tastes unreasonable but, because 
such persons’ interests are not incorporated in securing the central range of basic rights and liberties, this 
is much the same in effect.  
142 “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” p. 321. Quong importantly points out that exclusion of a claim, a 
doctrine or a citizen insofar as he or she is unreasonable is distinct from a refusal to tolerate that citizen 
or depriving that citizen of the benefits of citizenship. Nonetheless, even on Rawls’s own terms, sharing 
political power is an awfully significant benefit of citizenship. 
143 I will suppose that Macedo, Quong, and Larmore would largely subscribe to these criteria as well. 
144 Joshua Cohen, “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus,” in The Idea of Democracy, eds. David Copp, 
Jean Hampton, and John Roemer: pp. 270–291, 282 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
145 Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” p. 319. Among those to whom Quong attributes this 
common error are Erin Kelly, Lionel McPherson, and Marilyn Friedman. It must be emphasized that this is, 
or at least I contend, primarily an exegetical error that Quong identifies. Other democratic theorists than 
Rawls specifically wish to define “reasonableness” as a prerequisite for political participation in such a 
way that it includes rationality. 
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cognitive, epistemic requirement of a citizen or comprehensive doctrine. Rawls explains that 
“there are no restrictions or requirements on how religious or secular doctrines are to be 
expressed; these doctrines need not, for example, be by some standards logically correct, or 
open to rational appraisal, or evidentially supportable.”146  
Even though Rawls presents “rationality” and “reasonableness” as conceptually distinct 
characteristics a person might possess, the qualities of reasonableness that I listed above 
presume some epistemic accomplishments or some threshold capability for rational 
engagement. As Robert Talisse argues in Democracy and Moral Conflict, what inheres in our 
possession and communication of beliefs, insofar as we are participants in public, political 
dialogue, is a willingness to subject them to public criticism and competition with other 
worldviews.147 While very much the point of Talisse’s epistemological defense of public reason is 
to provide a different basis for democracy than Rawls’s, it is difficult to imagine that terribly 
many comprehensive doctrines can be judged “compatible” with political liberalism pursuant to 
(2) or (4) without their also being judged as possessing a certain degree of rationality or certain 
epistemic accomplishments. Accepting the burdens of judgment, for instance, is difficult to 
understand as an entirely moral, and non-epistemological, achievement. So too is any 
participation in public justification; the articulation and justification of a constitutional rights 
regime, for instance, need only be made towards those who can engage with and respond to 
such justificatory acts of deliberation. Moreover, though it is unclear how significant these terms 
are, given that he only makes them in passing, Rawls states that containment extends to 
“irrational” and “mad” doctrines.148 What I will assume arguendo for the remainder of this 
                                                          
146 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 463 
147 See especially Chapters 3-4 in Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
148 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xvi-xvii. 
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discussion is that “reasonableness” only includes “rationality” qualifications within it insofar as 
the latter sort are necessary to satisfy (1) – (5) and any other relevant criteria of reasonableness. 
This might mean, for instance, that a faith community can express its doctrine however it 
wishes, and its beliefs or its adherents’ reasons for believing them can be supported by 
whatever logical defects they wish, without this leading to their being dubbed “unreasonable” 
and thereby excludable from the democratic constituency. What would render them 
unreasonable is if they only offered reasons in this logically defective way in the public sphere, 
and expected their interlocutors to accept or understand these reasons. Thus, I will suppose as 
criterion (6) that having a capacity for and willingness to debate in public matters rationally is 
essential to reasonableness. 
So far, these criteria might strike you as fair prerequisites to inclusion in public, political 
life. But the category “unreasonableness” is, I submit, far from as barebones and inclusive as 
Rawls or Quong sometimes make it appear, as becomes apparent when Rawls confronts specific 
political controversies. Within the general criteria of “unreasonableness,” there is room for 
significant perspectival diversity even within political liberalism, let alone other reasonable 
conceptions of justice. This indeterminacy lays the groundwork for the objection against 
Rawlsian unreasonableness I will offer in the following section. From those political liberals who 
consider this idealization of citizens necessary to maintain “respect” among one’s fellow citizens 
(or to inculcate some other democratically essential civic attitude), a detailed and universally 
accessible narrative about just what “respect” requires of us is owed. 
If the reason that each characteristic disqualifies a doctrine from political incorporation 
is that those who possess them would undermine the very democracy in which they wish to 
participate given the opportunity, then I recognize the arguable necessity of including (1) and 
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(3), but not (2), (4) or (5).149 Putting this disagreement aside for the moment, and assuming 
arguendo the validity of (1) – (5), notions of “fair terms,” “free and equal” (including who 
citizens are), an “idea of public reason,” the precise scope of the burdens of judgment, and 
“greater share,” initially admit of multiple interpretations, almost as inexorably as do similar 
phrases in the Bill of Rights. A full-throated democratic defense of excluding the unreasonable 
from democratic constituency therefore requires reference to specific insistences or attitudes in 
the public sphere, or rather, snapshots of unreasonable persons or groups. 
Where comprehensive doctrines include truth claims, Rawls admits that we must deny 
them in some circumstances, even though we are ordinarily to eschew statements about the 
whole truth regarding the true or the good in politics, particularly where a religious group or 
citizen demands that transcendent concerns override public, political ones. Privileging the 
transcendent over the political, in fact, might be one of the greatest indicators of 
unreasonableness to which nearly all others correspond. Such is the case, Rawls imagines, 
where a person or doctrine claims that a transcendent value is so important that it justifies a 
degree of civil strife, such as where the “salvation of a whole people may depend on” the true 
and correct settling of a fundamental political matter.150 Second and relatedly, those who claim 
that their religious freedom requires special access to sacred lands or the provision of public 
resources are said to be ill-suited for political liberalism:  
Some persons may count among their religious obligations going on pilgrimages to 
distant places or building magnificent cathedrals or temples. To guarantee the equal 
worth of religious liberty is now understood to require that such persons receive special 
                                                          
149 My disagreement with this list, as I will explain later, is due to the possibility of those who regard 
themselves as epistemically privileged or otherwise superior to fellow citizens, but (a) deeply care for the 
other and value her autonomy; and (b) present no threat, by the terms of her worldview, to a stable 
democracy. 
150 Political Liberalism, 152. Interestingly, there seems to be little room in political liberalism for a 
temporary, and possibly risky, period of civil strife in order to potentially achieve a more wholehearted or 
perpetual peace.  
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provision to enable them to meet these obligations. On this view, then, their religious 
needs, as it were, are greater for the purposes of political justice, whereas those whose 
religious beliefs oblige them to make but modest demands on material means do not 
receive such provision; their religious needs are much less. Plainly, this kind of 
guarantee is socially divisive, a receipt for religious controversy if not civil strife. Similar 
consequences result, I believe, whenever the public conception of justice adjusts 
citizens’ claims to social resources so that some receive more than others depending on 
the determinate final ends and loyalties belonging to their conceptions of the good.…It 
suffices to say that one main reason for using an index of primary goods in assessing the 
strength of citizens’ claims in questions of political justice is precisely to eliminate the 
socially divisive and irreconcilable conflicts which such principles would arouse.151     
 
I have discussed the cases of Lyng and Navajo Nation (as well as several current sacred land 
cases involving Utah monuments) elsewhere, wherein Native American tribes claimed that their 
free exercise rights demanded that the government cease activity on its own land. It is likely that 
the litigants in these cases must be considered unreasonable as well.152 Third, Rawls declares 
unreasonable those comprehensive doctrines that “cannot support a reasonable balance of 
political values,” including those who believe, or religious or other transcendent grounds, that 
the balance of political values does not support a woman’s right to an abortion during the first 
trimester.153 Fourth, those whose community’s internal culture includes a division of labor or 
political holdings along gendered lines, based on either natural differences between the sexes or 
a deity’s command, cannot offer reasons in public to enforce this division, as such a division of 
labor, on the basis of public reasons, must be voluntary for its participants.  
As one final and particularly interesting example directly from Rawls, in Law of Peoples, 
he introduces Kazanistan, a hypothetical society in which there is no separation of church and 
state, Islam is the favored religion, and being Muslim generates a higher status and greater 
opportunity, in certain ways, than does practicing another religion.  Only Muslims can “hold the 
                                                          
151 Id., 329-30. 
152 In my prior essay, however, I assumed arguendo that these litigants would be considered reasonable, 
and determined what the consequences of that assumption would be for political liberalism. 
153 Id., 243 n. 32 
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upper positions of political authority and influence the government’s main decisions and 
policies, including foreign affairs.”154 Kazanistan’s government, however, leaves numerous 
opportunities available for non-Muslim citizens (including some political offices and the various 
professions) and encourages the cultural survival of non-Muslim cultures within its state. Human 
rights are otherwise recognized and guaranteed.155 It appears that peoples like those in 
Kazanistan would be unreasonable persons domestically, should they demand that their political 
structure is implemented in the United States, but are decent peoples who warrant political 
inclusion on the international stage as “equal participants in the Society of Peoples.” They also 
come close to fitting the CID label, insofar as Kazanistan ostensibly values numerous liberal 
democratic commitments, while rejecting or living in tension with one or more of them. By 
analogy to Rawls’s domestic social contract, which is determined in the original position, a group 
like Kazanistanians would perhaps be tolerated, but not included as participants in social 
contract bargaining. Thus, they would be subject to containment. 
 Other political liberals who are largely Rawlsian, at least insofar as they incorporate 
Rawlsian unreasonableness and the legitimacy of processes like containment, offer examples 
that help fill in the unreasonableness picture further. The following, general description of 
groups ill-suited to democratic life (from Larmore) is one with which Rawls would agree, and 
which is particularly germane to my focus on an image of social cooperation as sharing space:  
[W]ays of life that depend upon close and exclusive bonds of language and culture – the 
French in Canada or the Bretons in France – may lose, within a liberal society also 
tolerating quite different and more open ways of life, some of the authority and 
cohesion that they would have if they formed complete societies unto themselves.156 
                                                          
154 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 75. 
155 Id. 
156 Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 43. Jeff Spinner-Halev, in addition to the Amish, also 
discusses at length the Sorbs, a Slavic cultural group in Germany that wishes to maintain its cultural 
cohesion.  his example is not meant to imply that a desire for cultural isolation is itself unreasonable 
under the Rawlsian picture, but that such a desire is almost sure to lead to political action or advocacy 
that is unreasonable. 
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Combining this kind of interest – maintaining social cohesion through isolation – with the 
lengthy passage on sacred lands above, we can conclude that Rawls and Larmore would regard 
as unreasonable those who insist on some right or demand some privilege in their efforts to 
preserve their cohesive, but independent, way of life. Quong offers an example of a religious 
minority that chooses to educate its community’s children privately, providing excellent 
academic instruction (and hence scoring especially well on standardized tests), yet teaching 
principles that contradict parts of (1) – (5), such as that non-believers are of less moral value, or 
that civil society is a sphere to be tolerated until the political situation becomes more 
favorable.157 This example is based on the oft-discussed Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th 
Cir. 1987) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),158 both of which involved the conflict 
between parental choice in childrearing versus public interests in the education of its future 
citizens. In neither of these cases did the religious community involved intend to overtake 
mainstream society should the political opportunity arise (the Amish in Yoder, after all, were 
pacifists). In Mozert, however, the majority opinion was concerned with the civil dissension the 
school would create if it entertained excusing children from portions of public school curriculum 
that their parents found objectionable. Compulsory public education is a common issue among 
political liberals and their critics. Such practices are also sometimes defended, including by 
Rawls and Amy Gutmann, on the grounds that declining to expose children to other lifestyles or 
other citizens deprive those children of a fair range of life opportunities, including any 
meaningful right to exit their communities. It might also be the case, among other worries, that 
the delivery of parochial education could have the effect of discriminating against women and 
                                                          
157 Quong, “Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 326. 
158 I would add the more recent example of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp.2d 707 
(M.D. Pa. 2005). 
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girls, a practice which invokes several of the indicia of unreasonableness cited above. Regardless 
of their precise rationales, what Rawls and likeminded political liberals have in common is a 
conviction that the state has a sufficiently strong interest in educating children as future, 
cooperative citizens (or preventing the proliferation of unreasonable views) to place limits on 
parents’ rights to set the conditions of their children’s education. 
To summarize and cull a general description from these examples, unreasonable 
persons or doctrines reject one of the principles identified in (1) – (5), examples of which might 
include: requiring excessive space or independence for religious reasons, demanding 
exemptions from generally applicable laws on religious or non-public grounds, requesting 
special access to or greater than the equal share of public resources, insistence on public 
recognition of one’s own view of the whole truth, or insisting that the public adopt something 
akin to Pascal’s wager regarding a spiritual threat that the religious claimant perceives.159 
Because these criteria and examples are not exhaustive, it will also be instructive to provide 
background principles that might determine unreasonableness where a culture’s characteristic 
in not specified as such in the existing canon of political liberalism. Political liberalism commonly 
supplies at least one of two, interconnected justifications for labeling such practices and 
attitudes “unreasonable” doctrines, aiming to transform or contain them, and excluding them 
from the political constituency: one based on respect and another based on stability.  
                                                          
159 An example of this last possibility was the subject matter of my “Adjudicating Sacred Land from 
Somewhere: The Original Position, the Free Exercise Clause and Minority Faiths.” The federal court 
decisions that were the focus of my discussion in that essay involved Native American tribes claiming that 
government use of public lands would destroy or desecrate areas the tribes held sacred, rendering any 
rituals performed there inefficacious, and resulting in (according to their beliefs) catastrophes around the 
world and a loss of their culture. 
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First, political theory is, for Rawls, a coherentist project,160 as Political Liberalism 
attempts to base its conception of justice on our considered convictions, such something like 
“respect” or “dignity” being owed to all persons. Rawls summarizes this process as follows:  
We collect such settled convictions as the belief in religious toleration and the rejection 
of slavery and try to organize the basic ideas and principles implicit in these convictions 
into a coherent political conception of justice. These convictions are provisional fixed 
points that it seems any reasonable conception must account for…We express this by 
saying that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our 
considered convictions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection[.]161 
 
Among the considered convictions (which change with sociohistorical circumstance) with which 
Rawls begins is a conceptions of persons as free and equal moral agents. If I aim to coerce or 
otherwise impose my values on a compatriot, rather than attempt to persuade him of my view 
or otherwise provide a reason to accept a coercive law, then I do not treat him as an agent with 
a complete moral life of his own, but instead as an “object of coercion” or “subject of 
legislation,” and thereby degrade him. If I am concerned with my compatriot’s autonomy, then, 
this means that I am to generally refrain from coercing her except under conditions that she has 
reason to accept; otherwise I impose an alien power on her and inhibit her autonomy. Going 
further, Quong suggests that the person invoking a liberal right to carry out an illiberal purpose 
is also self-contradictory, such as where I claim that my religion entitles me to steal your 
laptop.162 Just as in Jeremy Waldron’s example of a Nazi exercising his or her right to free speech 
by advocating the suppression of another, nearby group’s free speech, the application of the 
putative right is antithetical to the environment that allows it. Respect is therefore either a 
stipulated moral value or one that, in a Kantian vein, necessarily follows from my seeking 
recognition. 
                                                          
160 Robert Talisse, On Rawls (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2009): 59-60.    
161 Political Liberalism, p. 8 
162 Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” p. 333 
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Second, as Paul Weithman explains, Rawls is concerned with the central role that 
mutual assurance plays in describing the sort of social stability (i.e., “inherent stability” in 
Theory of Justice and “stability for the right reasons” in Political Liberalism) that is political 
liberalism’s goal. Weithman recalls the Rawlsian psychological insight that we are creatures of 
divided loyalties, most often between our government and our selfish, familial, or moral and 
religious commitments. The Rawls of Theory sought what he called “congruence,” pursuant to 
which his conception of justice and citizens’ conceptions of the good will align in a well-ordered 
society.163 If a religiously convicted citizen’s deepest normative commitments conflict with his 
political duties, it is foreseeable that such a citizen will decide it is not individually rational for 
him to follow the law, even if the law is collectively rational for the citizenry’s interest in, say, 
social order;164 it is individually rational for him to act on his religious or communal loyalties 
instead. If this first defecting citizen so chooses, then other persons or communities in a similar 
circumstance might well decide it is individually rational for them to defect from the terms of 
social cooperation, either to the extent there is a conflict or entirely. Even those citizens whose 
normative commitments are not so inconsistent with the terms of social cooperation might well 
see these defectors as “free riders” on their law-abiding behavior, leading them to believe that 
their compliance is not individually rational if they cannot be assured of the legal compliance of 
others. Thus, there is only hope for a stable political system is if mutual assurance can be 
provided to all parties that each will abide by negotiated terms of social cooperation,165 or 
rather, if each of us can be assured that no one has sufficient reason for preemptive 
                                                          
163 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 350. 
164 See Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability and Assurance” in Rawls and Religion, 83. For an extended 
exegesis along these lines, see his Why Political Liberalism? (Cambridge: Oxford University Press 2010). 
165 As Rawls puts the matter himself: “The sense of justice leads us to promote just schemes and to do our 
share in them when we believe that others, or sufficiently many of them, will do theirs” (Theory of Justice, 
p. 267). 
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defection.166 Indeed, in Rawls’s last word on the matter, he expressly incorporates a willingness 
to provide “mutual assurance” into his notion of reasonableness.167 
What Rawls seeks in ensuring stability is not the imposed stability of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan; the aim in Theory was to ameliorate the tension between one’s parochial and 
political loyalties, such that the political conception of justice can be embraced 
“wholeheartedly.” Though the assumptions about citizens’ motivations differ in important ways 
in Theory and Political Liberalism, Rawls consistently recognizes that a well-ordered society’s 
institutions must help citizens develop a sense of justice that is motivating to citizens’ and 
communities’ internal lives. In Political Liberalism, Rawls is particularly concerned with the fact 
of reasonable pluralism, and hence the necessity of a political conception of justice being 
affirmed by an “overlapping consensus” of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that exist in 
society. This might well require the evolution of various communities and doctrines, i.e., the 
inculcation of both a sense of justice in a doctrine’s adherents and adequate motivation to live 
up to the demands of political liberalism. Instilling the motivation to be just in reasonable 
citizens and doctrines, and the evolution of such doctrines over time in favor of a public political 
conception of justice, are each necessary for such citizens and doctrines to affirm a system of 
laws in a way that is sincere and enduring.  
Once again, the various categories of unreasonable doctrines I have described – both 
the democratic principles they reject ((1) – (5) above) and some of the specific policy positions 
they might take (such as the sacred lands example) – purportedly do not have a claim to 
inclusion in the political constituency, particularly when it comes to constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice. These groups are excluded because (on different accounts) (a) they 
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167 See Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 6-7. 
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disrespect fellow citizens by pursuing their parochial goals, either in a way that treats others as 
unequal or treats their own truth claims as warranting special attention, or (b) they undermine 
the inherent stability at which a democratic system aims. Yet the process of exclusion is 
lamentable (to Rawls), or at least in tension with other democratic principles, and only in rare 
circumstances can it mean abridging freedoms (such as free speech or freedom of movement) of 
unreasonable communities. Nonetheless, the Rawlsian seeks to instantiate a public political 
culture in which unreasonable groups such as these will disappear over time, and “containment” 
is ostensibly a legitimate mechanism for ensuring that this happens. As such, I suggested in the 
introduction that containment can be understood as an evolutionary process, and a morally 
legitimate one to the Rawlsian, that purposely minimizes the presence of unreasonable 
doctrines by altering the hospitableness of the social landscape.  I will now turn to just how 
Rawls, Quong, and Macedo describe this guided evolutionary process, before turning to my 
critique of it. 
B. Containment and Transformative Constitutionalism 
 Rawls is notoriously vague on just what democratically legitimate containment 
measures are, other than that a containment measure is typically (but far from always) more 
permissive than a more direct approach, like abridging free speech or other rights for those who 
are unreasonable.168 Rawls’s explicit discussion of containment is limited to the following 
passages:  
Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, 
comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them so that they do 
not undermine the unity and justice of society.169 
 
That there are doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself a 
                                                          
168 There is, for Rawls, an idea of toleration that applies to both reasonable and unreasonable doctrines 
alike. 
169 Political Liberalism, xvi-xvii 
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permanent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us the practical task of containing them — 
like war and disease — so that they do not overturn political justice.170 
 
What is common to each of these passages is that containment is (a) an ongoing, practical task 
for a public, political culture, and (b) it is justifiable on the grounds that certain doctrines (i.e., 
ones that are unreasonable, irrational, mad, or reject one or more democratic freedoms) will 
undermine a central desideratum of political liberalism (such as inherent stability or an 
overlapping consensus). This is because unreasonable doctrines are “a threat to democratic 
institutions, since it is impossible for them to abide by a constitutional regime except as a modus 
vivendi.”171 The task of containing these threats (i.e., those doctrines that threaten democratic 
institutions) includes a strategy of non-engagement: for those who view the political relation as 
a “struggle to win the world for the whole truth” and carry a “zeal to embody the whole truth in 
politics,” Rawls notes that political liberalism “does not engage those who think this way.”172 As I 
read Rawls here, this means that public reason is not designed to address itself to those for 
whom transcendent values are greater than political values, nor is the determination of 
constitutional essentials designed to responsive to those who hold out hope that the political 
culture will eventually reflect a hegemony of their own comprehensive doctrines, nor those who 
seek public recognition of the value or correctness of their views.  
 Though Rawls does not define what the affirmative components of containment 
include, Quong argues that containment must mean something distinctive beyond “the regular 
application of liberal principles of justice,” or else the definition of containment simply collapses 
into “the protection of basic individual rights and freedoms.”173 The police arresting members of 
the Ku Klux Klan for attempting to lynch a black man cannot be what “containment” means (this 
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is just to enforce laws against attempted murder); to constitute a containment measure, the 
aim must be containment. Quong therefore proposes the following definition of containment: 
“any policy whose primary intention is to undermine or restrict the spread of ideas that reject 
the fundamental tenets of a liberal democracy, that is, (1) that political society should be a fair 
system of social cooperation for mutual benefit, (2) that citizens are free and equal, and (3) the 
fact of reasonable pluralism.”174 Though Quong is careful to emphasize that there should be a 
“strong presumption” in favor of non-containment,175 its availability as a legitimate option is 
essential to ensuring that basic liberal values become entrenched. This is legitimately 
accomplished, for instance, through the liberal education of children. Because a politically liberal 
state, though it has an obligation to be religion-neutral, is not entirely value neutral (it values 
core democratic principles and social stability), it rightly has interests in ensuring that its future, 
politically participatory citizens recognize the value of a democratic system of cooperation. 
Consequently, it has an interest in limiting the spread of ideas – such as the moral superiority of 
one’s own community members or the depravity of civil society – that are antithetical to this 
goal, even if it may not stop this spread directly (e.g., through restrictions on free speech, such 
as imprisoning those holding such views). After all, Quong observes, “history tells us that 
regimes where these basic liberal ideals are not firmly entrenched have been vulnerable to gross 
violations of human rights and other serious injustices.”176  
The other side of the containment coin is what I have said Macedo calls “transformative 
constitutionalism.” Macedo agrees that making it more difficult for unreasonable doctrines to 
persist or spread is necessary, since we cannot pursue any “shared civic ends without making it 
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harder for the proponents of some moral and religious doctrines to perpetuate their views.”177 
Where Quong is focused on the moral legitimacy of this preventative component of 
containment, Macedo’s focus is on the transformative component of containment, though each 
seems to just be a corollary of the other. Macedo contends that many of us take the cultivation 
and eventual prevalence of virtuous, democratically cooperative citizens for granted: such 
citizens did not, he claims, “spring from the soil of private freedom.” A stable democracy plays 
what Macedo calls a “radical educative function”:  
Liberal constitutional institutions have a more deeply constitutive role, which is to work 
at shaping or constituting all forms of diversity over the course of time, so that people 
are satisfied leading lives of bounded individual freedom. Successful constitutional 
institutions must do more than help order the freedom of individuals prefabricated for 
life in a liberal political order: they must shape the way that people use their freedom 
and shape people to help ensure that freedom is what they want. If a constitutional 
regime is to succeed and thrive, it must constitute the private realm in its image, and it 
must form citizens willing to observe its limits and able to pursue its aspirations.178 
 
Unless we are to intentionally intervene in, say, the education of future citizens (i.e., children), 
Macedo contends that there is nothing to guarantee, other than by operation of magic, that 
various communities and localities widely recognize “toleration” or other virtues, habits, and 
practices necessary for social cooperation. I read Macedo as justifying transformative 
constitutionalism with an empirical claim similar to Quong’s: our democracy has only thrived 
because certain pivotal moments in American history centrally featured this process. Much of 
Macedo’s work includes a detailed history of the evolution of common schools in the United 
States during the middle of the 19th century, which is a successful instantiation of 
transformative constitutionalism.179 Though common school curriculum was initially justified on 
religious grounds (i.e., on an idea of Christianity as tolerant and ecumenical, such as it appears in 
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John Locke’s work), the mission and effect of the common schools was to promote, through 
classroom instruction, ways of life and thinking that formed the basis of public, liberal morality, 
in turn forming a more self-restrained, reasonable, and moderate populace. This process both 
motivated greater civic engagement and caused many of those communities with inconsistent 
ways of life or thinking to moderate themselves in the mainstream public’s direction. 
As an example of a religion that underwent significant change, or an instance in which 
political liberalism (as Rawls would phrase it) “bent a comprehensive doctrine toward itself,” 
Macedo recounts the evolution of the American Catholic Church. This denomination was 
liberalized over time, after purportedly having previously spent decades impeding democracy, 
as it began to adopt the American notions of public authority and the relationship between 
church and state, rather than the Vatican’s notions of each. Not only did Catholic attitudes shift 
regarding common schooling,180 but Macedo recalls Sanford Levinson’s observation that 
Catholics seeking judicial appointments had to declare their religion “practically meaningless” as 
a condition of service. This latter, declarative ritual and ones like it had the effect of “diminishing 
the importance of some religious convictions in people’s lives,” particularly those with principles 
in tension with democratic ones, a consequence that Macedo believes calls for neither regret 
nor apology. This is so even if, as many like Wolterstorff contend, it might be said that religious 
citizens bear an unequal and weighty psychological tax from performing this political-religious 
compartmentalization, a social expectation that has the result of driving many ways of life out. 
That an educative function which, “gently” and over time, affects and shifts citizens’ deeply held 
beliefs, is inscribed in the self-supporting patterns of liberal democracies is, for him, perfectly 
legitimate and even laudable.  
                                                          
180 For a history of Catholic opposition to religiously neutral, common schools, see Macedo, Diversity and 
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So described, containment and transformative constitutionalism appear troublesome, 
as the processes can be read as justifying rights abridgements or other forms of oppression in 
the name of either stability or the development of a tolerant public culture.181 This concern has 
been raised by numerous critics of the idea of public reason, like Wolterstorff, Christopher 
Eberle, and Jurgen Habermas. Marilyn Friedman has levied it against “unreasonableness” and 
“containment” specifically.  Friedman claims that, because unreasonable persons or doctrines 
are treated like “bearers of a pestilence,”182 they are denied their political autonomy in two 
ways:  
First, they will be excluded from the legitimation pool [comprised of reasonable 
persons], that collection of citizens whose consent to the political system confirms its 
legitimacy.183 Second, in daily life, they will be denied the full protection of the system’s 
basic rights and liberties, particularly freedom of expression.184 
 
Since the consequences of being labeled “unreasonable” are quite serious and potentially 
oppressive, Friedman emphasizes that we must be careful to only do so based on “good” 
reasons and to ensure that the “application of good reasons is not over inclusive, that is, that it 
does not exclude by mistake any persons who do belong in the legitimation pool.”185  
What especially troubles Friedman is the possibility that certain historically oppressed or 
underrepresented groups might be excluded from the legitimation pool. The poor are often 
depicted, whether deservedly or not, as being preoccupied with their own means of 
subsistence, such that they are less able to occupy a mental attitude that “surmounts self-
interest,” and are instead inclined to adopt “self-serving and unfair terms of social 
                                                          
181 Quong has described arguments in this genus as claiming that Rawlsian political liberalism is “self-
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182 Friedman, “John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People,” p. 23. 
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cooperation.”186 While the Rawlsian difference principle’s very purpose is to serve the best 
interests of the least well off, Friedman suspects that the public hearing at which we determine 
the poor’s “best interests” will often exclude the poor themselves. This is similar to Amartya 
Sen’s worry that, by making the equal distribution of primary goods the barometer of equality, 
Rawls ignores or minimizes the widely varying capabilities among citizens to actually convert 
those primary goods into self-betterment or pursuit of one’s projects.187 Rather than actual self-
respect, Sen claims Rawls is wrongheadedly concerned with the “social bases of self-respect,” or 
with income rather than “what income does.”188 
 The worry common to Friedman and Sen is that “unreasonableness,” particularly when 
considered in conjunction with the Rawlsian index of primary goods, will often lead to a political 
culture that is unresponsive and even tilted against those persons or groups who are most in 
need of a just system’s protection. As Daniel Weinstock as put it, we ought to be wary of a 
system that creates “permanent minorities or ‘losers’” at the outset.189 Recall, for instance, that 
one of the indicia of Rawlsian unreasonableness is expecting public recognition of one’s 
“expensive” or “unusual” tastes. I have suggested that past tyrannies of the majority, or simply 
historical accident, might create categories of property or privacy rights that contingently (i.e., 
not by necessary extension of democratic concepts) disfavor the lifeways of indigenous cultures 
or non-mainstream religious communities. Thus, in many cases, the only factor that might 
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render a certain taste “expensive” or “unusual” is a practice of historical injustice, or even a now 
oligarchic institution that began innocently.190  
 Though certain components of Friedman’s worry have centrally influenced my objection 
to reasonableness and containment, her approach’s weakness lies in her disambiguating 
containment’s oppressiveness into two distinct effects on unreasonable persons: exclusion from 
the legitimation pool as well as the abridgement of a basic scheme of rights and liberties. The 
heart of political liberalism’s rights-abridging tendency, I will argue, is or directly issues from its 
over-exclusion of doctrines from the legitimation pool; these are not separable defects of 
containment. The proponents of containment I have discussed, especially Quong, offer several, 
closely related reasons why Friedman’s reading is partially incorrect and why her claim about 
rights denials is consequently misguided. It will be useful to summarize these replies before then 
turning to the residual portion of Friedman’s worry that I believe is sound, and to which the 
containment-advocating Rawlsian lacks a forceful reply. 
First, whatever principles justify a person’s exclusion from the legitimation pool do not, 
according to each of Quong, Rawls, and Macedo, also justify denying that person the basic 
scheme of rights and liberties enjoyed by reasonable citizens.  “There is not one account of 
toleration,” Rawls emphasizes in his last word on the matter, “for reasonable doctrines and 
another for unreasonable ones. Both cases are settled by the appropriate political principles of 
justice and the conduct those principles permit.”191 My being declared “unreasonable” does not 
mean that I lose constitutional protection for the same expressive acts that are protected for 
reasonable persons, nor does it mean that I have any less of a Fourth Amendment protection 
                                                          
190 The Rawlsian might well reply that this is hyperbolic: we can easily imagine, say, physically disabled or 
historically oppressed persons in the original position and make a public reason-based argument for their 
reasonable accommodation. I will take up this sort of reply in my critique. 
191 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 489. 
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against unreasonable searches and seizures. If I adhere to a doctrine that includes unreasonable 
expectations about privacy, though my precise expectations will not be borne out in privacy law, 
I still enjoy those same privacy protections that all reasonable persons enjoy (though it is true 
that these protections will be more in line with their expectations). The purpose of the original 
position is to be fair and impartial, Quong explains, such that the scheme of rights and liberties 
derived within it “are going to hold for everyone, and not just those citizens who happen to 
endorse their premises.”192 In this vein, Rawls justifies a long-recognized exception to expressive 
freedom: the government may proscribe speech that incites imminent lawless action. This rule 
applies equally to reasonable and unreasonable persons, though momentarily engaging in the 
proscribed conduct would render a person unreasonable at that moment. Importantly, Matthew 
Clayton and David Stevens clarify that what all this means for political liberalism is that it doesn’t 
legally proscribe or exclude unreasonable persons at all, strictly speaking, but only unreasonable 
actions.193 Friedman is therefore incorrect in supposing that the unreasonableness label triggers 
a surrender of all civil rights. While this reply to Friedman is apt, a worry remains: certain 
unreasonable persons’ lives or doctrines might be so permeated with unreasonable actions or 
demands, as is precisely mine and (I think) Friedman’s suspicion, that the distinction between 
excluding persons and actions is one without much practical difference. What I will argue in the 
following section is that there must still be a constituency of persons that determines what 
speech rises to the requisite “threat-to-social stability” level to forfeit First Amendment 
protection, and that determining this threshold is always a parochial or majoritarian decision. 
Second, Quong argues that a containment measure directed at an unreasonable 
doctrine or community, in most cases, is not inconsistent with an asserted right at all, even if it 
                                                          
192 Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Persons,” p. 316. 
193 Matthew Clayton and David Stevens, “When God Commands Disobedience: Political Liberalism and 
Unreasonable Religions,” Res Publica, Vol. 20 (2014): 65-84. 
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is intended to diminish the asserted right’s impact. It is feasible to both respect a parental right 
to choose a child’s conditions of education while also hoping that public school education will 
transform that child’s beliefs and, in subsequent generations, either transform or eradicate that 
child’s native community. Rawls often speaks in Political Liberalism of a fundamental 
constitutional right’s “central range,”194 emphasizing that it is primarily this component of an 
asserted right that must be preserved. Where two rights conflict, as is arguably often the case in 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, or where essential governmental functions and 
unorthodox applications of constitutional rights conflict, it might well be that our duty is to 
maximally preserve both of them. Thus, the recognition of parental freedom must always be 
understood as running up against (a) the child’s right to choose his or her life path from among 
those generally available to citizens, and (b) the state’s interest in educating future citizens. 
 Third, even where there is a de facto rights abridgment, this occurs only where the 
asserted right or the doctrine asserting it is inconsistent with the very environment necessary 
for such a right to exist. Quong argues that this might justify legal restrictions on hate speech, 
insofar as such speech denies the very environment required for free exchanges of ideas among 
citizens of diverse viewpoints. Both he and Rawls emphasize, at least nominally, that such 
restrictions are to be pursued very cautiously. In a section of Theory that Rawls continued to cite 
with approval in his later work, Rawls emphasizes that the tolerant in society should only restrict 
the freedoms of “intolerant sects” where “only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason 
believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in danger.”195 Where 
there is little reason to suspect that such a danger exists, however, Rawls argues that political 
liberals have a strong interest in preserving intolerant sects’ freedoms. As Fuat Gursozlu 
                                                          
194 See, for example Political Liberalism, p. 341. 
195 Theory of Justice, p. 190. 
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explains, Rawls (at least in Theory) had faith that intolerant sects generally enjoying the same 
freedoms as others would lead to their becoming more tolerant over time, and embracing 
justice as fairness wholeheartedly.196 For those intolerant sects that are not persuaded to 
eventually embrace the political system, containment measures might well be justified to the 
point of rights curtailment. In these circumstances, it is up to the tolerant citizens (which 
appears to be a proxy for the “reasonable”) to decide where such abridgments are warranted. In 
sum, the first two replies deny that various containment measures are rights abridgments at all, 
while this third reply emphasizes the limited scope of rights abridgments to unreasonable 
persons that are permissible within containment measures. 
 These replies successfully demonstrate that containment and unreasonableness should 
not be understood as concepts depriving certain citizens or groups of an equal scheme of rights 
and liberties, though the bundle of rights and liberties it does supply might not address certain 
citizens’ deepest normative commitments. But I take Quong to argue that his coherently 
distinguishing between “exclusion from the constituency” and “depriving rights and liberties” is 
sufficiently exculpatory for containment that it ought to be considered morally (and 
democratically) legitimate. Quong thereby undervalues what, even by political liberalism’s own 
standards, are the very most substantial sticks in the citizens’ bundle of rights and liberties: 
those involving freedom of conscience, autonomy, and political participation.  
Most instantiations of political liberalism purport to refrain from making comprehensive 
judgments about, for instance, what forms of privacy are required to accord one another 
dignity, or the best means of cultivating friendship among the background’s various 
associations. Thus, instead of being a judgment about the truth of the matter (i.e., what sorts of 
                                                          
196 Fuat Gursozlu, “Political Liberalism and the Fate of Unreasonable People,” Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, 
No. 1: pp. 35-56. 
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privacy are “good” for us), a democratically legitimate regime of privacy protections is one 
arrived at through consensus. If a putatively unreasonable religious or cultural group is accorded 
the same privacy protections as everyone else, but this regime of privacy protections does not 
include a protection that is of vital importance to this community, then the privacy protections 
that the group does receive are a very cold comfort to it; in fact, they might receive, as they see 
it, no privacy protection at all.  
Admittedly the political liberal thinks she has good, democratic reasons for not paying 
any heed to what such a group thinks about the proper balance of privacy interests against 
other social concerns. But there are many areas in which a group’s exclusion from the 
constituency (and hence their authorship in determining their rights) is precisely, in its 
members’ views, the same as being deprived of any meaningful rights whatsoever. This 
observation alone, I submit, at least blunts the force of Quong’s replies to Friedman. In this 
sense, it might be the case that the “plain incorrectness” of Friedman’s reading of political 
liberalism is only superficial. The political liberal has not provided sufficiently strong reasons, or 
at least reasons that are not sufficiently strong from the political liberal’s own standpoint, for 
such a group’s view (of their rights deprivation) not counting at all against its political exclusion 
or in its rebutting containment measures that militate against it. Kelly and McPherson are 
correct, I will contend, in their supposition that some purportedly unreasonable persons still 
might be “due a say.” 
C. Containment as One-Dimensionality  
 This section will return to the intuition that an imposition of values is a basic moral 
wrong in a democracy (which is a form of social life that is predicated on shared construction of 
shared living space), and illustrate this wrong through an application of containment to two, 
hypothetical CIDs. The alien imposition of values that is wrought by the operation of 
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unreasonableness and containment is only democratically legitimate, by the political liberal’s 
own criteria, if such measures are necessary in the sense that they inhere in the very idea of an 
enduring democracy. The difficulty for the political liberal is that there are several values, often 
in tension with one another, which inhere in the very idea of democracy. Recall that one of the 
bases for containment is that it is necessary to ensure an enduring, wholeheartedly embraced 
stability among the citizenry, rather than a grudging modus vivendi that might crumble with any 
generation of non-rule-followers. This rationale, with its understanding of stability, creates two 
sources of internal tension: one about the other conceptions of enduring stability that might 
exist and another with the other values central to a liberal conception of democracy than 
stability. By placing such a high value on the sort of stability that justifies containment, betrays 
any sincere attempt at valuing diversity or respecting autonomy, principles that at other times 
are supposedly of paramount political import. The tension between pluralism and autonomy (or 
at least one species of autonomy) on the one hand, and a stability of social cooperation among 
equals on the other, is one among several tensions I will explore in this section. It is also one of 
several reasons why we are rightly suspicious of any variety of political liberalism that claims, as 
Rawls often does, to be a-teleological. A containment measure that privileges the degree of 
liberal sameness required for stability over respecting pluralism is, to those contained, an alien 
imposition that cannot be justified on neutral grounds. Even assuming that containment 
measures give appropriate due to another necessary desideratum of democracy called (to use 
Rawls’s phrase) “stability for the right reasons,” numerous choices remain, such as how many 
and what sorts of risks to stability are to be tolerated. If the answer were “none,” we would 
have a state-sponsored enforcement of perspectival uniformity, which is not what any political 
liberal favors. So we find ourselves, even if we assume politically liberal premises, in search of a 
risk-toleration threshold that is democratically appropriate. 
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 Because of the doubt that I have just expressed that containment can count as a 
justifiable imposition of alien values that logically necessary, my critique is structurally similar to 
a Moorean shift. I have discussed two sets of premises that containment proponents commonly 
employ in support of a conclusion about the moral legitimacy and desirability of containment. 
Here are, in admittedly simplified and rough form, these two sets of premises:  
(a) A just and stable democracy ought to ensure dignity (i.e., equal rights and liberties) for 
all citizens. 
(b) Unreasonable doctrines, in various ways, endanger such systems of equal rights and 
liberties. 
 
or 
 
(i) A just and stable democracy requires mutual assurance from all its constituents that 
they will abide by the fair terms of social cooperation (e.g., by not asserting 
transcendent values over political ones). 
(ii) Unreasonable doctrines, in various ways (especially (1) – (5) in the previous section), 
cast suspicion on their willingness to fairly cooperate, thereby eroding mutual 
assurance. 
 
My one-dimensionality objection will respond to these containment justifications in two senses. 
First, it will essentially deny (b) and (ii) by describing two, hypothetical CIDs that neither 
imminently endanger a fair scheme of rights and liberties nor especially threaten stability. 
Second, the four points that comprise my argument are predicated on three alternate premises, 
which are just as supported by central liberal values as are (a), (b), (i), and (ii): 
(c) A just democracy should respect the autonomy of its religiously and morally plural 
citizens, reasonable or not. 
(d) (From (c)) The state’s intentional imposition of alien values on a citizen or group is prima 
facie impermissible, and only permissible where reasonably necessary to ensure 
circumstances essential to a stable and just democracy. 
(e) Rawlsian containment measures are not reasonably necessary in the sense mentioned 
in (d). 
 
I take these premises to establish the conclusion that Rawlsian containment is democratically 
illegitimate, and below I will offer four justifications for (e). Because containment is not 
ordinarily the same sort of values imposition that forced speech would be, and a Rawlsian might 
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wonder just how it constitutes an imposition, I need to first characterize the sort of coercive 
force that I take containment to have.  
 Recall that this essay began with the admission that it is unavoidable that the range of 
possibilities for belief, lifeways, and living out one’s conception of the good are limited by one’s 
social circumstances. I will interchangeably call this the social atmosphere or social environment 
that one inhabits. There might be insufficient space to allow a worldview to persist as a live 
option, and this is always and everywhere true of some worldview. This “space” can be 
construed literally as living space necessary to the performative requirements of living out a 
worldview (such as worshipping on sacred land or accessing an area to conduct a community’s 
internal affairs without interference), psychologically by access to an environment non-
dismissive of or reaffirming one’s lifeway, or legally insofar as the structure of society’s 
institutions allow sufficient freedoms or other mechanisms to carry out the central duties of a 
lifeway. Where one or some other of these senses of adequate space, a rigorous account of 
which I cannot pursue here, is absent, the worldview or lifeway might cease to be a live option 
for most citizens, at least not without monumental efforts from those seeking to preserve it as 
one. Depending on their often inherited and unchosen circumstances, some worldviews, 
communities, or persons are in better positions than others to successfully undertake such 
efforts. Some of those who are in poor positions to do so often include the classes of citizens 
who worried Sen and Friedman, as explained in the previous section. 
 Notwithstanding this inevitability, it remains true by definition that a social environment 
in which some worldviews cannot survive (and indeed in which many have already all but 
vanished), lessens both the degree of pluralism a society contains and the range of options from 
which an individual has to choose. Both liberals and their critics have recognized the latter as a 
component of autonomy, which Stephen Aron defends in the public education context as 
112 
 
freedom of “belief formation,” which goes well beyond freedom of belief profession. For specific 
freedoms to be meaningful or effective, like those under the heading of freedom of conscience, 
the ability to form beliefs beyond the prevailing public philosophy cannot be unduly 
constrained. Where the Rawlsian’s advocacy of containment emphasizes some necessary limits 
on this component of autonomy, my argument refocuses our attention on what is important 
about this component. What makes a difference regarding whether this “inevitability” of social 
decline creates a democratic problem is the extent to which the inhospitable social atmosphere 
is incidental or necessary to an essential public purpose, on the one hand, or intentional and 
overbroad, on the other.  
Christopher Eberle captures an example of this phenomenon of a social atmosphere 
quite well by having us imagine a society called Christendom, whose citizens are literal believers 
in the fundamental tenets of Christianity at all times, and in which Christian buildings adorn the 
countryside and proclaim Christianity’s truth, school curricula include the studying of Christian 
doctrine, Christian symbols (and no others) are ubiquitous in official state institutions, and so 
on. Eberle asks us to imagine the conditions under which an ordinary person of average 
cognitive competence and inquisitiveness, Thomas, could come to disbelief in such a setting:  
In what way should we expect Thomas’s immersion in a society so saturated with 
Christianity to affect his perception of Christianity? We can be reasonably confident that 
Thomas can resist deference to Christianity only with difficulty – if Thomas can muster 
the strength and independence of thought to reject Christianity, he’ll succeed only with 
effort and determination. Most likely, however, the massive social confirmation of 
Christian creeds will have its counterpart in Thomas’s subjectivity: Christian tenets will 
enjoy the maximum plausibility that naturally attends realities that one is fortunate 
enough to be able to take for granted. As a ubiquitous and firmly entrenched feature of 
his social environment, Christianity appears to Thomas as a massive reality that imposes 
itself on his consciousness as ineluctably as do similarly massive features of his natural 
environment.197 
 
                                                          
197 Christopher Eberle, Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics, p. 30. 
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Eberle then asks us to slowly alter the environment, making it more religiously plural both in 
population and in the living space, considering the effect on Thomas’s doxastic possibilities. 
They will obviously change as what I have called Thomas’s social morass changes. If we were to 
alter Thomas’s environment so fundamentally that either a competing religion or something like 
the naturalism of Richard Dawkins (let’s uncreatively call it Dawkinsdom) defined the public 
sphere so totally as Christianity had in Christendom, I suspect Eberle would agree that Thomas’s 
maintaining Christian beliefs would become the option that would be difficult, and agreement 
with Dawkins would come more easily. Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age is a comprehensive, 
historical account of the connection between one’s social atmosphere and the possibilities of 
belief within it.198 Theologian and religious philosopher C.S. Lewis has written on the need for 
“old books” for this very reason.199  
 The phenomenon of our religious and other doxastic possibilities being limited by our 
social atmosphere is not, conceptually at least, oppressive. But Rawls and various others 
plausibly posit that the operation of free human reason in a free society will eventually produce 
a multiplicity of worldviews, given what he calls the burdens of judgment, resulting the “fact of 
reasonable pluralism” in all free societies. Conversely, Rawls suggests that any society in which 
one comprehensive doctrine is ubiquitous, this is a clear indicator of the “fact of oppression,” 
according to which doctrinal uniformity cannot be maintained without deception or political 
oppression. This would seem to include Eberle’s hypothetical Christendom or my hypothetical 
Dawkinsdom. Whether we agree with the strength of Rawls’s conclusions, I hope it is 
uncontroversial to suggest that doctrinal uniformity is often (but not always) accomplished 
throughout our post-Enlightenment history by coercive means, and that coercive environments 
                                                          
198 A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2007). 
199 I am indebted to David Bradshaw for this example. Lewis’s discussion is contained in his introduction to 
a translation of St. Athanasius’s On the Incarnation. 
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more easily maintain doctrinal uniformity among large swaths of the populace than democratic 
ones. This therefore describes a skepticism about the process by which the social atmosphere 
can come to be like Christendom or Dawkinsdom. Even Rawls would suggest that Thomas has 
been oppressed because of a prior or ongoing political process, and not because a 
hypothetically free state has failed to produce a maximum number of alternate worldviews for 
Thomas’s cognitive menu. 
 What is important about Rawls’s own suppositions is essential in my critique of his and 
other public reason liberals’ approaches of identifying, transforming and containing 
unreasonable doctrines: the evolution of thick, ostensibly insurmountable social atmospheres of 
determined possibilities can be oppressive even if they do not resemble paradigmatic, violent 
political coercion. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse presents a powerful, Marxist account of 
how twentieth-century American life had become so saturated with the values of its 
technocratic capitalist system, across institutions and even in the academy, that its citizens had 
lost the ability to posit genuine desires of their own, or imagine any possibilities of life being 
different in any important way from the daily grind. Through a process he called repressive 
desublimation, the control of one worldview and set of values was so total in social existence 
that it was no longer possible for, say, subversive literature or other forms of social critique to 
serve as a check on (or alternative to) existing social forces. Where Marx’s time was one in 
which the factory worker’s private self was alienated from his working self, resulting in an 
unhappily divided but two-dimensional person, Marcuse’s time was one of a more “progressive 
stage of alienation” in which the alienated self had been swallowed by an imposed, alien, public 
existence. The self had lost the ability to critique society and experience what was other than 
society, and every iteration of the self’s “false [in the sense of being imposed] consciousness” 
had become his or her true consciousness. To put it in the terms I have just introduced, Marcuse 
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argued that the forms of “space” necessary for authentic and non-imposed living were absent, 
making all other forms of life than the mainstream one psychologically dead options. 
 While Marcuse’s work is rife with proofs and illustrations of this phenomenon, there are 
two that are particularly illustrative of my chosen image of our inhabiting a certain social 
atmosphere and being limited in our tenable conceptions of the good. First, Marcuse claims that 
part of the reason that our needs as consumers are uniform and “false” is because we cannot 
feasibly escape public, commercial life: even after we leave the public sphere and enter our 
homes, the putative psychological respite for our ownmost, private selves, cleverly and 
nefariously designed advertisements work on our conscious and subconscious thoughts in such 
a way that the totalizing force of the commercial world stays with us even at home.200 This was 
one tool among many, Marcuse claimed, that ended up encompassing the entirety of one’s daily 
physical and mental space:  
The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging, 
food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry 
carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional 
reactions which bind the consumer more or less pleasantly to the producers and, 
through the latter, to the whole.201 
 
A detail of central importance to Marcuse’s work is that this was so effective because it was 
done, as are the processes described in the previous section, under the auspices of democracy 
and with a putatively benign purpose; hence Marcuse’s famously beginning his book with a 
description of a “comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom”202 prevailing in 
advanced industrial civilization. 
                                                          
200 See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), p. 92. Claims 
like these regarding advertisements were far from unique, particularly among the members of the 
Frankfurt school. 
201 Id., p. 12 (emphasis supplied) 
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 Another central part of the Marcusean narrative is the idea that such things as nature 
and poetry once served as loci of critique or negation of all that was publicly given, though an 
effect of one-dimensional society and thought is to have robbed citizens of even these spaces of 
respite. Marcuse provides an evocative image as to how these pre-technological images of the 
relation between man and nature have lost their power:  
[T]he physical transformation of the world entails the mental transformation of its 
symbols, images, and ideas. Obviously, when cities and highways and National Parks 
replace the villages, valleys, and forests; when motorboats race over the lakes and 
planes cut through the skies—then these areas lose their character as a qualitatively 
different reality, as areas of contradiction.203  
 
Marcuse’s claim here is not simply that the absence of adequate physical or mental space in the 
furthest corners of our lived world whittles down some worldviews that are just ill-suited for 
social life, but that this is a process whereby our (all of us) very means for forming authentic, 
autonomous worldviews is irretrievably whittled down. Such a concern is very much in line with 
Lewis’s recommendation of reading old books (i.e., those of another reality) or what would 
concern Rawls about Eberle’s hypothetical Christendom or Dawkinsdom. Far short of a 
democracy that guarantees a complete menu of worldviews as tenable, which is neither 
practical nor desirable in itself, the autonomous formation of worldviews comes with certain 
preconditions that can be intentionally, and undemocratically, threatened or removed.  
 Though they professedly propose containment (or transformative constitutionalism) as 
processes that intentionally alter the social atmosphere, Macedo and Quong would surely 
object that the one-dimensionality description is apropos even if what Marcuse describes is 
autonomy-inhibiting. Those cultures that are contained in political liberalism, in one way or 
                                                          
203 Id., p. 66. I have argued elsewhere that this is very much French phenomenologist Michel Henry’s 
narrative regarding what 21st century scientism has done to art, education, and journalism (see J. Aaron 
Simmons & David Scott, “Is There Life After Barbarism? Phenomenological Reflections on Science and the 
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another, are said to endanger the just environment that prevents one-dimensionality from 
taking place. Containment therefore is not intended to inhibit autonomy, which is what one-
dimensionality does, even if it is said to prevent or make difficult certain choices or lifestyles. 
More work needs to be done to show that, in response to the political liberal, the one-
dimensionality attribution is apt, as removing choices, or failing to maximize the range of 
choices, from the cognitive menu does not one-dimensionality make. 
 To begin my defense of this one-dimensionality charge against containment, I introduce 
two hypothetical cultures for whom the social atmosphere intended by the processes of 
identification, containment, and transformation is inhibiting, and in such a way that the 
democratic theorist has cause for concern insofar as these cultures are what I have called CIDs. 
These hypothetical cultures are non-violent, and generally accept (1) and (3), but perhaps 
interpret (3) differently than the Rawlsian, or else reject (2), (4), (5), or (6).204 Each of the 
following examples, in which I intend to include many of the putatively unreasonable doctrines 
identified in the previous section, are either composites or near-copies of cultures involved in 
legal disputes of great constitutional significance:  
(A) Wolf’s Tower is a butte in the Great Bear Mountains that is both a popular destination 
for climbing enthusiasts and a sacred site for the Tunuk tribe. The rituals the Tunuk 
perform on Wolf’s Tower require quiet, non-disturbance and solitude for 
efficaciousness, all of which is inconsistent with the climbers’ nearly constant presence. 
It also happens that the climbers’ activities and the paths that are cleared to ease their 
access to Wolf’s Tower have been destructive to the nearby forest and vegetative life 
around the butte that the Tunuk hold sacred. Thus, the Tunuk have requested a 
temporary or seasonal climbing ban during their rituals, to which various climbing 
groups have objected, and a cessation of certain path-clearing activity; the Tunuk have 
negotiated and agreed to a land management plan, in cooperation with the National 
Park Service and some of the climbers, that would apportion time to both the climbers 
and the tribe members for their respective land uses.205 The Tunuk insist that their ritual 
performance is sufficiently important to guard against natural disasters and to their 
                                                          
204 See supra, pp. 85-87. 
205 This thought experiment is an amalgam of Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v. Babbitt, 173 F.3d 814 (10th 
Cir. 1999), Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), and Navajo 
Nation, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) 
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culture’s survival that it is worth restricting land access to others. They also insist that 
the government cease any land-clearing activities nearby that disturb or destroy the 
spirits that inhabit the surrounding land, thereby rendering the rituals ineffective. A 
federal court has recently found that the land management plan violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and has denied the tribe’s request to 
preserve the surrounding vegetation, since the Free Exercise Clause does not permit a 
religious believer to complain about the government’s use of its own land or foreclose 
private activity on government land by others, especially others who have an equal 
claim to such land. 
 
(B) The Piedmont Amish (or simply the “Piedmont”) believe in and practice a strict division 
of labor and social opportunity along gendered lines. While the roles assumed by each 
gender are regarded with equal respect in the community and both genders have equal 
votes in communal decisions, central to the community’s religion is a moral obligation to 
respect gendered divisions of labor as instantiations of God’s will in creating men and 
women with different properties and strengths. None of the ills that afflict some insular 
religious communities of gendered divisions, such as physical or sexual abuse or 
conversational norms that silence women, are present among the Piedmont. 
Nonetheless, some examples of gendered divisions do reserve roles of political leader, 
builder, and protector for men, and numerous other communal roles are open only to 
women. While violations of these rules result in internal, nonviolent community 
sanctions, and count as a sin against God in their eyes, members are also not restrained 
from leaving the community. Beyond their gendered practices, essential to the 
Piedmont is a belief that mainstream society is a source of moral and spiritual 
corruption, particularly public schools. The Piedmont only send their children to public 
school for as long as the state requires them, which is currently through the eighth 
grade. While the children are in middle school, they are taught the theory of evolution 
in biology and world religions in history, to which the Piedmont object and demand that 
their children be withheld during the teaching of such subjects. Their epistemology 
denies that the free exercise of human reason will lead anywhere other than God, and 
that teachings such as evolution are nefarious tricks of the Devil that operate on the 
consciousness more as a drug or other agent of deception than as a hypothesis to be 
evaluated by the free exercise of human reason. Those in civil society (and their children 
if they are left in school) who come around to such teachings are regarded not as 
reasonable but mistaken, but as under some sort of cognitive spell, as intellectually or 
spiritually corrupted, or otherwise benighted. The Piedmont nonetheless regard physical 
coercion of those who are benighted in this manner as morally improper and contrary to 
what is supposed to be a freely-chosen, voluntary relationship with God.206 
 
The Piedmont and Tunuk are both almost always pacifists, though they do regard their own 
spiritual claims as having special priority and unique, privileged access to the truth or the good 
life. Each culture participates somewhat minimally in political life, but does tend to vote on 
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119 
 
candidates for political office and on referenda or ballot initiatives. While they believe others 
ought to recognize their moral and spiritual conclusions, they are loath to impose their wills by 
physical force, and are in all relevant senses cooperative with laws, governmental authorities, 
and their neighboring communities, where the need arises (though peaceful civil disobedience is 
not out of the question for either community). They might nonetheless be said, at least in the 
Piedmont’s case, to risk the sort of social dissension that the court in Mozert v. Hawkins found 
sufficiently worrisome to refuse to allow parents to exclude their children from certain 
segments of the curriculum.  
 What I will demonstrate is that the exclusion from the political constituency of 
communities like the Tunuk and Piedmont, and even more so, their containment, is an alien 
imposition of values that is similar to Marcuse’s illustrations of one-dimensionality society. The 
political liberal thinks she has good grounds for such impositions, namely that they are only 
impositions insofar as they prevent greater impositions of others by the Tunuk or Piedmont. But 
the one-dimensionality charge sticks. While one-dimensionality describes a social situation, I will 
speak of containment measures as one-dimensional in the sense that they instantiate a 
condition of one-dimensionality. I will take any political measure to be one-dimensional where it 
is intended to (a) make the social climate more difficult for a non-mainstream culture to persist, 
by (b) imposing a mainstream conception of the true or the good on that non-mainstream 
culture, except where (c) doing so is necessary to keep a democracy’s citizens free from 
impositions by others. The sort of imposition that is a containment measure is broader and 
more extensive than that which is necessary to prevent imminent harm to others or towards 
democracy. I will provide four senses in which the political liberal, through unreasonableness 
and containment, attempts (perhaps innocently) to fashion cultures in accordance with one 
image among many of a well-ordered liberal society, thereby undermining autonomy and 
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pluralism. Taken together, these four species of imposition suggest that containment aims at a 
social circumstance much like Marcusean one-dimensionality. 
First, suppose that containment measures, whether in the form of judicial rulings, 
legislation, or other political acts, have been directed at both practices revolving around the 
Piedmont’s gendered division of labor and its parents’ practices regarding their children in 
public school. Recall that, regarding those political liberals who support compulsory public 
education as a containment measure, there are two commonly provided justifications: ensuring 
that children could function in civil society should they wish to leave their communities and 
inculcating political virtues, such as tolerance, to ensure that they will be future, cooperative 
citizens. Containment measures here are not instances of one-dimensionality, according to the 
containment proponent, because they seek to dissipate social atmospheres that are inimical to 
personal choice, not create them. If the child is unequipped to function outside of his or her 
community, then the child lacks a meaningful right to leave the community, and somewhere like 
a Piedmont community would consequently be one-dimensional. Moreover, if the child does 
not learn political virtues, like developing tolerant attitudes towards others, then it is 
foreseeable that they will be inclined to impose their views on or devalue others. Hence, so this 
reply might go, all that containment removes from the cognitive menu for those like the 
Piedmont is an opportunity to remove choices for the other person (whether that is another 
within or outside one’s community). 
 While the case for containment’s heart is in the right place, in being worried about civil 
rights within faith communities and the eventual evolution of an oppressive majoritarianism, it 
presumes what it sets out to prove: that exposure to mainstream society is autonomy and civic 
virtue-augmenting, at least relative to communal life among the Piedmont. The first reason why 
the aforementioned reply fails to deflect a one-dimensionality charge is that containment 
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proponents often treat the community to be contained and the mainstream public culture doing 
the containment asymmetrically. A community like the Piedmont, the one to be contained, is 
taken as it actually is, with its civic vices and virtues, or even with a focus on its vices. The public 
institutions and mainstream culture, on the other hand, are construed at a high level of 
idealization, as though they are primarily purveyors of widely shared democratic virtues, rather 
than institutions that also contain destructive social or psychological effects of their own.207 If 
there are psychologically harmful or coercive elements in public culture as it is in lived reality, a 
culture which is pervasive for American citizens, then the worry about lacking a “meaningful 
right of exit” seems to apply just as much to those routinely affected by public institutions. Aside 
from the relative value of these influences, it is also far from clear that exposure to the public 
sphere, even if it involves encountering a diversity of influences, is the neutral ground for social 
living in direct contrast to the Piedmont community’s paradigmatically parochial one.  
Were we to actually compare like-with-like, i.e., actual public culture with actual 
communal culture, the one-dimensionality picture is much different. In the passage above about 
the distorting (and value-laden) psychological effect of advertising, including its tendency to 
invasively follow us home, I take Marcuse to depict public culture in just this manner. Spinner-
Halev similarly recognizes this non-neutral character of mainstream society and defends a 
religious community like the Piedmont against the containment proponent, in two passages that 
I believe worth quoting at length:  
The main flaw in this argument is that it fails to recognize that in the consumer, 
materialist societies of the West, the lure of exit [from insular religious communities] is 
always present. It is partly because our societies are so materialist, including our public 
schools in many ways, that some people retreat to religion. Some people complain 
about the hold that certain groups have over their children, but the hold that popular 
culture has over many people is not exactly uplifting…In the USA today public schools 
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routinely make marketing deals with Pepsi or Coca Cola; where other private companies 
are allowed to buy advertising within the schools; where private television networks are 
shown for free in schools in return for the ability to show advertising to children; where 
peer pressure is often intense and sometimes harmful. Are these the sorts of schools 
that produce autonomous adults? Then, of course, there are the private media that 
children in mainstream culture often find themselves immersed in...[S]uffice to say that 
autonomy is not what much of popular culture is after. As William Galston remarks, 
‘Children immersed in a culture defined by advertising, entertainment media, and peer 
pressure are often dominated by influences they neither understand nor resist.’ 
 
While some object that religious groups may make exit difficult by sheltering their 
children, this is hard to do in our society. Some religious groups do keep a tight grip on 
their children, but the range of popular culture is farreaching, and extends to almost all 
groups in our society. It is hard for traditional religious children not to see that other 
kinds of life exist in our society. The streets are full of different kinds of people; 
advertising is ubiquitous; computers allow people to virtually travel around the globe.208 
 
The sort of unchosen, autonomy-inhibiting psychological influence that a containment 
proponent would claim is prevalent among the Piedmont is also prevalent in actual, non-ideal 
public life; in either case, if Spinner-Halev and Marcuse are fair in characterizing the pervasive 
influence of the public sphere, the child’s thought formation is shaped in some direction. 
Observing the psychological pull or thought influence of one’s religious community, on its own, 
does not provide the containment proponent with a sufficient rebuttal to my one-
dimensionality charge (i.e., that compulsory education of the Piedmont would be an imposition 
of alien values on parents and children). The burden is on the containment proponent to 
demonstrate that there is a sufficient degree of autonomy inhibition that is present in living 
among the Piedmont, and absent in actual public life, that a public policy measure making the 
social atmosphere more difficult or less hospitable to the Piedmont is something other than an 
imposition of alien values on them. Moreover, the containment proponent must do so without 
appealing to a controversial conception of autonomy about which those who can live peaceably 
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in a democracy can disagree. What I hope I have initially demonstrated is that discharging this 
burden requires comparing the Piedmont as they are with public life as it is. 
 While this point is less applicable to the Tunuk’s case, a similar observation can be made 
regarding this asymmetry in non-ideal/ideal treatment of parochial and public communities. It 
might be said that a law allowing the Tunuk to make special claims to areas of public land is 
unreasonable because it is to insist on the special value of its truth claims and to require others 
to forbear their desired land uses on grounds that only the Tunuk recognize as true or good. As 
things stand, the Tunuk must deal with persons being on sacred land or sometimes being 
permitted to engage in land uses the Tunuk find blasphemous or downright dangerous, such as 
land uses that are disruptive and that make guaranteed solitude impossible. This is admittedly 
somewhat disanalogous to the Piedmont, in that a law refusing special protection for the Tunuk 
is not, under Quong’s definition, a containment measure (it is just the normal operation of law). 
Nonetheless, it remains true that the disfigurement or transformation of natural features for 
commercial and recreational purposes, the steady stream of visitors who might disturb the 
rituals and disrupt the harmony of the area, and the potential desanctification of the site, all 
make maintaining cultural cohesion and religious observance difficult for the Tunuk.  
The assumption one might make here, analogous to the assumption a containment 
proponent makes about public schools being an autonomy-maximizing location, is that the 
Tunuk seek to abridge freedom of movement and government disposition with its own land as it 
pleases, whereas others (the government and recreational visitors) wish to institute an ethos of 
land use that is public and shareable. The non-ideal construction of the land ethos that the 
government and recreational climbers (or other recreational visitors) likely includes a greater 
likelihood of at least one of the following: a tendency to view the natural world as including 
objects of appropriation, mastery, or transformation for suitability for convenience or 
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accessibility; even with preservationist attitudes, a decreased emphasis on the interests of 
future generations in preserved land, or on the present aesthetic value of undisrupted natural 
spaces; and a conception of landowner sovereignty that permits a wide range of uses and bases 
for exclusion of others, rather than a timeshare view. While the democratic value of each of 
those elements of the government’s land ethos is debatable, so are the Tunuk’s (as I will further 
explain regarding another axis of one-dimensionality). Another feature of the governmental land 
ethos is its origin. The only reason that the Tunuk are in a position of making arguably 
unreasonable requests (special access, temporary exclusion of others, creating a potential 
Establishment Clause issue, and interfering in internal governmental affairs) is because 
American Indian tribes, as is well known, were forcibly removed from or divested of many of 
their claims to large stretches of land across the United States. The reasonableness of the 
Tunuk’s and similarly situated communities’ land insistences could therefore turn on a historical 
contingency, such as whether the lands in question are located on areas granted tribal 
sovereignty or not. The relative democratic value of the government’s and the tribes’ land 
claims must be judged according to the actual persons making both. Since containment appears 
to reason with an ideal/non-ideal asymmetry, however, the criteria by which containment is 
judged appropriate is already tilted against CIDs like the Piedmont and Tunuk. 
 A second, related respect in which containment measures institute one-dimensionality 
is that containment measures are frequently directed at a whole community or, even if they are 
narrowly tailored to a specific communal practice, at a practice integral to that community. This 
is problematic because a doctrine and its community of adherents, even if it does contain some 
antidemocratic or illiberal elements, also includes some democratically virtuous or 
democratically friendly elements as well; the latter elements ought to cut against any case for 
containment or the non-engagement approach that often comes with it. Beyond the asymmetry 
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charge, which complains that only the side to be contained is treated in its actuality, it might be 
the case that containment effectively reduces the contained doctrine to its illiberal elements. 
But the Tunuk and Piedmont, as well as other hypothetical CIDs we could instead discuss here, 
contain multitudes. I therefore call this the reduction problem with containment. While 
Friedman’s and Sen’s concerns relate to each of these axes of one-dimensionality, I believe they 
relate most closely to this problem, as the poor or disadvantaged are likely to be reduced in this 
way based on their political behaviors. 
Suppose we concede to the Rawlsian that certain of the Tunuk’s land claims in 
themselves violate the duty of public reason, and evidence a preference for the transcendental 
over the political, each of which arguably cause social strife and evidence some desire for 
unequal treatment. These land claims and their underlying land uses, for many real-world 
indigenous groups like the hypothetical Tunuk, are quite often of central (even life-or-death) 
religious significance and are at the center of cultural cohesion, and hence, cultural survival. 
Even if we were to concede, then, that such claims detract from certain political desiderata, we 
ought to be mindful of the senses in which the same culture (like the Tunuk) might in other 
senses further important political desiderata. Contrary to the possibly undesirable elements of 
the public, political culture’s land ethos, what might be contained in the Tunuk’s land claims is a 
kind of reverence for the natural world that is lacking among many of us, and a concern for 
future generations’ use of land that is itself a concern of the original position.209 Even for those 
who do not share their beliefs, the Tunuk might provide moral motivation for what has proven 
to be a market externality (pollution and related environmental issues) that mainstream society 
struggles to appropriately manage. Finally, though surely some American Indian land use claims 
have arguably been excessive or incredibly intolerant of others’ interests, several sacred land 
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cases have included tribes who might ask a lot with a willingness to give a lot in return, or who 
are at least eager to negotiate with other interested parties in the land at issue. Certain of these 
negotiations have required the interested parties to gain a deeper understanding of the 
transcendent basis for the other’s land claims and expanded the possibilities of peaceable, 
tolerant bargaining between peoples. By admitting such arguments in public discourse, we 
might develop better precedent (in court and elsewhere) for ameliorating conflicts between 
mainstream society and minority religions whose beliefs are predominantly non-doxastic. While 
such negotiations might deviate in some ways from the Rawlsian ideal of public reason, which is 
the language that reasonable persons are willing to speak, they need not thereby be detrimental 
to either respect of one’s fellow citizens or social stability.  
The purportedly illiberal elements among the Piedmont, at least those likely to be 
targets for containment measures, might similarly be bound up with a community that contains 
other morally neutral or virtuous practices. I submit that this fact ought to require any 
permissible political practice like containment to proceed much more cautiously than along the 
lines that the Rawlsian has drawn them. The Piedmont, insofar as they interact with mainstream 
culture, exemplify unique forms of social cooperation that might add to civic benevolence, 
respectful treatment among citizens, or otherwise serve as a positive influence or source of 
constructive insights for industry or family life. Amish communities, for example, manage little 
social discord amongst themselves in our age of discord’s rampancy and are uncommonly 
industrious, self-sustaining, and extraordinarily supportive of their community members. 
Spinner-Halev makes a similar observation about groups that have an illiberal element of a 
gendered division of labor:  
The idea behind tax-exempt status for non-profit groups is to encourage the existence 
of a vibrant civil society…It will surely be the case that liberals will not agree with the 
goals or the institutional structure of someone of these non-profit groups. Yet many of 
these non-profit organizations can still contribute to civil society: they can encourage 
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people to interact, offer people a sense of community, and offer them opportunities to 
engage in social and political activities. These are all important functions and they are 
helped by many non-profit groups, even many of those that do not have a liberal 
agenda or structure. It is probably the case that many non-profit organizations have a 
mixed record from a liberal point of view. Many Baptist churches, for example, are 
patriarchal, yet they give many women important opportunities to learn a variety of 
skills, since women participate in church activities in larger numbers than men. If we 
only look at their institutional structure[,] we may miss the liberal and democratic 
opportunities that many non-profit groups offer their members.210 
 
Moreover, even if the Piedmont are not supportive of social unity or stability in a participatory 
sense – recall that for Macedo and Gutmann especially this is crucial for a political system’s 
health and survival – their spiritually-motivated pacifism results in their being far less likely to 
have a hand in various other species of social discord, particularly those involving the vitriol or 
potential for violence that are, in fact, unfortunately common among more mainstream political 
participants.  
Speaking more generally, CIDs might well contain inextricably intertwined, in Marcusean 
parlance, disorderly and harmonious elements, just as do doctrines within mainstream society 
that are not judged unreasonable by Rawlsian criteria. It seems that there are more paths than 
those that containment and unreasonableness favor that are open to good citizenship, as there 
is a wider array of vices and virtues that lead to non-coercion and stability in public, political life 
than these concepts care to admit. Regarding the liberal virtue of tolerance, Kevin Vallier notes 
that even Macedo admits both that the effectiveness of public schools in inculcating tolerant 
attitudes in students is unclear and cites a study that purports to demonstrate that Catholic 
schools are more effective in producing tolerant students who believe strongly in civil rights.211 
Admittedly, Catholic schools are not the first sort that come to mind in speaking of CIDs or non-
mainstream doctrines; indeed, Catholicism is the very denomination that Macedo suggests was 
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successfully transformed in favor of public, liberal politics. But this example both casts doubt on 
the claim that public, non-parochial reasons are most effective at inculcating “ways of thought 
and feeling” conducive to liberal democracy, and suggests that there might be varied and 
parochial paths towards tolerance, respect, and so on. This can even be the case where, as it is 
in the way I have described the Piedmont, the child’s home community views those in 
mainstream society as benighted, depraved, etc., thus rejecting the burdens of judgment and 
the fact of reasonable pluralism (recall that such attitudes are indicative of unreasonableness). 
Certain senses of cooperation, tolerance, or respect might coexist with the latter sort of 
attitudes where, for instance, that community practices pacifism, perhaps on spiritual grounds, 
or aims to participate in public life only minimally.  
The third respect in which containment measures represent an unjustifiable value 
imposition, which I have mentioned in passing already, is that it presumes a conception of social 
stability, and a specific, non-zero degree (and quality, in the sense of kinds of threats) of risk 
tolerance to that stability. The following are examples of demands that are sufficiently socially 
divisive that the Rawlsian commonly finds they should not be engaged in public, political life: a 
demand for state support or access to a religious pilgrimage, an insistence on a greater share of 
a primary good, and that getting our transcendent values right as a public body is worth some 
civil strife.212 Once again, the worry underlying this conception of stability is that assertions of 
transcendent values of these and other varieties will result in defection from the social contract, 
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129 
 
making it tantamount to a modus vivendi. This is a conception of stability, however, that anyone 
who takes transcendent values to heart will have reason to reject. Therefore, if the Rawlsian 
wishes to stick to the claim that this sense of stability is the only proper concern of political 
theory (and hold that the decision to opt for transcendent values is simply not something 
political theory addresses), and thereby justify non-engagement, this would so heavily 
circumscribe the constituency in advance that we might rightly wonder what good such 
conception is for our actual population of citizens.  
I think it is not only clear that CIDs would operate under a substantially different notion 
of stability, but that numerous stripes of comprehensive liberals would as well. This degree of 
resistance to these kinds of risks of social strife evidence a rather weak faith in the liberal 
project’s potential for winning hearts and minds; a more Millian liberalism, for instance, would 
seem to think that it could bear the risk of dissension. Daniel Weinstock has argued that the 
modus vivendi concern is now overblown in the United States, given our level of social and 
institutional stability, as most citizens have sufficient reason to (eventually) come to a 
compromise. Both Rawls and Quong, for instance, seem to believe that the only reliable 
motivation people might have (absent political liberalism) for not imposing their view on others 
is that they do not have sufficient political currency for doing so. As Weinstock puts the matter, I 
think correctly, the view of human nature and social stability that is operative here is that 
citizens in a liberal democracy will either achieve thin social consensus or completely devolve 
into power politics, and that it is the liberal’s task to safeguard against the latter.213 The Tunuk 
would surely reject as overbroad the claim that a request for special provisions of access to 
public land and requesting a partial veto power over uses of that land constitutes an 
impermissible risk of civil strife; the strife at issue is well-controlled and the countervailing 
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interest of theirs could not be of deeper normative significance to them. Likewise, the Piedmont 
Amish (just like actual orders of Amish) would reject claims that their desire to avoid public 
education presents a sufficiently high risk of mass defection from the democratic project that it 
warrants “containment” measures like making at least public primary or secondary education 
required for their children. They might well view school choice as a conflict between the law and 
their children’s salvation, with the latter being an obvious choice for such convicted parents. 
There are various threats to stability: actual and imminent threats, reasonably foreseeable ones, 
and those that are to varying degrees further off into the future or only become threats where 
myriad others mimicking the purportedly threatening behavior. CIDs like those I have picked out 
certainly do not belong in the first of these categories. Moreover, the Tunuk and Piedmont, even 
if they hold to beliefs or practices that make matters of political accommodation more difficult 
than without their views, or even views that would become unwieldy to the state if 
universalized, they are nonetheless socially cooperative, non-aggressive, and are presumably 
willing to reciprocate accommodations granted them by honoring the parallel religious or moral 
claims of others.  
 What further compounds this stability problem with containment is that it is not clear 
that it best serves the political liberal’s goal of achieving a form of stability that can be 
wholeheartedly embraced. Numerous critics have argued that we have every reason to believe 
that drawing the political constituency narrowly, or at least construing the norms of public 
dialogue narrowly, will motivate a retreat from or a mistrust of the public sphere.214 Here, in 
brief, is Robert Talisse’s statement of this problem with respect to the requirement of public 
reason: “Consider now the predicament of those persons that the politics of omission 
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epistemically excludes: believing, correctly, that there is no point in raising their arguments in 
public, they will likely form small groups devoted to the advancement of their position; these 
groups will meet regularly to discuss the group’s views and devise strategies for disseminating 
their message. Conditions will be ripe for polarization.”215  This would obviously occasion a 
different sort of social strife than the one with which the containment proponent is principally 
concerned, but it is an outcome that would be awfully threatening to stability nonetheless. An 
alternate conception of stability therefore claims that moderate civil strife is necessary for 
longer-term stability with a broader political constituency, which seems to be a proper end of a 
democratic conception of justice. If citizens are differently motivated, we might instead propose 
that civil strife over transcendent values is permissible so long as the combatants are, as 
Weinstock puts it, stably disposed to compromise rather than engage in perpetual normative 
warfare.216 In any event, since certain of the containment measures and certain of the indicia of 
unreasonableness are about a certain conception of democratic stability rather than democratic 
stability per se, imposing this conception on others without justification is another indicator of 
one-dimensionality. 
 Finally, even if containment were predicated on an agreeable conception of stability or 
respect (of one’s fellow citizens), there remains a balance of political values problem. Where 
compulsory education, claims about subsidized sacred land access, or an insistence on the right 
to cultural survival are denied based on social stability, this justifiable only by favoring social 
stability over a certain conception of individual or group autonomy. Spinner-Halev argues, in 
discussing the aforementioned example about Baptist churches with “mixed records” in a liberal 
sense, that we should not deny tax-exempt statuses to those religious groups that practice 
                                                          
215 Democracy and Moral Conflict, p. 60 
216 Daniel Weinstock, “A Neutral Conception of Reasonableness?” Episteme (2006): 234-47, 244. 
132 
 
gender discrimination. Even if we find such practices morally repugnant, he claims, the need to 
protect toleration and diversity is also of paramount democratic import:  
If all groups adhere to robust liberal standards on individuality, equality and 
discrimination, the pluralism within the liberal state would be reduced. This would 
diminish the choices that people can exercise, undermining their autonomy. Pluralism 
and autonomy are not very meaningful if the only pluralism that is available is 
completely compatible with the ruling public philosophy. Meaningful choices means 
having to choice to belong to a hierarchical religion. If all private groups are remade in 
the image of the liberal state, then everyone’s choices are reduced.217 
 
Put otherwise, conditioning of tax-exempt status on acceptance of various liberal values 
(especially those contained in reasonableness) is a containment measure that Spinner-Halev 
finds unjustifiable given other commitments, and one that he finds to be awfully dangerous 
territory. It might also be the case that a woman belonging to a hierarchical religion, like 
Catholicism or the Piedmont community, can choose her faith community despite her misgivings 
about its patriarchal structure, attempt to influence her community from within in a more 
liberal direction, or might not feel demeaned by taking what she regards as a meaningful role. 
Similarly, the Tunuk would likely claims that honoring the deepest normative commitments that 
they hold, sustaining their culture, or (in their view) keeping the world safe, are political virtues 
that are of greater import than minimally abridging recreational climbers’ equal access to public 
land or causing social dissension. This would be to elevate something like cultural autonomy or 
self-determination over other democratic values. The political liberal must be able to articulate 
a publicly communicable balance of safeguarding stability, respect for autonomy, and sincerely 
protecting pluralism in order to avoid the one-dimensionality charge regarding containment 
measures. 
 To summarize, I began with the claim that the intentional creation of an inhospitable 
social atmosphere, or a one-dimensional one, is a basic moral wrong in a democracy, or rather, it 
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is an undemocratic imposition of alien values on others by the public, political mainstream. This 
is distinct from guaranteeing minority cultures equality of outcome, since containment 
measures (as I have construed them and Rawlsians describe them) are intentional rather than 
what Rawls rightly said is an “inevitable fact of political sociology.” This presumption is 
defeasible, however, if the impositions at issue are necessary to the idea of a democracy of free 
and equal persons, such as a culture that is abusive of women or minorities, one that wishes to 
impose a religious social hierarchy, and so on. A state ought not leave its citizens unprotected 
against the force or threats of others, nor need it tolerate imminent threats to its being. But the 
containment measures and the scope of unreasonableness that Rawlsian containment 
advocates propose are much broader in application than that. If CIDs like the Piedmont and 
Tunuk are non-hostile and capable of living cooperatively and peaceably, then some justification 
is owed to them, per the Rawlsian’s notion of autonomy, regarding any measures that attempt 
to crowd out or discourage their ways of life. There are at least four respects in which 
containment and the concept of unreasonableness are guilty of attempting to fashion all 
doctrines or communities in Rawlsian liberalism’s image – the asymmetry, reductive, stability, 
and balance of political values problems – rather than merely taking the necessary steps to keep 
its citizens secure and accord them equal rights. This problem is most acute for non-mainstream 
minority and other disadvantaged groups, as they are more easily stereotyped and excluded in 
the name of political values. 
 The mistake underlying each of these four instances of one-dimensionality inherent in 
containment is the assumption of many political liberals that there is only one reliable source of 
moral motivation to be perpetually peaceable and cooperative (and thus worthy of political 
justification and inclusion), which justifies the creation of an inhospitable social atmosphere 
against persons who do not hold that sort of motivation. Quong indicates as much in considering 
134 
 
and rejecting Kelly and McPherson’s proposal to redraw the lines of unreasonableness, 
distinguishing between philosophical reasonableness, which describes the metaphysical and 
normative beliefs a citizen or doctrine holds, and political reasonableness, which relates to the 
doctrine’s public, political behavior in light of its beliefs. A doctrine that is philosophically 
unreasonable might reject the burdens of judgment, and hold (as I have said the Piedmont do), 
that all who disagree with them are benighted, corrupted, etc. Kelly and McPherson suggest 
that it is possible that there might be those who are philosophically unreasonable, yet politically 
value toleration and equal citizenship (and therefore are politically reasonable), and that 
justification of political measures is still due to such persons.218 While Kelly and McPherson do 
not substantially discuss containment, their position presumably also means that philosophically 
unreasonable yet politically reasonable persons should not be subject to containment.  
Quong wonders, in response to Kelly and McPherson, how there could be such people 
or doctrines; regarding the requirement of public justification, Quong wonders what moral 
motivation someone could have to accept it if they reject the burdens of judgment or the fact of 
reasonable pluralism.219 Such persons, and here Kelly and McPherson actually agree with Quong 
to an extent, are far more likely to simply bide their time until political power shifts in their favor 
(i.e., produce a modus vivendi). But I believe I have offered examples of precisely such persons 
who cut against that assumption: the Tunuk and Piedmont might be illiberal in some Rawlsian 
senses (wherever they value the transcendent over the political), but they are pacifists who are 
both minimal participants in public life and as loathe as any doctrines to engage in hostile 
takeovers. I believe the Rawlsian would reply that, even if it so happens that there are 
motivations like spiritually-derived pacifism or some other motivator of non-coercion, we are 
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after a reliable, enduring, and public motivator to ensure that stability is a lasting one. But this is 
just what I have said is one conception of the path to social stability among others: it might be 
that risking strife or allowing certain senses of illiberal tension with public life produce a 
different sort of stability, or else doing so appropriately gives more weight to autonomy and 
pluralism, on the one hand, and less to persistent stability, on the other.  To ground the 
containment of those who reject a certain conception of social stability or respect of others on 
the ground that a certain conception of stability or respect is democratically essential is to beg 
the question.  
A worry that I share with containment proponents is the prospect of oppressive regimes 
becoming prominent or, even more so, the prospect of leaving certain persons vulnerable to 
abuse or without equal rights when they are born into a certain religious community. Put 
otherwise, one might worry that criticizing unreasonableness and containment is to 
countenance communities that are oppressive to some of their members. This has been called 
the problem of “internal minorities” or “minorities within minorities.” This is not my position at 
all. It is not as though a community can “make up” for its oppressive practices by being virtuous 
elsewhere, though it might contain lesser severe illiberal elements and still count as a collection 
of good citizens. Punishing communities that are abusive to women or children is not an 
instance of containment, as Quong correctly observes, and democracies are right to disregard 
various hostile communities’ inputs. A meaningful contrast can be drawn between a society like 
the Piedmont, where there is a gendered division of labor, and, for instance, the numerous 
polygamist Mormon sects that remain who practice polygamy. The important difference 
between the two is that in the former, at least as I have depicted the Piedmont, there is a 
provision of basic human rights and what is often called a meaningful “right to exit” the 
community (should they disagree with its patriarchal practices) for women and older children, 
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whereas in the latter denials of basic human rights are often coupled with physical intimidation 
and physical and sexual abuse.  I have suggested that the concepts of “unreasonableness” and 
“containment” are overbroad by the political liberal’s own criteria, not that it is improper to 
exclude anyone or make it more difficult for any doctrine to survive. Those that are committed 
to violent aggression, for instance, are rightful targets of such processes. As mentioned 
above,220 criteria (1) and (3) of Rawlsian unreasonableness, or what Kelly and McPherson call 
political unreasonableness, remain necessarily excludable in any democracy.  
Because of the internal value conflicts in containment that I have identified through my 
one-dimensionality charge, it seems that the political liberal has two choices regarding 
containment: broaden the political constituency by significantly narrowing the label 
“unreasonable” or double down and defend containment on comprehensively (i.e., non-political) 
liberal grounds. The latter option might involve a claim that Rawls’s conception of social stability 
is a more important moral end than for religious communities to have the autonomy to behave 
somewhat illiberally, or some other such judgment about ultimate truth that the political liberal 
purports to avoid on state neutrality grounds.  Since the latter option is well outside the scope 
of this essay, I will briefly discuss the former option, which is the one that I favor. What makes 
the Piedmont a CID is that there is a meaningful right to exit their community, as well as a 
conception of other citizens as benighted or corrupted yet worthy of non-coercion. What makes 
the Tunuk a CID is that they insist on others’ forbearance from action for religious reasons only 
the Tunuk recognize, and demand more than their share of a public good, but are peaceable and 
willing to recognize the deep normative commitments of others in so insisting. Rawls laudably 
recognized the need to account for such cultures, mentioning that his conception of justice 
seeks to go as far as it can to consider the “claims of those who wish to withdraw from the 
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modern world in accordance with the injunctions of their religion, provided only that they 
acknowledge the principles of the political conception of justice[.]”221 My suggestion has been 
that it can, and must, bear going somewhat further. 
The concept of a CID closely resembles Weinstock’s alternate proposal, according to 
which someone is reasonable “if she is stably disposed to prefer compromise over conflict in 
those situations in which she has to share social space with people whose views are quite 
different from hers,”222 to which I would only add a guarantee of basic human rights to the 
minorities internal to a doctrine’s adherents. My criticism seeks (with Ryan Muldoon and Iris 
Marion Young) to preserve the opportunity for genuine perspectival diversity against a Rawlsian 
assumption of relative sameness. If we are to take the fact of reasonable pluralism seriously, 
then the application of something like the categorical imperative to derive “reasonableness” is 
inappropriate. Some doctrines demand more tribal sovereignty or religious exemptions in 
certain areas than it would be practical to universalize, but less in others. The Tunuk might want 
privileged public land access to perform its rituals, but not care much about tax exemptions, and 
be willing to temporarily suspend one of its activities due to some other religious community’s 
normative commitments. The reason some might appear “unreasonable” is that historical 
injustices have rendered their lifeways unusual in the modern world. Even if it would not be 
practical to honor all non-mainstream cultures’ claims, valuing all persons’ autonomy requires 
that we construe any disqualifications from the political constituency awfully narrowly, and 
construe still more narrowly any state-supported attempts to transform or extinguish an 
existing way of life. This is not only for the sake of those being contained, but often for our own 
sakes as well. What I will briefly argue in closing is the closely related point that these same 
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processes that seek to disfavor CIDs also leave far less room for novel reasons or lifeways from 
certain public environments, to the detriment of both CIDs and public discourse. 
D. Containment as a Closing of the Dialogical Universe 
 I have argued that the processes associated with containment can be distinguished from 
those features of a political environment that affect certain comprehensive doctrines’ vitality 
and flourishing by happenstance or by simple operation of democratic processes. What I will 
argue in closing is that this risk of overbroadly “containing” CIDs in certain settings is to the 
detriment of discourse generally, just as one-dimensionality is to one-dimensional society. 
Another way of understanding this charge involves a recasting of what Lawrence Solum calls 
Jeremy Waldron’s “novelty objection,” which is well summarized in the following passage: 
John Rawls offers what, in my opinion, is an overly narrow conception of the matrix of 
public reason, suggesting that it must always proceed from some consensus-"from 
premises that we and others recognize as true, or as reasonable for the purpose of 
reaching a working agreement." He suggests that public deliberation be limited to "the 
shared methods of, and the public knowledge available to, common sense, and the 
procedures and conclusions of science when these are not controversial." What this 
conception seems to rule out is the novel or disconcerting move in political 
argumentation: the premise that no one has ever thought of before, but which, once 
stated, sounds plausible or interesting. Rawls' conception seems to assume an inherent 
limit in the human capacity for imagination and creativity in politics, implying as it does 
that something counts as a legitimate move in public reasoning only to the extent that it 
latches onto existing premises that everybody already shares.223  
 
The result of Rawls endorsing a public reason requirement for political participation (though I 
must agree with Solum that Waldron’s exegesis here is questionable) and excluding “novel or 
disconcerting” moves in political discourse is to its impoverishment:  
[I]t is important for people to be acquainted with the views that others hold. Even more 
important, however, is the possibility that my own view may be improved, in its subtlety 
and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphysics that I am initially inclined to 
reject.... I mean to draw attention to an experience we all have had at one time or 
another, of having argued with someone whose world view was quite at odds with our 
own, and of having come away thinking, "I'm sure he's wrong, and I can't follow much of 
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it, but, still, it makes you think ... " The prospect of losing that sort of effect in public 
discourse is, frankly, frightening-terrifying, even, if we are to imagine it being replaced 
by a form of "deliberation" that, in the name of "fairness" or "reasonableness" (or worse 
still, "balance") consists of bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted 
without question on all sides. That is to imagine open-ended public debate reduced to 
the formal trivia of American television networks.224 
 
Phillip Quinn, in embracing Waldron’s argument,225 was particularly convinced by Waldron’s 
suggestion certain moves might “be made in political argument that bear no relation to existing 
conventions held opinions, but which nevertheless gain a foothold as soon as they are discussed 
by persons with open minds.”226 Much of Waldron’s objection brings to mind a proposal from 
Rob Talisse, who provides what he calls a “folk epistemological” approach to public justification, 
one of the principles of which is that our search for the truth necessarily involves an open 
exchange of reasons that subject one’s view to scrutiny.227  
Against Waldron’s novelty objection to Rawlsian public reason, Solum offers many 
replies, though I will only consider the one most pertinent here insofar it relates to my argument 
in the previous section. Solum reminds us that the obligations of public reason are of limited 
scope in Rawlsian thought and most other prominent approaches to public reason liberalism: it 
applies only to public, political action regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice, leaving ample room both within the political sphere and especially outside of it, in the 
life of culture and associations, for persons and cultural groups to employ whatever reasoning 
they wish. By this process, non-public reasons employed in the background culture (i.e., the 
culture outside of the public sphere) might prove sufficiently influential in nonpublic life that 
they eventually find their way into the corpus of facts that the public generally accepts, and 
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hence, into public reason. Solum suggests, for instance, that the novel argument might first be 
introduced in “academic discourse or even in an opinion piece in a newspaper or journal of 
public circulation, so long as the author did not advance the argument as an already sufficient 
reason for political action.”228 Indeed, Rawls’s later “wide view” of public reason seems to 
anticipate a vehicle for what Solum has in mind, as under the proviso, nonpublic reasons can be 
introduced in even political debate at any time, provided that an adequate, public reason will be 
provided in due course. In one of his last words on the subject, Rawls described at length the 
circumstances under which public reason can change over time, composed as public reason is by 
a family of conceptions of justice that is constantly evolving. Social change in particular may give 
rise to new questions on race, gender, ethnicity, and so on, thereby giving rise to new 
components of public reason229 or new conceptions of reasonableness. 
It is unfortunate that Rawls was not with us longer to further develop his “wide view” 
and square it with the remainder of Political Liberalism, as Solum is right to point out that Rawls 
was clearly concerned to leave more room for novelty towards the end of his life. He became 
preoccupied with, as I am now, the pivotal role that the various moral and religious 
communities and associations of our society play in establishing a stable conception of justice. 
But as his corpus stands, and as contemporary liberalisms influenced by Rawls develop, the 
practical flexibility of life in political liberalism and its capacity for creative inclusiveness cannot 
be understood by reference to the idea of public reason alone. In this essay I have concerned 
myself with the process by which CIDs or other comprehensive doctrines are declared 
unreasonable, and are sought to be transformed or contained. If the strictures of public reason 
are widened, but the environment is rendered more inhospitable to those who might offer 
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novel reasons (which is what I have said containment does), then Waldron’s worry regarding a 
lack of or limited novelty persists, and Solum’s reply is not entirely responsive to it. While 
Waldron’s argument focuses on public reason specifically, novel ideas are had not just by 
participating in public deliberation, but by seeing other lifeways lived out in public or semi-
public spheres. My argument has been directed at the risk of myriad sources of novelty fading 
from public life, or from their own cultural life, through any number of public forces: perhaps by 
the children’s parents’ authority or worldviews intentionally being undermined by politicians or 
public-school administrators, or by threatening the conditions under which certain cultures stay 
cohesive through performative religious rituals or otherwise attempting to maintain control 
over their internal affairs.  
Notwithstanding his rejection of how I have argued for the notion of an oppressive or 
one-dimensional social atmosphere – to justify non-exclusion of CIDs and criticize the 
aforementioned Rawlsian processes that do so exclude – Rawls was by no means unconcerned 
with the problem of an intentionally inhospitable social atmosphere as to certain citizens (nor, 
to their great credit, are Quong and Macedo). He emphasizes that it is not simply the letter or 
direct aim of the law that must not advance certain conceptions of the good at the expense of 
others, and not simply a market or electoral process that is free by its terms. His conception of 
justice included a necessity of first ensuring that the background conditions existing beyond the 
laws, markets, and elections do indeed instantiate such equal playing fields.230 Regarding the 
possibility that a conception of justice could be impermissibly inhospitable, Rawls found this to 
be a much more narrowly drawn concern than I have begun to argue it is, but nonetheless 
foresaw it as a possibility:  
Political liberalism is unjustly biased against certain comprehensive conceptions only if, 
say, individualistic ones alone can endure in a liberal society, or they so predominate 
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that associations affirming values of religion or community cannot flourish, and 
moreover the conditions leading to this outcome are themselves unjust, in view of 
present and foreseeable circumstances.231  
 
What I take myself to have identified here are precisely types of CIDs that are analogous to the 
“associations affirming values of religion or community” and unable to flourish in substantially 
similar circumstances to the above passage. Those who are poor, historically oppressed, who 
practice highly performative religions, and so on, often coincide with this group. Moreover, as I 
have argued elsewhere, the kind of environment that the representatives in the original position 
are to foster, according to Rawls, is one conducive to citizens’ fulfillment of the listening 
component of the duty of civility, which states that citizens are to listen to the views of others 
and decide whether reasonable accommodations ought to be made. Most of all, only by 
embracing the narrow tailoring of unreasonableness and containment I have espoused here, 
could a Rawlsian hope to make good on the claim that representatives in the original position, 
when considering the optimal conception of justice for their own interests, would choose 
political liberalism as the system that maximizes their opportunities to pursue their chosen 
conceptions of the good, especially those that have fallen almost irretrievably out of public 
favor. While political liberalism is not committed to ensuring equality of outcome, in the form of 
cultural preservation, it is committed to the sort of evenhandedness that I have said 
containment is not. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
231 Id., 199. 
143 
 
III. Shared Histories and Corporate Minds: A Framework for Group Rights  
from Hopi to Hobby Lobby 
 
 Defenders of the recent, divisive decisions of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 
U.S. ___ (2014)232 and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) might seem to have awfully 
little in common with measures protecting indigenous populations, such as the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.233 Defenders of the former, in the reductive 
language of North American politics, are deemed to have a conservative or libertarian agenda, 
whereas pundits often consider the latter paradigmatically progressive. The moral case for the 
latter also often includes historically contingent observations about unequal treatment of 
minorities, or of rectifying past injustices that are unique to the indigenous peoples in question, 
whereas the moral case for the former often leans more heavily on universal freedoms of 
conscience.  Yet defenders of each of these legal-political actions share a common 
dissatisfaction with the traditional conception of moral rights in liberal democracies, i.e., that 
the only appropriate subject of moral rights234 is the individual human being (or possibly several 
human beings within a collective). These are also both political measures whose defenders are 
motivated by a claim about the import of culture, and a robust right to live in accordance with it. 
Put otherwise, what Hobby Lobby and the UNDRI share is some form of advocacy of what I will 
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call group rights of conscience.235 This concept that implies that rights of conscience236 can be 
held by, and corresponding duties can be owed to, an organized entity with a decisional 
structure of some sort, be it an Aboriginal tribe,237 a place of worship, a political party, or a 
business entity.  
Attempts to radically distinguish Hobby Lobby and the UNDRI are understandable and, 
in some respects, clearly correct. Conestoga Wood Specialties, Mardel and Hobby Lobby differ 
substantially from most cultural groups insofar as they are: for-profit companies, which are 
creations of the law that come with unique immunities and duties; voluntary (rather than so-
called “ascriptive” or “primordial”) groups in the sense that one can only “join” at the statutory 
working age in a given state; and are comprised of persons not belonging to the sorts of 
historically marginalized cultural or ethnic minority groups that have concerned prominent 
defenders of group rights like Vernon van Dyke and Will Kymlicka.238 There are nonetheless 
certain liberties, such as freedom of internal self-governance, or what Avia Pasternak calls 
freedom from “moral subversion,”239 that are commonly asserted by both (and all) sorts of 
groups seeking group rights of conscience. As Kymlicka has framed the two major categories 
more generally, group rights often seek protection against mainstream political society, which 
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presents external threats, or against claims by their own members, which present internal 
threats.240 It is also a contingent matter that the closely-held corporations asserting these rights, 
especially in Hobby Lobby’s case, were particularly large companies whose ownership practiced 
a major religion; had it been a minority faith, then the overlap with the kinds of groups that 
concern van Dyke and Kymlicka would be greater.  
Religiously motivated, closely-held corporations and cultural minorities are also both, as 
groups, not a set of persons like the following: “all persons currently standing in line at the 
bookstore” or “all persons who have been improperly denied unemployment benefits.”241 As I 
will explain in the following section, understanding assertions by groups as a multiplicity of 
individuals each asserting aggregated, identical rights will not always do: group rights are, as 
Joseph Raz’s influential shared interest conception of rights explains, those that would not be 
sufficient to justify a corresponding duty if claimed by individuals.242 Even under this shared 
interest conception, however, what still appears presumed is that only individuals are the rights 
holders; it is just that the utilitarian calculus, where enough individual interests are involved, 
favors the many over the one. If group rights are to be understood as a separate category of 
morally grounded rights (as I submit they ought to be), then there must be more of a relation 
between those individual interests and corresponding rights.243 
I hope to offer a conception of group rights that can explain some commonalities 
underlying group rights of conscience as they might be asserted by all types of groups with 
sufficient shared interests among its decision-making members to claim such rights. With some 
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limited exceptions, relatively little attention has been paid to the possible interaction between 
these two areas of group rights (i.e., those claimed by cultural minorities and those by other 
corporate entities). My motivation for proposing some preliminary criteria for the boundaries of 
group rights, which subsequent work will give a more comprehensive treatment, is not just its 
timeliness (given ongoing controversies over Hobby Lobby, Citizens United, various other cases 
for group-differentiated religious exemptions, and still-brewing sacred land disputes), but my 
increasing dissatisfaction with some of the internal value tensions that arise in Rawlsian 
liberalism, especially tensions between value pluralism, a guarantee of equal liberties, and social 
stability.  
To be fair to Rawls, he began to exhibit similar dissatisfactions towards the end of his 
life and career. By Political Liberalism and his addendum, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 
Rawls recognized the vitality to social stability of what he called “the background,” which 
includes "the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities, learned 
and scientific societies, clubs and teams."244 The Law of Peoples marks a further move in favor of 
my sympathies, as it attempted to construct a picture of international justice that included a 
doctrine of tolerance and a recognition of various subgroups as duty- and rights-bearing units.245 
Nonetheless, though I do not intend to defend communitarianism itself in making a preliminary 
case for a group rights framework, I believe the greater willingness of certain communitarian 
political theorists (especially Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor) to recognize the import of 
identity-conferring (or, as Raz prefers, “encompassing”) groups holds more promise for a 
genuine allowance of value pluralism than Rawlsian liberalism alone. 
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Group rights for all group types have been met with a variety of overlapping moral, 
conceptual, and pragmatic difficulties.246 Many critics have argued that measures recognizing 
such rights will have a strong tendency to abet oppression against a group's own members (this 
is the oft-discussed "internal minorities" or "minorities within minorities" problem), such as 
women and girls,247 or against those who do not belong to religious and cultural groups,248 since 
group rights often involve relieving members of burdens that other members of society will 
instead bear. Third, some claim that group rights involving cultural preservation invariably 
fetishize such cultures as static units or as relics of the past, and in preserving them are either in 
denial or suppress the dynamic nature of actual groups. One of those offering this variety of 
criticism, Jeremy Waldron, advocates what he calls the "cosmopolitan alternative," wherein he 
proposes that we pay adequate heed to the debt we owe to the development of an 
international community, and the mosaic of cultural offerings we cosmopolitans enjoy without 
inhabiting one, traditional culture all the time.249 Fourth, there are pragmatic worries about the 
proliferation of "groups" or "cultures" demanding recognition, especially those that are ad hoc 
in the sense that they only form as a "group" or claim a "group right" in the wake of a legal 
measure with which they disagree.  Fifth, and often asserted in conjunction with one of the 
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aforementioned objections, many believe that the concept of group rights itself is incoherent, 
such that its incorporation into our legal systems or other platforms for public moral recognition 
would bring more confusion than clarity.  
To compound the difficulties further, there is an increasingly common meta-objection 
that, where there is a proposal to grant (for instance) religious exemptions to a cultural group, 
the issue of whether a group can be properly hold a right is said to be morally unimportant. As 
Peter Jones observes, Kymlicka, who is often credited with bringing rights of minority cultures to 
the forefront of political theory, has to a small extent gravitated in this direction himself, finding 
the “real issue” to be “whether and why a right should be specific to a group, rather than by 
whom the right would or should be held.”250 Similarly, Steven Walt and Micah Schwartzman 
argue that “questions about corporate rights turn on substantive, first-order moral 
considerations” and not “ontological considerations about the existence of groups or the 
requirements of personhood.”251 Put otherwise, it seems that Kymlicka and Walt & 
Schwartzman believe all that is significant about group rights is captured by the currently 
growing conversation regarding the moral basis for religious exemptions, and that the nature of 
the corporate conception of group rights is harmfully obscure or much ado about nothing.252 
While certain metaphysical details regarding the rights-holder might initially appear to be mere 
quibbles, morally balancing the rights of minorities internal to groups, non-mainstream 
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(especially historically marginalized) religious groups, and the public requires that we have a 
doctrinal means of separating bona fide from ad hoc or otherwise spurious group interests. 
Positing a group entity with structural prerequisites is one manner of doing so, which is what I 
will aim for in Section B. 
Though I cannot hope to respond to each of the above substantive objections to group 
rights in this essay, I am convinced that Dwight Newman is correct that our recognizing the 
individual right to freedom of religion presupposes the religious (and to this I would add 
cultural) rights of various sorts of collectives.253 Like Newman, I will propose a corporate (and 
value-individualist) conception of group rights that nonetheless maintains a certain sort of 
supervenience relationship (I will can this the “weak supervenience” condition) with members’ 
interests. I will depart from and supplement Newman’s account in two important ways: (1) 
Given that the only sustainable conception of group rights require ex ante demonstrations of 
sincere group practices or interests, I will present a group’s having a shared history as necessary 
for a cognizable group right; and (2) There must be a coherent and recognized decision 
procedure or ethos within the group for the group be properly conceptualized as a moral agent. 
While (2) is far from unique in this conversation, and I will borrow largely from a concept in 
Andrew Shorten’s account, I will emphasize what I take to be one significant departure in my 
account from Shorten’s. 
Though a more thorough defense of this conception demands book-length treatment, 
my aim here is to demonstrate that a conception of this sort is generally justified by widely-
recognized democratic values, sufficiently determinate to avoid the aforementioned ad hoc 
problems, and sufficiently flexible that it takes seriously the moral objections to group rights 
                                                          
253 See Dwight Newman, “Collective Interests and Collective Rights,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 
Vol. 49 (2004): 127-63. 
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cited above. In the next section, I will describe the most common justifications given for group 
rights and field those objections that rest on a conceptual misunderstanding. I will then develop 
my account in Section B. In my concluding section, I will briefly explain a wider-reaching 
practical use of my framework in political theory. The incorporation of group rights into a 
bargaining social contract model, such as that proposed by Ryan Muldoon,254 shores up certain 
of the shortcomings of the Rawlsian model.  
As a disclaimer before moving into my presentation of the scope of and case for 
conscience-based group rights, I do not offer criteria that are potentially common to cultural 
minorities and religiously-motivated business entities to suggest that these are absolute rights 
(i.e., those that will always override individual ones): it is only to suggest that they are desirable 
and cognizable as a category; my conception of a “right” in this sense still operates on the 
principle of proportionality.255 The application of my framework to Hobby Lobby should 
therefore not be taken as a wholesale defense of the majority opinion, but merely a defense of 
the majority's recognition of a prima facie corporate right to religious freedom. Just as one can 
respect and advocate for the principal of tribal sovereignty without thereby allowing a denial of 
basic human rights to women and girls within that tribe, I do not purport to provide a thorough 
answer to the question of whether and what sort of governmental or third-party interests can 
override a prima facie group right.  
 
 
                                                          
254 See his Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
255 The sort of principle of proportionality I have in mind is the standard of review prevalent in American 
constitutional law known as “strict scrutiny.” For a similar standard, see Miodrag Jovanovic, “Recognizing 
Minority Identities Through Collective Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27 (2005): 625-51. 
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A. The Inadequacy of Individual Interest Aggregation and Two Common Moral Bases 
for Group Rights 
 
Because the debates surrounding group rights are fraught with conceptual confusions, a 
preliminary definitional distinction is in order to clarify the sorts of rights that are and are not 
our subject matter, for this is a confusion to which even commentators in this area have fallen 
prey.256 A group-differentiated right is one that is held by virtue of one's membership in a group, 
and is not held by non-members, whereas a group right is one that is held by a collective itself 
and not severally by its individual members. My subject matter is primarily group rights. I will 
not specifically concern myself with group-differentiated rights, even though there is very often 
an overlap between these two categories, as attempting to sketch a defense of both would be 
unwieldy. This is not to say that group-differentiated rights are any less morally important, but it 
is less common that objections are levied at group-differentiated rights per se. 
To illustrate this distinction, let us consider a frequently discussed example both 
elsewhere in my work and throughout the literature on group rights: cases where an indigenous 
group seeks a special right to use or preserve a (often government-owned) tract of land in a way 
that is distinct from the general population’s land access. Where a tribe or band possesses or 
merely claims a right to hunt on lands on which hunting is prohibited to others, or to hunt or kill 
species that others are prohibited from hunting under the Endangered Species Act, this is a 
group-differentiated right. Even if we might refer to the right by claiming that it is owed to "the 
tribe" as a collective, it would ordinarily be exercised by individual members of a tribe as 
                                                          
256 For a summary of this confusion, see Peter Jones, “Cultures, Group Rights, and Group-Differentiated 
Rights,” at 39-41. 
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individual hunters, such that we would say the individual tribe members hold or claim such a 
right severally.257  
Land bequests to tribes or decisions granting legal spheres of tribal sovereignty, 
however, are awfully difficult to understand as being exercisable by an individual tribe member. 
Instead, they are only describable as being held and exercised jointly. This is equally true of the 
related issue of repatriating sacred objects or ancestral remains, enshrined in the United States 
in the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),258 to federally-
recognized tribes. Where ancestral remains are returned to federally recognized tribes, the 
disposition of the remains is subsequently exercised by the authority structure of that tribe, or 
at least by more than an individual member. I am also fond, for purposes of illustrating group vs. 
group-differentiated rights, of Janna Thompson’s discussion of the island nation of Kiribati, 
which involves a putative group right of cultural preservation.259 Uninhabited portions of Kiribati 
land have already disappeared underwater. Much of the habited nation will do so in the not-
too-distant future, making it (per Thompson) the first nation to be a victim of climate change.260 
Given that the Kiribati place an extremely high value on the political and cultural lifeway that 
they have come to enjoy with one another on their traditional land, Thompson’s guiding 
question is whether the Kiribati, as a nation, have a “human right” to a new tract of land so that 
                                                          
257 There are, of course, innumerable examples of strictly group-differentiated rights outside of the sacred 
lands context. Sikhs claiming a right to carry kirpans (ceremonial daggers that Sikh men are obligated to 
carry on their person) in public schools forbidding weapons are claiming such a right due to their Sikh 
membership, but are exercising such rights as individuals. Under certain conceptions of affirmative action 
or restitution programs, we might say that the moral justification for such measures are group-regarding, 
but that the benefits inure to individual members of that group (rather than the group itself). This might be 
the case in South Africa, for instance, where land restitution was accorded based on one’s group 
membership, but where a tract of land, quite clearly, was transferred to individual members or families of 
that group. 
258 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq. 
259 Janna Thompson, “Can Groups Have Human Rights?” Ethical Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2015): 291-
313. 
260 Id., p. 292. 
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they might preserve their cohesive culture. In answering this question in the affirmative, 
Thompson suggests that various other nations of the world might be understood as holding a 
corresponding joint-and-several duty to the Kiribati, since they contributed to global warming 
and rising sea levels.261 Putting aside the controversial nature of Thompson’s claim, it cannot, if 
valid, be meaningfully exercised by a single Kiribati citizen or even an aggregated collection of 
them; it is only cognizable as a right exercisable by the people themselves.262 Put otherwise, as 
will become significant in sketching my own criteria, the land bequest to the Kiribati is only 
cognizable as a dispensation to whatever collective, internal decision structure (likely the Kiribati 
government) exists for sharing or using the land.  
As one more conceptual wrinkle to iron out before introducing some common 
justifications for group rights, even those who appropriately make the distinction between 
group and group-differentiated rights sometimes include in the former those rights that I would 
classify as aggregated individual rights-claims (or simply “aggregated” or “collective” rights). 
Raz’s aforementioned shared interests conception leads to his holding the following 
prerequisites for a group right:  
First, it exists because an aspect of the interest of human beings justifies holding some 
person(s) to be subject to a duty. Second, the interests in question are the interests of 
individuals as members of a group in a public good and the right is a right to that public 
good because it serves their interest as members of the group. Thirdly, the interest of 
no single member of that group in that public good is sufficient by itself to justify 
holding another person to be subject to a duty.263 
 
                                                          
261 Id., p. 309-11. 
262 Importantly, some group-differentiated rights are group rights, and the same conduct can relate to both 
a group right and an individually articulable group-differentiated right.  
263 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 208. 
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As an illustration of Raz’s conditions, Peter Jones asks us to imagine a circumstance in which a 
factory puts out polluting fumes that have significant adverse effects on the quality of life of 
those living in the factory’s vicinity, but presents no significant harm to an individual’s physical 
health.264 Because of the high costs of curtailing the pollution (including potential job loss for 
factory workers), the interest of one individual in shutting the factory down or curtailing its 
operations would likely be insufficient to justify doing so. We would be much more likely to find 
a duty on the factory’s part, however, if a much larger number of individuals living near the park 
made a similar claim. Because the larger group of individuals acts as a but-for cause of the 
factory’s duty to curtail its polluting activities, Jones suggests that this is properly considered a 
group right. 
There are elements missing in the residents’ collective interests that must be present in 
the conception of group rights that I will offer in the following section as my proposed 
criteria.265 Other than being subject to a similar harm and living in the same area, the residents 
whose lives have been negatively affected by the factory are not stipulated to have anything 
else in common; they much more closely resemble one of the examples that I offered of a set of 
persons possessing a right.266 In this way, even though it takes a larger number of residents to 
give rise to a corresponding duty on the factory’s part, the reasons supporting the residents’ 
rights are markedly different than Hobby Lobby’s/Conestoga Wood Specialties’ or the 
aforementioned societal cultures’ putative rights. Unless much more were added to this story, 
the residents lack what I will refer to as a “shared history” and, additionally, an “internal 
                                                          
264 Peter Jones, “Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 80 (1999): 
80-107, at 84. 
265 To be sure, this is not to question the validity of the residents’ claim, but simply how that claim is 
properly characterized. 
266 For a similar concern regarding sets, see Darlene M. Johnson, “Native Rights as Collective Rights: A 
Question of Group Preservation,” in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995): 179-202. 
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decision procedure,” each of which the kinds of groups that are my primary concern must 
possess (or so my framework will hold).267  
With this initial distinction in place, I can now tackle the question of why we ought to 
bother incorporating such a concept, or family of concepts, as group rights into our legal and 
moral framework. Presenting an entirely generalized case for group rights is difficult, due to the 
confusion regarding group and group-differentiated rights, the conflation of the collectivist and 
corporate understandings of group rights, the numerous sorts of groups claiming such rights, 
and the different legal-political measures that might fall under this heading.268 Recall, however, 
that my focus is on conscience-based group rights, which include the equal opportunity to live in 
accordance with communal (often religious) values, a category of rights that I am claiming can 
be properly thought of as held by collective entities themselves. Thus, I will summarize two 
common justifications for group rights that are most germane to this scope of rights, including 
commonly discussed examples falling under each heading. These are justifications both in a 
moral sense (that groups deserve either special provisions or noninterference) and in a 
conceptual sense (that we can meaningfully think of certain putative rights, assuming they are 
morally justifiable, as being held by groups). 
 
 
1. Cultural Preservation and Equal Opportunity 
                                                          
267 Denise Reaume’s conception is much more consistent with mine insofar as she requires the benefit to 
not only be based on an aggregated, shared interest, but to result in a “participatory” benefit. 
268 For a nearly complete list of such justifications, see Gillian Brock, “Are There Any Defensible Indigenous 
Rights?” Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 1 (2002): 285-305.  
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 Many group rights are justified on the grounds that some associations of persons do not 
have an equal opportunity to pursue their conception of the good as others do. This often 
occurs where the community claiming such rights has been subject to some form of historical 
injustice, particularly where such injustice includes a substantial element of cultural 
suppression. Though there are several ways of framing just what liberty has been violated in this 
case, it seems that such arguments are fundamentally equal opportunity concerns. It is 
noteworthy that even those who are otherwise group rights skeptics often recognize such 
measures as necessary insofar as they have a restorative role, only in the sense that they give 
historically-deprived individuals the equal range of liberties enjoyed by the rest of the 
population.  My frequent interest in American federal court decisions like Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. 
v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) stems largely from the fact they involve American 
Indian populations whose beliefs and practices were centered on communal uses of their native 
land, from which they were forcibly removed, making it impractical or incredibly difficult to 
carry on their traditions. With much strain and hardship, various American Indian populations 
attempted to carry on their traditional beliefs and practices in subsequent generations. The 
package of rights underlying tribal sovereignty and land bequests for many American Indian 
tribes are best understood as attempts to restore a meaningful opportunity to live in accordance 
with their conceptions of the good. Darlene Johnson similarly presents the case for restoring 
native lands to “Indian bands” in Canada, pursuant to the Indian Act:  
History demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between the loss of their 
traditional lands and the marginalization of native people. Displaced from the land 
which provides both physical and spiritual sustenance, native communities are 
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hopelessly vulnerable to the disintegrative pressures from the dominant culture. 
Without land, native existence is deprived of its coherence and distinctiveness.269 
 
What is significant in much of Johnson’s analysis of similar cases in Canada is that the 
deprivation of cultural cohesion is a collective good that was taken from them, rather than one 
came about by happenstance. Jeff Spinner-Halev’s offers a similar account of some European 
societies, claiming that their loss is an opportunity for institutional structures:  
Groups that have their own culture and are oppressed often include minorities of the 
“wrong” nation in nation states: Hungarians in Slovakia, Russians all over the former 
Soviet Union, but also the Roma (gypsies) and Jews of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in parts of Europe, and many others. When groups are culturally 
oppressed, members of the group are denied the opportunity to create and sustain their 
own cultural institutions. Attempts to run their own schools, newspapers and cultural 
institutions are often suppressed; sometimes speaking their own language in public is 
illegal.270 
 
It cannot be said that any such cultures were given an equal chance in a proverbial marketplace 
of cultures or worldviews, as the conditions for success were removed from the beginning.  
In some circumstances, a right to cultural preservation is invoked in the absence of any 
practice of historical injustice as blatant as colonization and expulsion. This is arguably the case 
in Quebecois claims for independence or linguistic preservation.271 In such circumstances, 
however, groups might claim that the cultural atmosphere is tilted against their long-term 
survival, which is what many Quebecois claim, given the increasing dominance of English 
language use in Canada over time (a fact that, in fairness, it partly due to political action by the 
                                                          
269 Darlene Johnson, “Native Rights as Collective Rights,” at 194. 
270 Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Land, Culture and Justice,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2000): 
319-42, 322. 
271 As another example, Spinner-Halev opens his discussion with the Sorbs, who are a Slavic minority that is 
interspersed with non-Sorb Germans, but nonetheless have an interest in preserving their culture. Like the 
Quebecois, the Sorbs are not oppressed, but live in an environment that makes cultural cohesion a bit 
more difficult. 
158 
 
Canadian government). This is also the form that claims sometimes take from indigenous 
populations seeking to protect what might be called cultural intellectual property, such as 
American Indian rug patterns (behind which are an important tradition of hand-weaving) being 
machine-produced overseas and resold in the United States, or other American Indian symbols 
being used without a tribe’s consent.272 In such cases, neither the rug patterns nor the symbol fit 
within historically recognized forms of intellectual property, so what is sought is a special form 
of group ownership of such IP.273 In any of these cases, the claim is less that cultural 
preservation is required by historical injustice, but more that the group interest is being 
overwhelmed by historical or contemporary conditions, and therefore ought to be given a 
chance at cultural survival.  
While certain of these putative rights to cultural preservation could resemble group-
differentiated rights, many of them are not exercisable alone; they are what Denise Reaume 
calls participatory goods, i.e., those which “involve activities that not only require many in order 
to produce the good, but are valuable only because of the joint involvement of many.”274 While 
often cultural goods include some end product, the good itself is nearly always the act of 
participation. Cultural activities, Reaume argues, even for those of us much more cosmopolitan 
than the cultural groups I have used as examples so far, are difficult to conceive unless we 
coexist with other producers and enjoy them with others. In the case of those groups seeking to 
worship together or preserve their traditional way of life, rituals, linguistic practices, etc., this 
participatory element is even more prevalent. A potential future land bequest to the displaced 
Kiribati or the 19th century bequests to tribes like the Navajo are, in many cases, granted to 
                                                          
272 For a discussion of both sorts of controversies, see Michael Brown, Who Owns Native Culture 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
273 These have been recognized in limited contexts in the United States and Canada. 
274 Denise Reaume, “Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods,” University of Toronto Law Review, 
Vol. 38 (1988): 1–27, at 10. 
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those peoples, such that the use and disposition of the land is in part either to the authority 
structures or to present and future generations of that group. Moreover, to the extent that the 
rationale of the bequests is not just land as a means of sustenance, but land as a focal point for 
cultural cohesion and self-government, these putative goods are incoherent both as individually-
exercised rights and as aggregative rights in the sense of Jones’s factory example.  
Jeremy Waldron is a critic of group rights (especially on cultural preservation grounds), 
both because he: (1) questions that there is any intrinsic value in preserving a group, rather than 
simply preserving its contributions to cosmopolitan life in a technological and globalized world 
culture, and (2) believes that any attempts at cultural preservation are fetishizing or fossilizing 
the form of a culture that is on its way out, often because of its incompatibility with the present 
age. I will just address the latter claim, which Waldron provocatively summarizes in the 
following passage:  
From a cosmopolitan point of view, immersion in the traditions of a particular 
community in the modern world is like living in Disneyland and thinking that one’s 
surroundings epitomize what it is for a culture to really exist. Worse still, it is like 
demanding the funds to live in Disneyland and the protection of modern society for the 
boundaries of Disneyland, while still managing to convince oneself that what happens 
inside Disneyland is all there is to an adequate and fulfilling life It is like thinking that 
what every person most deeply needs is for one of the Magic Kingdoms to provide a 
framework for her choices and her beliefs, completely neglecting the fact that the 
framework of Disneyland depends on commitments, structures, and infrastructures that 
far outstrip the character of any particular façade. It is to imagine that one could belong 
to Disneyland while professing complete indifference towards, or even disdain for, Los 
Angeles.275 
 
Admittedly Waldron does not seem to intend for this characterization to extend to those from 
displaced cultures, and he certainly does not justify such historical practices as displacement. 
                                                          
275 Jeremy Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 101. 
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Yet Waldron believes that the contemporary “collapse of the Herderian argument based on 
distinctively human need [for immersion in traditional cultural life] seriously undercuts any claim 
that minority cultures might have to special support or assistance or to extraordinary provision 
or forbearance.”276 Other critics who are not as resistant to other aspects of group rights 
nonetheless believe that many forms of support for aboriginal cultures, to stick with Waldron’s 
example, preserve the “conservative” elements in the culture and do no such thing as preserve 
its organic form; cultures have always changed with times (which is very much Waldron’s point) 
and cultural groups have always had subversive elements within them that facilitate their 
evolution. In addition to his making a case of this sort, Chandran Kukathas also argues that 
group membership changes far too frequently for a group remedy to be either coherent or 
desirable.277 My account will indirectly respond to Kukathas’s argument. 
 I hope that, at least in the case of group cultures in decline due to historical injustices 
and violence, it is clear why a portion of Waldron’s Disneyland analogy cannot support a general 
claim that we ought not subsidize cultural preservation. Admittedly Waldron’s sense of “ought 
not” is at least as much a claim about futility or fiscal responsibility as it is a claim about moral 
obligations, but either way of understanding his metaphor invites a straightforward reply. 
Insofar as it is a claim about what is or is not owed to traditional cultures, then, at least in the 
case of forcibly displaced cultures like many American Indian tribes, whether or not the 
remnants of that culture are unsustainably living against the grain of the modern world is 
immaterial to whether there is a historical injustice that can or should be remedied. Insofar as it 
is a claim about what is futile, this is what could rightly be called a truism or self-fulfilling 
prophecy. For various displaced American Indian tribes, for example, there is an important 
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277 See his “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory, Vol. 20 (1992), 105-39. 
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difference from them and a religious community that is “dying out because its members are 
drifting away, no longer convinced by its theology or attracted to its ceremonies[.]”278 
Traditional tribal cultures declined in the first instance not because their beliefs were rationally 
unsustainable or unpopular in that age, but because the “way of the world” involved their 
forcible removal, assimilation, and other acts of violence. The basis for recognizing group rights, 
which might include some form of assistance, in these areas is the idea that such cultures ought 
be given an equal opportunity for cultural survival as those who were not subject to the same 
degree of wide-scale cultural violence.  
 The variety of objections from Waldron and Kukathas might be more apt, but still 
contentious, for those who are somewhat disfavored in a given society, but were not oppressed 
in the forcible and widespread manner that many of the indigenous populations of North 
America were. This is arguably the case, for instance, where the Quebecois make their claims for 
making French the compulsory language in courts, in the workplace, and in various other public 
contexts. Because English is and has historically been dominant throughout the rest of Canada,  
many Quebecois feel that they must and ought to have the opportunity to create a life 
organized around the French language and Quebecois culture. The Canadian government has, in 
many respects obliged, as evidenced in the numerous French Language Laws that attach to 
language use in Quebecois workplaces and courts. Groups might similarly demand other acts of 
public support or state-sanctioned measures aimed at preserving or expressing the value of 
minority cultures. For my present purposes, however, I need not make a thorough case for this 
latter category of equal opportunity claims. 
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2. Group Rights as Extensions of Free Exercise and Self-Determination 
 The more fundamental moral basis for group rights – insofar as it doesn’t rely on a 
showing of historical injustice and encompasses a wide array of groups – is that a recognition of 
group rights is a natural extension of what can be framed as every person’s right to: free 
exercise of religion, determination of one’s identity, or pursuing a conception of the good 
(among numerous other possible formulations). For many cultural and religious traditions, one’s 
deepest normative commitments are to a community, or involve goods that are only 
participatory or inevitably bound up with the wellbeing of institutions or communal practices. 
Pasternak’s account, which is also based on a corporate conception of group rights, begins from 
a similar justification:  
[M]any religions and religious practices have a collective nature: they revolve around 
organized structures, or institutions, that have a distinct and autonomous identity over 
time (e.g., the Church). Without those institutions, their followers’ individual right to 
freedom of religion would become meaningless. It therefore follows that these 
institutions are entitled to moral protections that would allow them to maintain their 
autonomous identity (for example, protections from state interference). Thus, ‘the 
individual right to freedom of religion presupposes the fulfillment of certain collective 
interests of religious collectivities.’279 
 
Making the right to free exercise or the right to self-determination of one’s identity meaningful, 
whichever right or bundle of rights one takes to be at issue, requires the scope of rights to 
extend to those who are committed to such groups or communal practices.280 As the passage 
from Pasternak above reflects, this collective dimension to free exercise or a more general right 
                                                          
279 Pasternak, “From Corporate Moral Rights to Corporate Moral Agency,” 146. 
280 While I will elaborate further on this point in specifically defending the corporate conception, it is 
significant that group rights are understood as belonging to certain of these “institutions” (which might be 
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“role provider” in exercising or fulfilling individual rights.  Because I recognize that this “role provider” 
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argument, I will reserve it for the following section. 
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to self-determination, will often take a negative form, commonly as a religious exemption or a 
right to self-governance (unless, as explained above, there is a reason of historical injustice or 
equal opportunity that demands some affirmative provision). This importantly includes, for 
group members, control over their “cultural integrity” and, particularly where the cultural or 
religious life is intertwined with other spheres of the group’s life, the “right to control their 
economic, cultural, and social development.”281 While innumerable examples of this reasoning 
can be offered, a commonly discussed example is a group’s right to educate its own children in 
accordance with its own beliefs and practices, such as in the cases of various Amish community 
schools or the Kiryas Joel Hasidium community’s separate school district in Brooklyn, New 
York.282   
 Justifications of group rights based on self-determination are more readily invoked by 
groups of all sorts than the previous, equal opportunity-based arguments for group rights. This 
should not be surprising, as individual freedoms of conscience have never been tempered by a 
failure to show past injustice; prior privilege does not limit one’s claims to freedom, even if it 
might limit one’s claims regarding state support pursuant for that freedom.283 As with societal 
cultures seeking to preserve their traditional ways of life, business entities often seek latitude to 
pursue their conception of the good in accordance with a (typically) lawful purpose (recall 
Kymlicka’s idea of external protection). They will also seek to enforce a code of conduct or 
demand certain qualifications of their members (Kymlicka’s notion of internal protection).  
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282 Ingram, “Between Political Liberalism and Postnational Cosmopolitanism,” 378.  
283 Regarding this latter point, a Hawaiian cultural minority might have a stronger claim regarding state 
funding for a museum devoted to Polynesian culture (such as the Bishop museum on Oahu) than a 
Protestant group would for a museum detailing the history of its church. 
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These self-determination interests have been highly contested in recent years by 
religious corporate entities. First, in response to what they perceive as external threats, 
businesses have sought religious exemptions to laws that purportedly prevent them from 
conducting their affairs pursuant to their religion mission or religious principles. This was the 
case in Hobby Lobby, where three companies (Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel) that were 
each closely-held by religiously devout families, sought an exemption under an HHS regulation 
(pursuant to the Affordable Care Act) that required large employers to include twenty different 
forms of contraception in their employees’ health insurance coverage. Each of these three 
companies’ decision-makers had, since their inception and through various media, including in 
their companies’ prior statements, the desire to conduct business according to their deeply-held 
religious beliefs.  The Evangelical Christianity of the Hobby Lobby and Mardel shareholders, and 
the Mennonite faith of Conestoga owners, included beliefs that human life begins at conception 
and that it is a sin to end it. Consequently, pursuant to what was also in essence (like the 
previously described indigenous populations) a claimed right of self-determination regarding 
their corporate ethos, they refused to cover four of the twenty forms of contraception included 
in the HHS regulation.  Second, various groups have hired or fired employees in such a way that 
it would be considered discriminatory in other contexts. This might occur where, for instance, a 
parochial school wishes to fire or discipline an instructor for behaving what it sees as un-
biblically. Such cases involve what is often called the ministerial exemption for religious 
organizations.284  
In short, those making these or numerous other free exercise or self-determination 
claims might include companies like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood Specialties, The Jewish 
                                                          
284 For a reason and oft-discussed application of this doctrine, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
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Community Center, various religious schools, etc. But such a justificatory line need not even be 
limited to religious entities: it is also common for non-religious, yet morally convicted entities, 
such as politically active nonprofits, charities, and legal aid organizations to have a strong 
interest in pursuing a determinate mission and to have all of its members support, or at least act 
consistently, with that mission statement. That not all members of these entities agree with the 
organization’s decision should not make the prospect of group-based conscience rights 
incoherent. Just as indigenous groups are diversely structured, various voluntary organizations 
might (e.g., in their Articles of Incorporation, advertising, or their public mission statement) 
operate under varied decision procedures, pursuant to which specified agents are said to govern 
or act on behalf of the corporate entity itself. By no means is this a claim that all corporate 
assertions of self-determination are identical to those of indigenous populations or that all 
assertions of self-determination are equally valid. Instead, I wish to simply make clear that this 
putative ground for group rights gives a wide array of groups a stake in whether a conception of 
group rights is desirable or coherent. 
Notwithstanding my discussion of participatory goods, some critics of group rights levy 
broad objections that (a) Denying that group rights are articulable as anything other than an 
aggregation of individual rights of association or freedom of expression,285 or that (b) Even if 
they were conceptually distinct, they wouldn’t cohere with a system of individual rights like 
ours.286 I will respond to (b) after introducing my conception. Michael Hartney grounds much of 
his argument in category (a) on the following observation about the nature of communities’ 
values, which he develops into a claim about their rights: “There may be collective dimensions 
                                                          
285 See Michael Hartney, “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights,” in The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 202-227.  
286 James Graff, “Human Rights, Peoples, and the Right to Self-Determination,” in Group Rights, ed. Judith 
Baker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 186-23. 
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to the value of communities—some of their benefits may be publicly available to their members 
and some of these benefits may be participatory—but the community has no value other than 
its contribution to the successful lives of its members.”287 This is a variety of value individualism, 
which generally provides that “only the lives of individual human beings have ultimate value, 
and collective entities derive their value from their contribution to the lives of individual human 
beings,”288 as opposed to “value collectivism,” which holds that groups can have value 
independent of their contribution to the well-being of individual human beings.289 For example, 
though surely enjoyment of an orchestra by its members is participatory (and perhaps non-
participatory for, say, a spectator), participation does not change the fact that the continued 
existence of the orchestra ceases to be a good for an individual musician once it no longer 
contributes to his wellbeing, yet might well remain valuable to those who remain members. 
Moreover, for an orchestra or any other group, Hartney claims that its existence ceases to have 
any cognizable value once it is contrary to the wellbeing of the majority of its members.  
Given his claim about the purportedly severable values a community holds for the 
individual members of a community, Hartney concludes that any moral rights to participatory 
goods (or any other goods that are said to be exercisable only in concert with others) are 
themselves severable. Though we require others to exercise the freedom of association, it is an 
individual that can be prevented from associating with others; even though its exercise requires 
others, we would say in this case that an individual right is violated.290 Just as the participatory 
                                                          
287 Hartney, “Some Confusions,” 208. I will to some extent agree with Hartney in the conception that I offer 
in Section B, but will argue that a supervenience relationship between members and group does not 
preclude the value or meaningfulness of a corporate conception of group rights. 
288 Id., 206. 
289 Id., 207. 
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nature of certain goods doesn’t prove that there exists an interest over and above those 
individual interests of its members, so it is where rights pertaining to such goods are involved.291 
As I would characterize Hartney’s argument, he moves from a supervenience claim to a 
reductive conclusion: because the flourishing of the group and any purported rights it could hold 
depends on contributions to members’ wellbeing, and ceases wherever it no longer so 
contributes,  group rights are no more than the members’ interests. What I will offer 
momentarily is a conception of group rights that can affirm some form of the supervenience 
claim while rejecting the reductive conclusion. 
Denise Reaume has responded to Hartney’s objection in part by wondering what 
Hartney hopes to gain through our speaking of rights as being held by an aggregated or 
severable collectivity of individual persons, rather than held by an entity itself. Reaume finds it 
significant, as do I, that the group entity itself is understandable as “that which is constituted by 
the rules that identify its members and determine what shall count as its actions.”292 In other 
words, rules of group agency and decision-making suffice to render speaking of a group as rights 
holder, or as an entity that can flourish or not, as meaningful concepts. Suppose that the 
individual who has left Hartney’s orchestra is Phil, a disgruntled flautist. Though Hartney is right 
that we can easily see how Phil’s interest is severable from that of the orchestra, as is every 
other musician-member’s, we might note what doesn’t change when Phil leaves: the conditions 
                                                          
291 Other common justifications for group rights would seem to provide further evidence for Hartney’s 
claim, including arguments from proponents of corporate conceptions of group rights. While this is 
sometimes framed as its own ground for group rights, groups are often regarded as supplying the 
necessary context for individual self-respect. Membership in a culture, as David Ingram summarizes 
Kymlicka’s position, “affects our very sense of identity and capacity insofar as it is ‘the context within which 
we choose our ends, and come to see their value, and this is a precondition of self-respect, of the sense 
that one’s ends are worth pursuing.”  
292 Denise Reaume, “The Group Right to Linguistic Security: Whose Right, What Duties?” in Group Rights, 
ed. Judith Baker, 118-141, at 124 (emphasis supplied). 
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for the orchestra’s flourishing remain the same, the orchestra’s interest in having a competent 
flautist still varies with the composition being performed, and the orchestra’s interest in keeping 
its property from being damaged (perhaps by a now-trespassing Phil) is not any less than it was 
before Phil left, even though it had one more member then. It will be those authorized to act on 
behalf of the orchestra who will hire a new flautist. For similar reasons, Jones, despite favoring 
the collective conception of group rights, recognizes that a corporate conception is much more 
capable of explaining a group’s various domains of resilience to changes in membership.293 
What is (I think) the more fundamental flaw that Reaume identifies is Hartney’s unfounded 
assumption that the same ambiguity he finds in notions of a collectivity’s distinct value (and 
hence, its distinct rights) do not also inhere in his notions of individual interests; just as we have 
rules for determining group rights, so too do we have rules for determining whether an exercise 
of individual agency has taken place. As such, even if this supervenience relationship exists, it is 
sensible and concrete to speak of group rights. 
What I offer in the following section is more than a counterproposal about which 
manner of speaking (i.e., aggregated individuals or groups themselves) about rights is more 
conceptually precise or expedient, which is to some extent what the exchange between Hartney 
and Reaume remains. I will now turn to my conception of group rights that, like Reaume’s 
account, seeks to recognize a supervenience relationship (between group and member rights) 
yet maintain that there is both concreteness and value in holding group rights separately. 
Beyond a point of mere ontological navel-gazing (as Walt & Schwartzman would have it), 
however, I believe the criteria I discuss are morally desirable, insofar as they give sufficient 
                                                          
293 See Peter Jones, “Group Rights,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 
2016 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/rights-group/. 
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weight to those rights that are exercisable only through collectives, yet set sufficient guidelines 
so as to not allow the group rights form to be manipulated. 
B. Two Criteria for Supervenient Group Rights: A Corporate Moral Mind and a Shared 
History 
 
 The framework for group rights I will describe in this section has three features: 
supervenience without reduction, a corporate moral mind, and a shared history. Much like 
frameworks proposed by Jeff Spinner-Halev and Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz,294 I do not 
propose these criteria in a binary fashion (i.e., that a group need always clearly have them or 
not), nor as the only relevant considerations in determining whether a valid group right exists.295 
Instead, I encourage them as indicators of the precedential coherence of an asserted group right 
and as having important political value in giving the appropriate weight to the distinct claims of 
collectives or, as others would frame it, to claims of individuals who derive central value or core 
identity from their membership in collectives. In this sense, I hope to at least partially respond 
to the meta-objection mentioned in the introduction regarding the import of discussing the 
possibility and mechanics of rights-holding entities. I am also especially concerned here with 
addressing what I described as ad hoc objections, which are those that worry about group rights 
running amok over fundamental rights of individuals and the government. 
1. Group Rights as Non-Reducible yet Supervenient 
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the mistakes of arguments against group rights 
like Hartney’s is to move too quickly from a claim about supervenience to one about reduction. 
Much like Dwight Newman, I believe that a species of value-individualism is consistent with a 
                                                          
294 See Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, “National Self-Determination,” in The Rights of Minority Cultures, 
ed. Will Kymlicka, 79-92. 
295 For instance, it is consistent with approaches focusing on the moral preconditions for group rights, such 
as Spinner-Halev’s chosen criteria of “land, culture, and justice.” 
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corporate conception of group rights (i.e., one that does not reduce them to those individual 
rights of their members). In making the concession of value-individualism to Hartney, however, I 
am conceding supervenience in only a weak sense. If there were a group that either did not 
contribute to the flourishing of any of its members, or whose members suddenly left, I concede 
that it would no longer be sensible to speak of group possessing moral rights,296 much less 
asserting them against a corresponding duty holder. Hartney makes stronger supervenience 
claims, however, that I am not prepared to concede, such as the claim that group rights 
extinguish at the point that a majority of the group’s members would be better served by the 
group’s no longer existing. While I am arguing against eliminitavism of any sort about groups, I 
will remain agnostic for my present purposes between List & Petit’s realism about group agents 
and fictionalism about such agents. In any event, group rights are consistent with a 
supervenience condition in two senses: (1) Group flourishing and individual flourishing can have 
separable conditions, and (2) Groups can be understood as having role provider rights for the 
individuals they benefit.   
First, as I briefly mentioned in responding to Hartney’s orchestra in the previous section, the 
conditions for a group’s flourishing and an individual member’s flourishing are distinct, and can 
either overlap or be at odds. If the group at issue is a corporate entity or a self-governing 
people, then we would expect these conditions to be laid out in one or more founding 
documents, such as articles of incorporation, a constitution, or a mission statement. The 
flourishing conditions also might be simply intuitive, such as in Newman’s example of a hockey 
team that belongs to a competitive hockey league comprised of other teams. Presumably the 
goal of hockey teams (both in Newman’s example and elsewhere) is to simply win and, if there is 
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rights. 
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through some other means an established company culture, there might be additional 
flourishing conditions: maintaining ties to the community, behaving respectably on and off the 
ice, or promoting a culture of camaraderie among its members. Newman’s analysis of the 
relationship between the interests of a hockey team, the Iglooville Icewizards, and a 
hypothetical team member, Bob, is worth quoting at length:  
They eagerly await the freezing of the local pond, the only place they can play. Suppose 
also that Bob has no other use for the frozen pond except insofar as it gives the 
Iglooville Icewizards a chance to play. In the circumstances, in the absence of the other 
team members, he would have nothing to do with a frozen pond but gaze at it 
plaintively and wish he had a team with whom to play hockey. Yet the Iglooville 
Icewizards, the collectivity composed of Bob and a number of others, does have a 
collective interest in having a frozen pond available, because the frozen pond's 
availability contributes toward the continued flourishing of this collectivity. We might 
then speak of Bob having an interest in the pond freezing, but we would have to do so 
only in a derivative sense. Bob has such an interest only insofar as it is mediated through 
the community of the hockey team; he has no such interest individually without the 
Iglooville Icewizards. In other words, the collective interest is primary.297 
 
Supposing that Bob would have no distinct, individual interest in skating on the pond absent the 
opportunity to play for the Icewizards, Newman concludes that “Bob has an individual interest 
in the flourishing of the hockey team, and the flourishing hockey team has a collective interest 
in the availability of the ice rink.”298 As with Hartney’s orchestra, I would add that Bob’s 
throwing down his stick and gloves, suddenly stricken with hate for the game of hockey, would 
do nothing to alter this team interest. Moreover, the hockey team’s collective interest would 
not change in nature if it lost and acquired a fundamentally new roster and new coaching staff 
                                                          
297 Dwight Newman, “Collective Interests and Collective Rights,” 149. It is worth noting that a common 
terminological confusion might arise in Newman’s passage, as Jones has similarly noted. Though Newman 
refers here to a “collective” interest, he does not mean what I have called an aggregative interest; his 
argument is for the hockey team itself having an interest in the pond freezing. This possession by the entity 
itself is, as a reminder, what I have been calling a “corporate” conception of group rights. 
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overnight. Most importantly, all that has been said regarding a collective interest would be 
equally true of the Icewizards’ collective right to access the ice rink if the ice rink’s owner had a 
corresponding duty (such as a prior promise) to provide it. 
 As a further illustration of the analytic precision that speaking of a group’s distinct 
flourishing conditions might afford us, it is meaningful and helpful (when making difficult moral 
choices) to speak of the group’s interests in the face of various conflicts with individual 
members. Phil the Flautist might have an individual interest in becoming an oboist, and Bob 
(supposing he plays left wing) might have an individual interest in playing goalie. But the hockey 
team and orchestra each have the optimal group members in those positions based on their 
collective flourishing conditions (that is to say, they already have top-notch oboists and goalies). 
Leaving aside the possibility that Phil and Bob are mistaken about their own well-being (perhaps 
acting for the best of the group contributes to their own interests), the collective interests of the 
orchestra and the Icewizards can remain unscathed by these conflicts. This distinction is even 
meaningful if each of the members has an individual interest that is contrary to the collective 
flourishing conditions; suppose another Icewizard, Fred, is fine with his assigned position on the 
team, but wants the team to hold fewer weekly practices, and that the oboist, Maria, is 
interested in the orchestra’s playing progressive rock rather than what she considers that tired 
old stuff. It is perfectly meaningful, and morally appropriate, for us to conclude that the hockey 
team or orchestra that hired or is otherwise counting on Fred or Maria have a morally-grounded 
right to their fulfilling their duties. Finally, Fred and Maria could also each get over their 
grievances by changing their minds or deciding that the group’s flourishing are of greater value 
to them than their conflicting, individual interests. What I intend these various interest conflicts 
to illustrate is that both groups, like tribes or corporations, can and do possess meaningful, 
static flourishing conditions in the face of fluid individual interests (or individual flourishing 
173 
 
conditions).299 Denying a corporate interest, and any corresponding corporate right, in such 
cases would render the duties and rights that attach to hockey or orchestral activities 
unmanageably fluid, such that doing so would frustrate the value that any individuals obtain 
from collectivizing (some of which were summarized in the preceding section). 
 As mentioned earlier, even my weak supervenience condition must admit of some limit 
on the distinct flourishing (or perhaps wellbeing) conditions for individual members and the 
group. If there is no one left like Bob, i.e., no one at all who has an interest or corresponding 
right in the hockey team’s flourishing, we might wonder what the group flourishing conditions 
are (at that point) other than an intellectual curiosity. Put more succinctly, we might well 
wonder in what sense they remain moral. It is on this point that I am in partial agreement with 
Hartney, as I would place the burden on the value-collectivist (of which Miodrag Jovanovic and 
van Dyke are examples300) to articulate the intrinsic value of a group without members. While 
Newman’s most complete statement on the subject embraces a more resolute form of value-
individualism,301 the same work in which he discusses the Icewizards includes a claim that a 
church without members would retain some collective interests. This would seem to be an 
outright denial of any supervenience relationship without some clarification. More precisely, 
Newman claims that a church which lost all of its members would still be morally wronged if the 
government were to come in and begin rewriting all of the church’s doctrine or appropriated 
the now-memberless church’s name; the church would retain some residual rights, which 
Newman recognizes “might” extinguish them.  
                                                          
299 This is not to deny that group interests could themselves be dynamic in other circumstances. 
300 Out of these two, only Jovanovic explicitly embraces value-collectivism (see his Collective Rights: A Legal 
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), but van Dyke’s most influential work (see his The Individual, 
the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory) makes a case for the intrinsic value of groups, which 
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301 See generally Dwight Newman, Community and Collective Rights. 
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 There is something deeply intuitive about Newman’s claim that either of the 
government’s actions are a violation of some interest beyond simply being a waste of 
government resources. Nonetheless, while it is not clear whether this is already what Newman 
had in mind, I submit that any individual right is only articulable only insofar as it supervenes on 
some other agent. Even in a church without members, this remains possible. It might be said 
that prospective or future members of the church have sufficient interests to explain why the 
government’s actions are unsettling. It might also be the case that, as is true of the hockey team 
or orchestra, non-members have some rights pertaining to the church. Religious (and possibly 
non-religious) citizens who belong to religious groups, or who might wish to, have an interest 
(on something like Establishment Clause grounds) in the government not denigrating 
collectivities or religious convictions. Absent either of these or similar categories of interests, 
however, it is not at all clear that a residual right remains. Even within these examples, it is not 
clear that this would constitute a right belonging to the church itself. Thus, at least for the 
flourishing conditions of a church to give rise to a group right of conscience, it must contribute 
to at least some person’s flourishing.  
 Second, in addition to this idea of distinct flourishing conditions, a group whose 
interests and rights are supervenient on those of its members are nonetheless distinct insofar as 
the group is properly considered a role provider. As an illustration, Pasternak gives an example 
of various parental rights: a parent’s right to make choices regarding her child’s education is one 
that she has the capacity to exercise, and that the child does not, but it is also one that is 
grounded in the child’s own interests.302 If it is correct that corporate entities fulfill some role to 
members, non-members, or both – and both Hartney and I would agree that they do – then it 
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(as role provider) has a capacity as role provider, an interest in fulfilling this role, and, 
oftentimes, a valid claim of non-interference with its role fulfillment. Such a right might also 
arise where a social worker or other government official is obstructed in providing a public 
service. But consistent with the weak supervenience condition I have allowed, the collective 
does not grant itself a role sua sponte, nor does it persist in this role (at least insofar as it has a 
right to do so) without any reference to present or potential human interests. To describe how a 
group can be understood as acquiring a role or flourishing conditions, I turn to the two criteria 
for coherent group rights that I endorse. 
2. A Corporate Mind as Authorized Alignment-Agency 
 Some of the more publicly visible objections to the notion that a group can claim rights 
of conscience (such as a right to free exercise or culture) are essentially denials that groups can 
possess the requisite moral agency to do so.303 This is often because, so such positions go, 
groups lack the requisite capacities for moral agency of the kind demanded for freedoms of 
conscience. Given the weak supervenience condition, however, I will explain why a group’s not 
possessing such capacities is not a defeater to its meaningfully exercising rights of conscience, 
and why such rights (where valid) ought to be honored, so long as a group can be said to speak 
on behalf of its members. As Pasternak summarizes List & Petit’s influential position, there is a 
meaningful sense in which individuals who decide to collectivize can imbue the group with 
“beliefs” and “desires” that can be different from “what some or even all group members desire 
and believe.”304 Thus, the group with the requisite decision procedure has a “mind of its own,” 
which “supervenes upon, but is autonomous to, the mind of its individual members.”305 I will 
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largely adopt elements of Shorten’s306 and Pasternak’s criteria for such a decision procedure, 
but offer one significant point of departure. 
The first of the capacities that is arguably necessary for moral agency, which corporate 
entities are said to lack, is something like sentience, for rights violations are wrong insofar as 
they make an individual suffer, feel disrespect, or otherwise harm his or her interests. The 
second of these capacities involve those qualities that attend means-end reasoning, including 
the capacity for deliberating, forming desires, and making consistent decisions pursuant to 
those desires. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby, levied such an 
objection, echoing Justice Stevens’s claim that corporations “have no consciences, no beliefs, no 
feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”307 Though Ginsburg emphasized the distinction between non-
profit religious organizations, on the one hand, and Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, on the other, 
the (possibly unintended) implication was either that (a) a lack of sentience or motivations is a 
disqualifying feature of conscience-based group rights, or (b) given this distinction, that 
conscience-based group rights are only coherent on an aggregative conception of group rights, 
where all of the members share the same, pertinent conviction. If any such implications were 
intended, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens would find plenty of company in the group rights 
literature. Walt & Schwartzman, for instance, criticize the corporate agency component of the 
majority in Hobby Lobby on substantially similar grounds.308 
                                                          
306 See Andrew Shorten, “Are There Rights to Institutional Exemptions?” Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 6 
(2015): 242-63. 
307 Hobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). 
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Some types of groups, various commentators (including realists about group agency) 
admit, do sometimes have difficulty satisfying these conditions,309 particularly under an 
aggregative conception of group agency. Several of them, the most influential of which are List 
& Petit, demonstrate at length how aggregated preferences of group agents fall prey to 
inconsistencies that are analogous to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. List & Petit call such 
problems the “discursive dilemma.”310 Though a complete exposition of this problem would be 
unwieldy for my limited purpose here (to demonstrate paradigmatic group irrationality), 
Shorten provides a succinct demonstration of this phenomenon that is worth reciting because of 
its proximity to my subject matter. Shorten asks us to imagine that three employees of an 
adoption agency are asked the three following questions: (a) Is the ethos of our adoption agency 
Catholic? (b) Should Catholic adoption agencies place children with homosexual couples?, and 
(c) Should our adoption agency place children with homosexual couples? If we were to impute 
to the adoption agency the aggregated majority opinions of the three employees on each 
question, each of whom offered differing yet internally coherent responses, the following could 
be the plainly irrational result: The ethos of our adoption agency is Catholic, Catholic adoption 
agencies should not place children with homosexual couples, but our adoption agency should 
place children with homosexual couples.311 Thus, as this and various other examples can 
illustrate, a group with a democratic decision procedure and some disagreement about its ethos 
can disqualify it as a moral agent and, consequently, disqualify it as a potential rights-bearer 
(including in Pasternak’s role-holder conception of rights).We can easily imagine factors that 
contribute to other, perhaps greater forms of decisional inconsistency or irrationality. This is 
                                                          
309 In addition to Shorten, see Christian List & Philip Pettit, Group Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2011).  
310 Christian List & Philip Pettit, Group Agency, 45-6. 
311 See Shorten, “Are There Rights to Institutional Exemptions?”, 255-6; for similar examples regarding a 
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often the case where there is disagreement about decision-making authority, such as who or 
what determines the group’s ethos, or where a group’s membership is diffuse (as might be the 
case for globally distributed religious, ethnic, or linguistic groups, or certain multinational 
organizations).  
Notwithstanding these obstacles, varied organizations can satisfy the conditions of 
moral agency, provided that a group’s authorized decision-makers consistently articulate its 
judgments, preferences, goals, etc.312 Since articulating moral judgments requires judgments 
about what is “good” or “bad” for the group, a group with the proper decision-making authority 
can possess what Pasternak analogizes to the “two moral powers” that Rawls imputes to 
individual citizens: “First, they have a capacity for normative reasoning, and they are able to 
regulate their conduct in accordance with good moral reasons. Second, they have a capacity to 
conceive their own good and pursue it.”313  In order to properly exhibit these two moral powers, 
as we have seen, a group would have to avoid the degree of inconsistency that Shorten’s 
example illustrates. As such, since we ought not presume intentionality in a group as easily as 
we do an individual citizen, a group must possess both (a) alignment agency, pursuant to which 
the group can be said to have a view about its ethos and the connection of that ethos to its 
structure or purpose; and (b) decision agency, pursuant to which an authorized representative 
adopts a policy that ensures that its ethos, structure, and purpose are in alignment.314 Suppose 
that in a private school, for example, instead of an aggregation of individual interests, there are 
representatives authorized (by the members’ consent) to exercise both of these forms of agency 
on the entity’s behalf. Such representatives can stipulate that the ethos of the school is Catholic, 
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that its purpose is to provide students with an education that honors the principles of the 
Catholic faith, and that hiring atheist teachers would run contrary to its purpose and ethos. In 
such a case, pursuant to Pasternak’s and Shorten’s overlapping criteria, the Catholic school can 
be said to “have an interest” in not hiring atheist teachers, even if other officials or the majority 
of parents at the school would have it otherwise.  
Though I largely subscribe to Shorten’s criteria for what counts as an adequate decision-
making procedure to give rise to group agency, my point of departure from his otherwise 
elegant and widely applicable account arises from a qualification on alignment agency that 
arises in his discussion of Hobby Lobby. A group no longer possesses the requisite consistency in 
moral reasoning to communicate a group interest, and hence the possibility of claiming a group 
right, Shorten appears to argue, where they “achieve alignment agency by unreasonably 
excluding some potential members.”315 Shorten contends that this is just what happened when 
Hobby Lobby (and presumably Conestoga and Mardel) based its alignment agency claim on the 
Green family’s religious views: 
Certainly, they were capable of exercising alignment-agency, since they were able to 
convince the court that the Affordable Care Act would disrupt the alignment of the 
structure and ethos of their firm. However, another group also has interests in the 
structure of Hobby Lobby, namely its employees, considered collectively. Had this group 
shared the views of the Green family about the alignment of structure and ethos, then 
the normative grounds for extending an exemption would have been stronger than a 
claim based solely on the views of the Green family. Correspondingly, the exclusion of 
the employees from alignment-agency would arguably undermine the normative force 
of the exemption claim, despite the firm being owned by the Green family.316 
 
There are several features of this view that are puzzling, such as the unelaborated claim that the 
employees are a separate “group” with an interest in the company’s “structure.” What is 
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significant for my purposes is Shorten’s unexplained presumption that a hierarchical alignment-
agency would deprive the corporate entity of adequate rational capacity for group agency, or at 
least would undermine it. Up until this point, Shorten’s discussion of group agency is analogous 
to what Lon Fuller calls the “internal morality of law,” or rather, the procedural requirements 
that permit us to recognize a body of rulemaking as law.317 Morally objectionable laws (such as 
those in Nazi Germany) failed to be laws in this “internal morality” sense by their ad hoc, 
inconsistent nature and their not being posted publicly, rather than by their substantive moral 
repugnance. Similarly, Shorten’s conception of alignment- and decision-agency did not suggest 
that some democracy in either form of agency was a prerequisite (or even material) to a group’s 
rational consistency. It is entirely coherent to suggest that the Green family (perhaps together 
with likeminded executives), pursuant to their founding corporate documents, act as the 
alignment- and decision-agents for Hobby Lobby’s policies. We can extend this claim to groups 
generally; people (including numerous religious, ethnic, and cultural minorities), as I have 
argued elsewhere, freely choose to join groups that operate hierarchical or pursuant to decision 
procedures (or even more clearly, substantive moral values) with which we disagree. That they 
do so, however, is immaterial to whether they have satisfied the rational agency conditions for a 
cognizable group interest. Stated succinctly, my point of departure is to include no requirement 
of a democratic decision procedure regarding the group’s ethos to render the entity itself a 
moral agent. 
 On this conception, were we to deny that Hobby Lobby or Conestoga had a group right, 
it could not be because, supposing that the Greens and the Hahns were (as founders) the 
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authorized decision-makers for their respective companies’ ethos, either company failed to 
satisfy the rationality condition of group agency. But, as I stated in the introduction, satisfying 
the conditions for group agency and a prima facie group interest need not work as an automatic 
trump on an individual right or a compelling government interest. Thus, while the statement of 
corporate rights-bearing set forth in Hobby Lobby is consistent with my conception of group 
rights, this does not foreclose the possibility that certain moral side-constraints318 (such as the 
necessity of making contraceptives widely available to employees of large companies) outweigh 
the assertion of a prima facie cognizable group interest in self-determination. Given that there 
are many different sorts of groups, however, and our limitations on the notion of group agency 
might have unintended consequences regarding other groups, we ought to be careful with 
confusing the moral validity with structural prerequisites.  
3. The Idea of a Shared History 
 The second of the two criteria that I propose as necessary for group rights of 
conscience, which is complementary to the first, is that its members must have what I will call a 
shared history. This concept will remain somewhat vague in my brief description of it here and 
will vary in its evidentiary requirements depending on the type of group (e.g., voluntary or 
ascriptive) at issue. By a shared history, I mean that, prior to the group’s rights assertion, there is 
a preexisting period (how long will depend on the nature of the group right) during which: (a) all 
of those group members that give it what Shorten calls alignment agency and decision agency 
share a common moral or religious conviction, (b) all group members either recognized or did 
not publicly act inconsistently with that conviction without group censure, and (c) all members 
                                                          
318 Here I intend the Nozickian use of “side-constraints” as set forth in Anarchy, State and Utopia (reprint 
ed.) (New  York: Basic Books, 2013).  
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of the group bear some means of mutual recognition towards one another.319 The purpose of 
this criterion, like the first, is to give adequate space in our moral and legal framework to those 
who collectivize, but to avoid tilting the rights-distribution balance too far in favor of religious, 
moral, or cultural collectives, as might be the case in a conception of group rights with a lower 
evidentiary bar.  
 My motivation for including shared history as a second criterion for group rights harkens 
back to anthropologist Michael Brown’s summary of an Australian case involving an indigenous 
group, the Ngarrindjeri, that sought to enjoin the government’s construction of a bridge 
connecting a small island (Hindmarsh Island) to the Australian mainland, each of which were 
proximate to lands that they had purportedly inhabited throughout their long history.320 Though 
the Ngarrindjeri had not lived on Hindmarsh since 1910, and there was no evidence of 
Hindmarsh religious activities there, they and Aboriginal rights advocacy groups claimed that 
there was secret ritual knowledge, known only to select senior women within the group, in 
which Hindmarsh played a central role. Thus, their advocates argued that “construction of the 
bridge would so thoroughly violate the religious principles of Ngarrindjeri women that it 
endangered the foundations of their cosmology and values.”321 Notwithstanding a report by one 
anthropologist that detailed, among other things, certain fertility rituals that purportedly took 
place at Hindmarsh, prior ethnographies and even reports of numerous respected Ngarrindjeri 
women themselves indicated that the purported ritualistic role of Hindmarsh was either a 
fabrication or supported by no evidence whatsoever.  
                                                          
319 This inquiry is a close cousin of judicial inquiries into the sincerity of a religious belief under RFRA. 
320 Michael Brown, Who Owns Native Culture?, 173-5. 
321 Id., p. 175. 
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 The position that Brown takes regarding the Hindmarsh controversy, as I will 
characterize it, explains what I am after in my shared history criterion. Assuming away the 
contradicting evidence from the culture itself (which would fail as a group right under my first 
criterion), Brown’s position is that a group right such as that involving the Hindmarsh cannot 
exist where: (1) there is an absence of evidence of prior conduct supporting the religious or 
cultural right, and (2) the supporting evidence adduced in support of a group right to sacred land 
preservation relies excessively on the radical alterity and secretive nature of the purported 
group interest.322 Brown generalizes his position regarding group rights (without specifically 
mentioning this concept), proposing that we give “actual practice” or “demonstrable social 
behavior” greater evidentiary credence than mere assertion of belief, particularly where the 
presence or absence of an attendant practice contradicts a mere assertion or third-party report 
of a belief.323 There is no such evidentiary gap between belief and practice in numerous other 
sacred land cases, including in Lyng, Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009), Wyoming 
Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004), cert denied 126 S. Ct. 330 
(2005), and the Zuni Pueblo pilgrimage controversy that Brown also discusses. An idea of shared 
history that is generalizable across group types need not include a demonstration of so deep a 
historical lineage as indigenous cases involving sacred land do. What is revelatory about these 
cases is that some ex ante “demonstrable social behavior” or something like “joint conduct 
pursuant to belief” is cross-culturally meaningful and a reasonable mechanism for rooting out ad 
hoc claims. After all, as Brown explains with regard to Hindmarsh and another dubious sacred 
land case he discusses, there are often ample material or other, ulterior incentives (than 
                                                          
322 Id., p. 189-90 
323 Id., p. 191 
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religious or cultural beliefs) for those seeking group rights in the form of exemptions or 
support.324 
 While the idea of a “shared history” is more readily cognizable in the case of a religious, 
ethnic, or linguistic minority groups, we might locate numerous analogues in the case of 
business entities. I have already suggested one possible source of ex ante “demonstrable social 
behavior”: founding documents, mission or value statements, press releases, position 
statements, or other initial documentation of company values. It might also be demonstrable 
through a series of more informal mechanisms, such as a history of managerial conduct or, more 
broadly, prior exercise of what Shorten calls decision-agency. In the case of a non-profit, this 
might include a demonstrable history of the particular causes (or cases) to which it devotes its 
time, and those that it avoids. Finally, at least insofar as we are speaking strictly of moral rights, 
inquiries into shared history might require corporate veil piercing: in the case of closely-held 
corporations, it might be helpful to supplement a vague statement of an underlying religious or 
cultural mission to what the entity’s authorized agents intended (though this by itself would be 
insufficient evidence of shared history). 
 The necessity of both criteria to be sufficiently responsive to ad hoc worries can be seen 
in reference to Hobby Lobby and other cases similarly involving a claim for a religious exemption 
from a generally applicable law. If our conception of group rights did not include the alignment-
agency prerequisite to a group’s having the requisite corporate mind, then various agents of a 
group could assert (for instance) religious exemptions on an as-needed basis.325 Moreover, 
                                                          
324 Brown discusses, for instance, cases in which corporate entities approach indigenous populations about 
financial incentives for opening casinos if they pursue the sought-after land on sacred grounds. 
325 We might imagine a large, multinational corporation simply getting into the practice of asserting all of 
the actual or potential religious or moral convictions of its members, employees, and affiliates to obtain 
maximum religious exemption coverage. 
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asserted group interests and attendant group rights within the same group would be more 
frequently contradictory with one another. If any meaningful group rights can arise from 
participatory goods, such as self-governance, an authorized agent must exist to render them 
coherent. Even if the Green or Hahn family satisfied the rationality criterion for group rights, 
such that they could make a prima facie case for a corporate religious exemption, however, the 
shared history criterion is aimed at preventing assertions of group rights as cost-saving 
measures. This is admittedly as much a criterion concerning practice as it is about the 
conceptual coherence of group rights. In the wake of Hobby Lobby, critics might worry that 
numerous other employers might wish to avoid ACA regulations, or that non-employers groups 
might similarly wish to invoke religious exemptions as soon as it suits their interests. The shared 
history criterion is meant to temper such concerns, pursuant to what is a cross-cultural inquiry 
into a group’s sincerely-held normative commitments.  
C. Conclusion and a Future Direction: Considering Groups as Bargaining Units 
 What I hope to have offered in the foregoing is a preliminary (in the sense that its 
application requires further development) framework for group rights that makes two 
contributions to the expansive, but increasingly relevant literature on the topic. First, it 
supplements or clarifies some of the existing accounts of the corporate understanding of group 
rights insofar as such conceptions are thought to be unwieldy or necessarily divorced from real 
persons who deserve our moral concern. Second, it brings much-needed attention to the 
potential impact on our moral understanding or consequent legal framework of our conclusions 
about the rights of one group type on others. I must also reemphasize that the latter point is not 
meant to imply that a monolithic conception or an identical conceptual treatment of various 
types of groups or collectives is feasible or desirable. Yet, if Dworkin was at least partially correct 
that lawmaking is an interpretive task, i.e., that our task is to cull from our framework internally 
186 
 
consistent principles, then we have some interest in further developing theories of agency and 
rights that can cohere across group types. This is particularly true for those who, like me, wish to 
ensure that the balance of principles accord equal weight between those whose deepest 
normative commitments demand collectivization and those who live in accordance with more 
individualist worldviews. Aside from this interest, however, I will close by briefly describing how 
the treatment of groups as I have defined them can contribute to political theory in a broader 
sense.  
Beyond my providing a conception of group rights that is both fair to those whose lives 
are more oriented towards life in and with a community and less vulnerable to ad hoc concerns 
about collectives, I also submit that groups are worth exploring as bargaining units within social 
contract theory. Elsewhere, I have expressed doubts about Rawlsian liberalism’s ability to 
account for the actual (not circumscribed by ideal theory) religious and moral pluralism among 
autonomous and cooperative citizens. If the original position truly is meant to provide a 
democratic framework that is inclusive and worldview-neutral, then it must be maximally 
responsive to the deepest normative commitments of its constituents. I have argued that 
certain segments of free exercise jurisprudence in the United States, which have much in 
common with public reason liberalism, cast doubt on whether it can. Moreover, I have argued 
that a many iterations of Rawlsian social contract theory, in attempts to ensure respect for all 
individual citizens and maintain social stability, unjustifiably exclude and attempt to root out 
various comprehensive doctrines (and, obviously, the citizens who live by them) over time. My 
interest in pursuing a conception of group rights is because a treatment of groups as rights-
holders might help shore up certain of these shortcomings, as there remains much to admire 
and salvage in Rawlsian liberalism. 
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Bargaining theories of social contract, particularly the version Ryan Muldoon has 
recently proposed, might do the sort of inclusive work to which I am referring.326 A bargaining 
theory, unlike a consensus theory of political legitimacy, does not require that the bargainers 
share terribly many perspectival elements in common. The essence of Muldoon’s proposal is 
well-summarized by his analogy to how transactions proceed in a Chinese market:  
When I negotiate the price of a shirt…I do not have to share many political values with 
my counterpart: we just have to find a price such that she finds it to be at least equal to 
her valuation of the shirt, and I find it no more than equal to my valuation of the shirt. In 
fact, my counterpart and I barely need to have a common language beyond the 
numeracy and some display of agreement or disagreement…Most importantly, we do 
not have a to have a common system of justification, even though we are typically able 
to find an agreement…I can seek to better understand the needs of my counterpart so I 
might be able to better determine her reserve price, and she likewise can do the same 
with me, but in these cases we aren’t finding an outside standard, but instead we are 
attempting to better understand each other’s standards. Each party must be convinced 
on his or her own terms.327 
 
Much of the appeal that Muldoon sees in such a shift closely aligns with the two vulnerabilities 
of Rawlsian liberalism that I have argued for elsewhere; once a public, political perspective is 
chosen, it might deprive religious or cultural minorities of a publicly admissible vocabulary to 
even articulate the nature of their complaint.328  
What I have explored in this essay is a conception of group rights that might head off 
this sort of problem, as the Rawlsian liberal’s rights conception is better suited to those who live 
                                                          
326 Certain aspects of Muldoon’s social contract theory are consistent with a model of public reason, the 
convergence model of public reason, that has been developed by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier (for 
instance, see their “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity,” Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, Vol. 35 (2009): 51-76). Public reason proposals have to do with the requisite justification that 
proponents of a legal or political measure must make for it to be democratically legitimate. Thus, future 
work will explore whether a convergence model of public reason is an optimal theory of public justification 
within a broader bargaining model for the social contract.  
327 Muldoon, Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World, 69. 
328 See id., 64-5. 
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in Waldron’s cosmopolitan life than those who collectivize in non-mainstream ways. While 
Muldoon’s work does not explicitly address the group rights/interests/agency conversation to 
which this discussion largely belongs, one of his illustrations of his bargaining model at work in 
the real world involves just the sorts of groups I have in mind. In Belgium, what I have called 
group-differentiated rights are more prevalent on the grounds that “cultural groups have 
interests in different sets of rights.”329 Muldoon accounts for this difference, as his bargaining 
model would suggest, in economic terms: “If a right is such that there are costs incurred for 
providing it to the marginal individual, then it is reasonable to only supply the right to those that 
want it at least as much as the marginal cost.”330 In my prior discussions of American Indian 
tribes seeking special permissions or temporary exclusion rights on lands they consider sacred, I 
have suggested a similar solution: Those tribes wishing to exclude others from (publicly owned) 
sacred lands during their ritual uses of it must, in some other domain, be willing to engage in 
forbearances of their own where other groups’ or individuals’ deep normative commitments are 
at stake.331 It might also have some applicability in the numerous and proliferating debates 
concerning religious exemptions to generally applicable laws, such as in cases like Hobby 
Lobby.332 According to some, of course, bargaining is just how the contours of various rights are 
produced anyway, but this is not the predominant understanding of constitutional political 
theory. 
Two of the obvious, overlapping difficulties with a bargaining approach to rights are the 
high transaction costs that come with institutional applications of such a proposal and the 
                                                          
329 Id., 75 
330  Id.  
331 Here I must express my indebtedness to Paul Salamanca for a similar suggestion, putting the matter 
(much like Muldoon) in Coasean terms, and suggesting that tribes seeking special privileges or powers 
might “pay” for it as proof of the land use’s value to them. 
332 Some would argue this sort of bargain is already present in the HHS regulation, since it allows employers 
who do not wish to cover the contraceptives at issue to instead simply pay employees higher wages. 
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consequent risk of making various public, political measures almost prohibitively difficult.333 This 
would be especially true if, on a broad scale for a wide array of issues, any individual or ad hoc 
group were to be the bargaining unit.334 Thus, one potential advantage of the group rights 
framework I have outlined here is that, if one found the inclusivity of a bargaining model morally 
or democratically laudable, but pragmatically unworkable in light of other public values, then 
using groups as bargaining units (wherever bargaining turns out to be desirable) might help 
alleviate such pragmatic concerns. This would, of course, need to be supplemented by accounts 
of moral constraints on the possible menu of group rights and the conditions of bargaining.335 I 
hope it will suffice to reiterate for now, however, my suspicion that Rawls was headed in this 
direction as he increasingly recognized the need, in order to attain the well-ordered society that 
he and countless other political theorists are after, to engage the myriad subgroups within each 
society. This is far from an impractical quibble about entities some have called metaphysically 
spooky or ontologically irrelevant. Instead, parsing the structure and capacities of groups and 
communities is a necessary step in determining just how the state ought to balance its 
obligations to individual citizens, who live as such, and to the nearly countless others who live 
and deeply identify with their encompassing collectives. 
 
                                                          
333 Muldoon’s discussion of Belgium suggests that the Belgian model recognizes this to some degree, as the 
rights of cultural and linguistic minorities are negotiated by communities and localities rather than the 
Federal government (see id.). 
334 This worry has been expressed on numerous occasions in free exercise jurisprudence, such as in Bowen 
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
335 The most prominent of these is the problem, briefly mentioned in the introduction, of minorities within 
minorities, i.e., how we balance granting groups broad freedoms of self-determination without allowing 
them to oppress their members. At a minimum, the state must limit a group’s freedom of internal self-
governance to the extent that a group makes it prohibitively difficult for any individual member to exit life 
in the group. This is a sufficiently complicated issue with its own expansive literature, however, that I did 
not attempt to resolve it here, other than to note that these limitations should be understood as side-
constraints rather than defeaters to the coherence of a group right. 
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